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Abstract
This thesis presents the implications of using a risk-informed licensing framework to
inform the design of Sodium Fast Reactors. NUREG-1860, more commonly known as the
Technology Neutral Framework (TNF), is a risk-informed licensing process drafted by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. The TNF
determines the acceptability of accident sequences by examining the 9 51h percentile estimate of
both the frequency and quantity of radioactive material release and compares this value to
predetermined limits on a Frequency-Consequence Curve. In order to apply this framework, two
generic pool type sodium reactors, one using metal fuel and one using oxide fuel, were modeled
in RELAP5-3D in order to determine the transient response of reactors to unprotected transient
overpower and unprotected loss of flow events. Important transient characteristics, such as the
reactivity coefficients, were treated as random variables which determine the success or failure
of surviving the transient. In this context, success is defined as the cladding remaining intact and
the avoidance of sodium boiling. In order to avoid running an excessive amount of simulations,
the epistemic uncertainties around the random variables are sampled using importance sampling.
For metallic fuel, the rate of fuel/cladding eutectic formation has typically been modeled
as an Arrhenius process which depends only on the temperature of the fuel/cladding interface.
Between the 1960s and the 1990s, numerous experiments have been conducted which indicate
that the rate of fuel/cladding eutectic formation is more complex, depending upon fuel/cladding
interfacial temperature, fuel constituents (uranium metal or uranium zirconium), cladding type
(stainless steel 316, D9 or HT9), linear power, plutonium enrichment and burnup. This thesis
improves the modeling accuracy of eutectic formation through the application of multivariable
regression using a database of fuel/cladding eutectic experiments and determines that the
remaining uncertainty governing the rate of eutectic formation should not significantly affect the
frequency of cladding failure for tested cladding options.
ii
The general conclusion from this thesis is that when using NUREG-1860 to license metal
or oxide fueled SFRs, it is steady state, not transient, cladding considerations which control
optimal operating temperature, currently corresponding to an approximate core outlet
temperature of 5500C. Metallic cores traditionally have been designed with core outlet
temperatures of 51 00C and increasing this temperature to 550'C may decrease the busbar cost by
19% when combined with the adoption of a Supercritical-C0 2 power conversion cycle, reduced
containment requirements, and Printed Circuit Heat Exchangers. While both fuel types will be
shown to meet the NUREG-1860 requirements, the frequency of radiation release for
unprotected loss of flow and unprotected transient overpower events for metallic fuel has been
shown to be orders of magnitude lower than for oxide fuel.
Thesis Supervisor: Neil E. Todreas
Professor Emeritus
MIT Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Thesis Reader: Michael J. Driscoll
Professor Emeritus
MIT Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering
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I INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a product of work conducted for the project "Risk-Informed
Balancing of Safety, Non-Proliferation, and Economics for the Sodium-Cooled Fast
Reactor (SFR)" supported by the US Department of Energy under a NERI contract (DE-
FG07-07ID14888). The premise of this project is that, while Sodium Fast Reactors have
many promising characteristics when compared to Light Water Reactors (LWRs), SFRs
are typically deemed more expensive, and thus cost prohibitive. It was believed that risk-
information may be able to reduce unnecessary conservatism incorporated into existing
SFR designs, most likely due to lack of knowledge about, or a deterministic approach to,
reactor safety. Over the course of this project, NUREG-1860 (1), a theoretical risk-
informed licensing structure produced by the Office of Regulatory Research in the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, was adopted to provide guidance in determining what
design alternatives would, or would not, be acceptable from a regulatory perspective.
This thesis focuses on three aspects of risk-informing the SFR: what, if any, may
be the design implications of choosing either a metal or oxide fuel form, how much can
the busbar electricity cost be reduced by maximizing thermodynamic efficiency and how
should modeling of the rate of metallic fuel/cladding eutectic formation be improved to
take into account the approximately 30 years of experimental work in this area.
1.1 Sodium Fast Reactors Overview
Sodium reactors have many design alternatives which should be considered
during cost reduction analysis. These design alternatives can be changes to the plant
layout which significantly affect capital cost, such as whether to adopt a loop or a pool
design, changes which affect core design, such as using oxide or metal fuel forms or the
inclusion of Self Actuated Shutdown Systems (SASS). (2). In fact, many proposed SFR
have multiple core designs to allow flexibility in fuel design or primary mission, such as
producing electricity or burning long-lived actinides (3) (4).
I
The primary difference between loop and pool reactors is that loop reactors place
the primary system pump and intermediate heat exchanger outside of the reactor vessel
which requires more piping, thus increasing the potential for sodium leaks, but allow for
a smaller vessel diameter (5). The smaller vessel diameter results in lower primary
sodium inventory that can be used for emergency cooling but saves in capital cost.
Sodium reactor designs often rely on passive safety to provide an extra layer of
protection against severe accidents. While passive systems do not have to be externally
activated like active systems, the uncertainties surrounding passive response require large
safety margins to safely mitigate an accident. Provisions of these large margins may
constrain the economic viability of reactors that rely fully on passive systems, especially
if inherent shutdown from reactivity feedbacks is required in anticipated transients
without scram.
The US efforts to create a commercial sodium reactor have evolved in approach
and design between the 1970s and present day. The first major commercial reactor
licensing project undertaken was Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR), which was a
loop-type SFR with oxide fuel. This design attempted to mirror LWR designs which were
constructed during CRBR's design phase. Substantial regulatory effort was expended
responding to intervenor's insistence that Hypothetical Core Destructive Accidents
(HCDAs) be considered as part of the design basis of CRBR. The NRC Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board (ASLB) eventually excluded HCDAs from the licensing basis, with
the NRC staff stating:
It is our current position that the probability of core melt and disruptive accidents can and
must be reduced to a sufficiently low level to justify their exclusion from the design basis
accident spectrum.
After CRBR was canceled after cost overruns and licensing delays in 1983, the DOE
embarked on the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) program in 1984. This program emphasized
a pool type reactor concept that would avoid some of the regulatory hurdles which
impeded CRBR. After an initial design competition between the PRISM (GE) and SAFR
(Rockwell) reactor concepts, with both designs submitting Preliminary Safety Evaluation
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Reports (PSER) to the NRC in 1986, the GE-led PRISM reactor became the focus of the
IFR program in 1988. After becoming the focus of the IFR, PRISM plant design was
renamed the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR), while the core maintained the
PRISM designation (6). After the ALMR program ended, GE changed the plant design
name back to PRISM. When GE decided to uprate the thermal power level to 1000MWth
(circa 1999), they renamed the plant design S-PRISM. After stopping work on S-PRISM
in 2003, in 2005 GE resumed work but changed the name of the plant back to PRISM (7).
Many individual SFR designs were considered as reference designs for detailed
analysis. The primary SFR designs examined were Argonne's 1000MWth Advanced
Burner Reactor (ABR-1000), GE's Super Power Reactor Inherently Safe Module (S-
PRISM), the Japan Atomic Energy Agency's (JAEA) Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor
(JSFR), and the Russian BN1800. Table 1 summarizes key parameters of the different
designs. Of the full scale power reactors, the S-PRISM reactor is unique due to its
emphasis on modularity. The S-PRISM chose a relatively small power/modular design to
reduce the construction time. By building reactors in two-unit power blocks, the cost of
the plant can be distributed over a longer period of time while some revenue from the
plant can be generated before the entire power block is built (5) (2).
The JSFR is much larger than the S-PRISM reactor and uses its loop design to
emphasize passive cooling of the high power core. All of the JSFR's decay heat removal
systems are approximately 38 meters above the core to ensure natural circulation and the
pressure. drop across the core was kept to 0.2MPa (3). The JSFR also has many designs
depending on desired fuel type, fuel inventory, and desired outlet temperature.
Unfortunately, the lack of a PRA or detailed design data on the JSFR limited the transient
analysis in this thesis to pool type reactors, such as the ABR-1000 and S-PRISM.
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Table 1- Current Sodium Reactor Parameters (2) (8) (9) (10)
Parameter ABR-1000 S-PRISM JSFR BN1800
Power 1000MWt/ 1000MWt/ 3570MWth/ 4000MWth/
Level 95MWe 38OMWe 1500MWe 1800MWe
Inlet/Outlet 355C/510 0C 371 C/510 C 3950C/550 0 C 410 0 C/5750CTemp
Fuel U-TRU-ZR Metal or Oxide Oxide or Metal Nitride
Cladding HT-9 HT9M ODS N/A
Pool/Loop Loop Pool Loop Pool
A reference design was established based on a small, pool-type design with
metallic fuel, a reinforced concrete containment, and seismic isolation (horizontal
accelerations). This design is similar to the ANL ABR-1000 design (8) (11). Key to the
evaluation of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs) in NUREG-1860, a.k.a. the Technology
Neutral Framework (TNF), is a level 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), but PRAs
for commercial power reactors were only available for PRISM (Level 3) and ALMR
(Level 1).' The ALMR PRA is an evolution of the PRISM PRA, both describing medium
sized pool type reactors with Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) as the
primary decay heat removal system. In order to evaluate design alternatives, a
computational model of the reactor was required. This model needed detailed design
information (e.g., core inlet flow distributions, orificing schemes, reactivity coefficients,
etc.) which is not available in the open literature for the PRISM or ALMR designs. As a
result, a generic pool type SFR was modeled in RELAP5-3D and SAS4a but with the
general features of the ANL 1000MWth Advanced Burner Reactor, ABR-1000. This
design has a PWR-type containment, both Direct Reactor Auxiliary Cooling (DRAC) and
Primary Reactor Auxiliary Cooling (PRAC) emergency decay heat removal system, does
not incorporate the Gas Expansion Modules (GEMS) system, and does not include other
advanced Self Actuated Shutdown Systems (SASS). Insights were obtained from the
1 A level 1 PRA stops at core damage. A level 3 PRA extends to offsite consequences.
4
PRAs but without greater design detail it was not possible to assign specific frequency
estimates to specific accident scenarios for the reference design. The ability of a design
variation to satisfy the TNF criteria was evaluated in a semi-quantitative manner.
1.2 Historical SFR Licensing
The current US SFR licensing knowledge has come about from the Clinch River
Breeder Reactor (CRBR) and the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) program
interactions with the NRC. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Department of Energy
attempted to license CRBR but Congress cut funding before a construction permit was
issued by the NRC. While core disruptive accidents (CDAs) were not considered as part
of the design basis for CRBR, accidents which could lead to CDAs, including
unprotected accidents and large break loss of coolant accidents, took a large amount of
regulatory attention which prolonged the licensing process. No construction permit was
issued for CRBR, but the CRBR licensing process did result in a NRC Safety Evaluation
Report in 1983, NUREG-0968. (Ivans, 2006) In order to avoid CRBR's experience with
CDAs, the ALMR design incorporated more passive safety measures into the PRISM
core design. Under the ALMR program, the DOE submitted a Preliminary Safety
Information Document (PSID) to the NRC in 1986 and the NRC in turn issued a
Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report (PSER) in 1994. While the incorporation of passive
safety features succeeded in reducing some of the regulatory concern with CDAs, to
satisfy defense-in-depth the NRC still forced changes to the ALMR including the
addition of an ultimate shutdown system and containment dome (6).
The NRC staff used a risk-informed approach for accident selection for the
ALMR. They divided accident sequences into four Event Categories (EC I through EC
IV) based on the initiating frequency of each sequence. Each EC's requirements were
then generally related to requirements assigned to LWR accident classifications. For
example, sequences in EC I had initiating frequencies greater than 102 /yr and their
requirements corresponded to Anticipated Operational Occurrences in LWRs. Accidents
categorized in EC II have initiating frequencies ranging from 10 2/yr to 104 /yr and
defined the design basis accidents for the reactor. These accidents were analyzed with
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conservative assumptions, (e.g., all parameters at their 2-sigma values) and any
components used in the analysis were held to safety grade standards. The primary
performance requirement for EC II accidents was to avoid any core damage, typically by
setting conservative limits for failure metrics (e.g., cladding damage fractions must
remain less than 0.2, coolant temperatures must remain below their boiling point).
Accidents in EC III extended over the next two orders of magnitude, 10-4/yr to 10-61yr,
and constituted the Beyond Design Basis Accidents. Core damage was allowed for EC III
sequences but radioactive materials had to be contained in the primary system. EC IV
sequences constituted all accidents having a frequency of less than 10-6/yr and had no
direct parallel with LWR accident groupings, but were used to define containment
requirements. For example, an Energetic Core Disruptive Accident induced a break in
the reactor vessel head was used to determine the ALMR, and later S-PRISM,
containment pressure requirements. (8) (6)
While the NRC attempted to align accidents with their ECs using initiating
frequencies, there was also a deterministic classification scheme that occasionally
conflicted with the frequency classification. For example, unprotected accidents, or
accidents where the Reactor Protection System (RPS) fails, were classified as EC III,
because the deterministic definition for EC III is the failure of two major safety systems
(8). This classification was in conflict with the frequency definition for EC III, between
10-4/yr to 10-6/yr, because the RPS has a point estimate unreliability of 10-7/demand.
Major safety systems should have an unreliability of less than 10-/yr, theoretically
pushing all unprotected accidents into EC IV. These discrepancies were not resolved
before funding was cut to the ALMR program in 1994. (6)
1.3 Metal and Oxide Fuel Overview
Most current reactor designs have core layouts for both metal and oxide fuels.
Metal fuels have higher thermal conductivity and allow for higher heavy metal loading
than oxide fuels. Unfortunately, metallic fuels also have relatively low melting point and
uranium, plutonium, and rare earth fission products from metallic fuel form an eutectic
with the iron in the stainless steel cladding leading to cladding thinning, which limits
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cladding temperatures to lower values than oxide fuels. Limited operational experience
exists for metallic fuels when compared to oxide fuel. Thus most reactor designs have an
oxide core option until metallic fuels are fully qualified for power generation (8).
For the purpose of this thesis, two generic pool type sodium reactors, one using
metal fuel and one using oxide fuel, were modeled in RELAP5-3D in order to determine
the comparative transient response of reactors with these two fuels to various licensing
basis events. In order to compare the probabilities of failure between these fuels,
important transient characteristics, such as the reactivity coefficients, were treated as
random variables which determine the success or failure of the survival of the transient.
In this context, success is defined as the simulation maintains cladding integrity and
avoids sodium boiling.
1.4 Thermodynamic Efficiency Overview
Increasing plant thermal efficiency is the most effective way to reduce the per
megawatt cost of the SFR. Every component of the busbar cost of a nuclear reactor
(capital, fuel, and operation and maintenance) is inversely proportional to the plant
thermal efficiency. Eq. 1.1, from the Gas Fast Reactor (GFR) report (12), approximates
the busbar electricity costs of generic nuclear plant as:
#1I 100F 1000
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where # is the fixed charge rate in %/yr, I is the capital cost in $, )7 is the cycle efficiency
in percent, L is the average capacity factor, Q is the plant power rating in kWth, B is the
burnup in MWD/kgHM, and F is the lifetime levelized fuel cost in $/kg. From the
relations above, Eq. 1.2 can be derived, which shows that:
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Assuming a starting efficiency of 40%, which is typical for SFRs, a 1% efficiency
increase will result in a fractional efficiency increase of 2.5% (0.01/0.4). Capital, fuel,
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and O&M costs all decrease proportionally with efficiency increases as can be seen in
Eq. 2, resulting in a busbar decrease of 2.5%. No other factor in Eq. I. 1 affects all of the
components of busbar cost in this manner.
1.5 Fuel/Clad Eutectic Overview
Many U.S. SFR designs utilize binary or ternary metallic fuel with stainless steel
cladding (13). At high temperatures, iron from the cladding will diffuse into the fuel, and
uranium, plutonium and rare earth fission products from the fuel will diffuse into the
cladding to form a low melting point fuel/cladding eutectic. The erosion of the cladding
due to this eutectic formation may accelerate creep rupture, thus allowing the radioactive
fission products to escape into the sodium coolant. Accurate modeling of this
phenomenon may be important to making the SFR more economically competitive, but
currently the eutectic formation rate is predicted using only the temperature of the
fuel/cladding interface. This thesis improves the modeling accuracy of eutectic formation
through the application of a multivariable linear regression with model uncertainty
distributions.
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is primarily designed to support the Case Studies of the final NERI
report, specifically Sections V.2 and V.3. Chapter II of this thesis overviews the
methodologies employed in support of the:
* Metal and oxide fuel comparison in Chapter III (Section V.2 in the NERI report),
o Transient response characteristics of TRansUranic (TRU)-bearing metal and
oxide driver fuels in beyond-design-basis scenarios
o Liquidus steady state limit for U-19Pu-1OZr
e Thermodynamic efficiency evaluations in Chapter IV (Section V.3 in the NERI
report),
o Elevating core outlet temperatures,
o Removing the intermediate loop,
o Changing to a compact heat exchanger design,
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o Changing from a Rankine cycle to a Supercritical-C0 2 power conversion
cycle.
* Rate of fuel/cladding eutectic formation modeling in Chapter V (no corresponding
Section in the NERI report).
o Consolidation of fuel/cladding eutectic experiments,
o Improving model accuracy using multivariable regression,
o Quantitatively evaluating the residual uncertainty in both existing and new
predictive relationships.
In the methodology section, the titles of the subsections which describe
methodologies used in the creation of the final NERI report will have the corresponding
report section number in the section title. Thus II. 1 Evaluating Design Alternatives
(NERI Report Sections V.2, V.3) indicates that section 11.1 was used in the analysis of
case studies V.2 and V.3 of the NERI report.
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II METHODOLOGY
The following section describes the methodologies used to create probabilistic
models and risk-inform design alternatives for the sodium fast reactors. These methods
include:
1. Evaluating Design Alternatives - A process evaluating of the acceptability of
design alternatives, including how the Technology Neutral Framework can be
utilized to determine safety criteria,
2. Semi-Statistical Method for Determining Steady State Peak Cladding
Temperature - A process for incorporating overlapping deterministic with
statistical hot channel factors in order to set an upper bound on the likely peak or
mid-wall cladding temperature.
3. RELAP5 SFR Model Overview - The primary system of the medium sized
(1000MWth) pool type SFR RELAP5-3D model used in transient analysis is
briefly overviewed, with a more complete description of the model found in
Appendix B,
4. Uncertainty Propagation via RELAP - The code package BEAGLE, which
produces, runs and post-processes a predetermined number of stochastic RELAP
simulations,
5. Evaluating Failure Probabilities with Non-Integer Evidence - A method for
evaluating the 95th percentile of importance sampled simulations such as those
produce by BEAGLE,
6. Multivariable Linear Regression - A technique use to improve the modeling
accuracy of the predicate relationship multiple dependant variables,
7. Model Uncertainty - A technique in which verification data is used to create a
probabilistic distribution around a model output through the code MUTT.
11.1 Evaluating Design Alternatives (NERI Report Sections V.2, V.3)
In order to determine the optimal design alternatives, a consistent approach was
needed to screen and compare potential design options. First, a method for using the
Technology Neutral Framework to screen the safety acceptability of a design will be
discussed. Next, the Elliot decision diagram will be discussed, which screens each design
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alternative for required safety and proliferation resistance standards before ranking them
based on their economic merit.
II.1.A Technology Neutral Framework
The TNF is a theoretical regulatory structure drafted by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's Office of Research (1). It is designed to provide more flexibility in the
licensing process since current regulations focus almost exclusively on Light Water
Reactor designs. By moving the licensing process into frequency-consequence space,
regulations can be formed around limiting the public's risk to radiation exposure, as
opposed to prescriptive regulations on one type of reactor's parameters. One of the
TNF's unique features is that sequences with either a release frequencies less than a mean
threshold frequency of 10-8/yr, or a 9 5th percentile below less than 107 /yr, can be
screened from the design basis.
The TNF functions by grouping accidents of similar phenomenology together.
Within each group, the 95 percentile of the highest frequency of radiological release is
combined with the 9 5 th percentile of the highest dose to form the Licensing Basis Event
(LBE). This LBE is then plotted on the Frequency-Consequence Curve (FCC), as
illustrated in Figure 1. If the LBE falls within the acceptable region, the group response
to the sequence is considered acceptable. Figure 2 shows the justifications for the dose
limit on the FCC given in NUREG-1860.
During the analysis of LBEs, any system or component that is credited in the
analysis is considered a safety grade component. Since most systems on the power
conversion side of the plant are not safety grade, they are considered failed once the LBE
is initiated, thus turning all LBEs into loss of heat sink accidents. Two internal LBEs are
considered in this thesis: Transient OverPower (TOP) and Loss Of Flow (LOF).
External LBEs, such as earthquakes, are not considered here but may prove to be
the most limiting constraint in the TNF. Very little evidence exists for earthquakes with a
return period of 10 5 /yr- 1 0 7 /yr causing large uncertainties in the predicted magnitudes. It
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is conceivable that designing any structure to handle the 95th percentile earthquake in this
frequency range would be cost prohibitive (14).
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Figure 1 - Frequency-Consequence Curve (1).
Finally, it should be noted that while the TNF incorporates many risk-based
concepts, pillars of traditional regulatory structure, such as defense in depth, are still
required. For example, while a reactor design may not require containment under the
FCC, some form of containment is still required to satisfy defense in depth, although it
may not need to be as large or robust as LWR containments.
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Figure 2- Frequency-Consequence Curve with Dose Justifications (1)
II.1.B Elliot Design Alternative Evaluation Decision Process
In order to ensure that any design modifications, such as increasing the core outlet
temperature, satisfy non-proliferation and safety goals, it is proposed that all design
modifications go through the decision process shown on the map in Figure 3. First, the
original design must pass through the decision map to ensure that all licensing basis
events meet the TNF safety requirements, and that the design meets the proliferation
resistance goals. If the original design fails either of these checks, then alternatives must
be examined which will allow the design to satisfy the screening boxes in Figure 3. Once
the base design satisfies these criteria, then the design alternatives can be evaluated to
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reduce the cost of the reactor. Currently, several cost saving design alternatives are being
studied, including:
e Metal or Oxide driver fuel,
* Increasing the core outlet temperature,
e Moving to a S-C02 power conversion cycle,
" Removing the Intermediate-Loop,
e Reducing containment requirements.
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Figure 3- Elliot Design Alternative Decision Process
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In order to satisfy the FCC, both the 95th percentile of the frequency and
magnitude of radioactive material release are required. Calculation of radioactivity
release can be difficult, but for low probability accidents where the frequency of core
damage is below the FCC frequency threshold there is no release limit. Radiation releases
corresponding to levels which would fall within the unacceptable region, (e.g., releases
exceeding approximately 100 rem) at low probabilities typically would only arise after
severe core damage. Thus, if the core damage frequency can be established to be below
the threshold frequency, the system response is considered acceptable without dose
calculations. If this requirement is too stringent or would cause the designer to add
systems, thus increasing costs, then dose estimates will be required for the associated end
states of those sequences. The optimal configuration of design parameters can be selected
through the following procedure:
1. Determine the 95 percentile of the frequency of radiation release for the most
limiting LBE.
2. Adjust the core outlet temperature and add or remove redundant safety features
until the radiation release frequency and magnitude is within the acceptable
region of the FCC.
3. Check to ensure that the changes to the reactor configuration did not
inadvertently place LBEs, which originally had lower failure probabilities, above
the FCC curve. If so, repeat Part 2 with the new limiting accident group.
11.2 Semi-Statistical Method for Determining Steady State Peak Cladding Temperature
(V.2, V.3)
As the first barrier to radioactive material release, fuel cladding must be operated
at temperatures which will allow for highly reliable performance, especially against creep
and eutectic deformations. Due to approximations used in analysis or natural fluctuations
in the state of the reactor, the cladding temperature calculated through a best estimate
analysis is not conservative. Thus, operation of the cladding at the recommended
temperature limit without incorporating safety factors may lead to unreliable cladding
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performance (15) (16). Figure 4 shows the semi-statistical hot channel factor method
which will be used to calculate steady state peak cladding temperature in this thesis.
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Figure 4 Graphical Representation of the Semi-Statistical Hot Channel Factor
Methodology (16)
Table 2 and Table 3 show the direct and statistical uncertainties that will
determine the cladding temperature for a given outlet temperature. These uncertainties
are the same for metal and oxide fuel, with the exception that metal fuel does not have
pellet-clad eccentricity after I to 2 atom % burnup due to gap closure as a result of fuel
swelling (Vilim, 1985). The direct uncertainties are applied to the nominal temperature
rise in the jth component in the hot channel, where j represents either the coolant, film, or
clad, by multiplying the hot channel factor from the ith source, fij, to the temperature rise
in the j'h component, as in Eq.II.1.
k
ATdir = ATn fij
i=1
I1.1
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Table 2 - Metal and Oxide Fuel Direct Uncertainties (f1,) for a I OOOMWth Liquid Metal
Reactor Core (15).
Source of Uncertainty
Measurement
Reactor physics models
Control rod banking
Interassembly flow distribution
Intraassembly flow distribution
Pellet cladding eccentricity
Cladding circumferential
temperatures distribution
Cladding conductivity and thickness
Total
Coolant
Temperature Rise
1.06
1.02
1.02
1.03
Film
Temperature Rise
1.06
1.02
1.006
1.14
1.8
1.14 2.23
Clad MW
Temoerature Rise
1.06
1.02
1.14
0.8
1.05
1.04
Table 3- Metal and Oxide Fuel Statistical Uncertainties (f 13"-) for
Metal Reactor Core (15).
a lOOOMWth Liquid
Source of Uncertainty
Fissile fuel distribution
Nuclear data
Balance of plant
Loop temperature imbalance
Interassembly flow distribution
Intraassembly flow distribution
Subchannel flow area
Wire wrap orientation
Coolant properties
Film heat transfer coefficient
Pellet cladding eccentricity
Coolant
Temperature Rise
1.052
1.02
1.14
1
1.05
1.058
1.01
1
1.013
Film
Temperature Rise
1.052
1.02
Clad MW
Temperature Rise
1.052
1.02
1.005
1.12
1.174 1.174
Statistical uncertainties are treated differently than direct uncertainties. The
temperature rise due to statistical uncertainty is calculated for each component of the hot
channel, with direct uncertainties included, and each horizontal row is added until
reaching the component of interest, in this case to the cladding mid-wall (MW in Table 2
and Table 3). The mid-wall temperature controls thermal creep in the cladding and thus is
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Temperature Rise
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of interest in this analysis. Because the cladding temperature is the limiting parameter
governing core outlet temperature for oxide and metal fuel within the core, all
components up to the cladding mid-wall, spanning the coolant, film and cladding
temperature rises for a given source of uncertainty, are added horizontally. This
horizontal addition ensures that a random fluctuation in the expected fissile fuel
distribution, for example, will lead to a corresponding fluctuation in the coolant, film, and
cladding. If these values were added in a root-mean-square manner, then a fluctuation in
a given value will affect each component differently, which is not a physical result. Next,
the horizontal sum for each source of uncertainty is added in a root-mean-square manner
to calculate the overall statistical uncertainty. This method is shown by Eq.II.2 and
Eq.II.3 (16). It should again be noted that the pellet cladding eccentricity was removed
from the metallic hot channel factor because the metal fuel quickly expands until it
touches the clad, removing this eccentricity that is found in a ceramic fuel design (15).
3
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k
AT 3aTot. Clad MW - (AT 3 )2 11.3
The statistical cladding temperature rise is then added to the direct cladding
temperature to determine the total peak cladding temperature. Because the horizontal
procedure only uses the temperature rise within components and not the temperature of
the component, the inlet temperature can be moved independently of the modeled
uncertainties to increase outlet temperature without changing the total hot channel factor.
Eventually, pushing the operating temperature too hot will increase these uncertainties,
but, due to limited information, this analysis assumes any changes in the hot channel
factors are minimal at the core outlet temperatures of interest.
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11.3 RELAP5 SFR Model Overview (V.2, V.3)
For transient analysis in this thesis, a RELAP5-3D (17) model is used to predict a
typical SFR's behavior during postulated LBEs. A model metal fuel was developed as a
subchannel analysis code by Matthew Memmott and was modified to predict SFR
transient response based on a 0.7 Conversion Ratio 1000 MWth metal fueled pool type
reactor modeled after the ABR-1000 (18) (8). This model does not include any advanced
safety features such as Gas Expansion Modules or Curie Point Latches and is designed to
determine generic SFR responses to potential LBEs, up to sodium boiling. To ensure a
conservative analysis, all reactor parameters, such as reactivity coefficients and plenum
pressures, are modeled at their end of cycle conditions. One of the design alternatives
analyzed was the adoption of oxide fuel instead of metal fuel, thus an oxide fuel RELAP
model was required. For the oxide core, the metal fuel in the RELAP5-3D model was
replaced by oxide fuel as defined by the oxide fuel ABR-1000 design (8). The only
change made to the RELAP5-3D model outside the core when converting the metal fuel
model to an oxide fuel model was that the pump coast-down halving time was increased
from 4 seconds in the metal reactor to 20 seconds in the oxide reactor.
In order to analyze the effects of increasing the core outlet temperature on
transient response, the base case RELAP5-3D results are calculated for an average core
outlet temperature of 5101 C. The core is assumed to have a radial core peaking factor of
1.22 for hot channel calculations. This core peaking factor equates to peak channel outlet
temperatures of 530"C after appropriate core orificing schemes are implemented.
RELAP5-3D does not have an internal cladding failure model. In order to predict
cladding deformation and failure due to a combination of thermal creep and fuel/cladding
eutectic effects, a simplified I-D cladding damage model was created. This model uses
the cladding temperature profiles from RELAP5 with the empirical creep and eutectic
equations from SAS4A's DEFORM5 module to predict the cladding damage fraction for
each simulation (19). Simulations in which the cladding damage fractions are calculated
to be above 1.0 are assumed to experience cladding failure. This failure module is run
after the RELAP5 simulations are complete, and as a result, negative feedbacks such as
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in-pin fuel motion and fuel sweep-out after cladding failure are not included in this
analysis. A detailed description of this failure model can be found in Appendix A.
RELAP5-3D has many limitations when compared to traditional sodium safety
analysis codes such as SAS4A. In addition to the lack of a cladding deformation model,
RELAP5-3D does not handle in-pin fuel motion or sodium boiling. The lack of in-pin
fuel motion should tend to make the results more conservative, i.e. higher system
temperatures, because movement of the fuel up the pin will add negative reactive to the
core. For molten fuel, if the cladding ruptures the fuel will flow to the rupture point
causing reactivity swings which are not accounted for in the current RELAP5-3D model.
Conversely, the lack of sodium boiling will cause the RELAP5-3D results to be non-
conservative because of the high sodium void worth in sodium reactors. Currently, the
onset of sodium boiling is assumed to occur at the instant that the sodium temperature
rises above the boiling point. While this initial approximation is conservative, future
events become highly uncertain. The unaccounted positive reactivity from local sodium
boiling may cause bulk boiling that is not predicted in the RELAP5-3D calculation.
Additionally, many of the passive safety features of a sodium core, including core
radial expansion and control rod drive line expansion, are modeled as first order
approximations as a function of the core outlet and control assembly outlet temperatures,
respectively. The expansions of these components are more complicated and are
dependent on the temperature at multiple points in the reactor.
It should be noted that due to these approximations, the RELAP5-3D ABR-1000
model experiences some discrepancy when compared with SAS4a results (19). One key
discrepancy is that the ABR-1000 cold pool heats up much slower in SAS4a than in
RELAP5-3D simulations. The most likely cause for this discrepancy is that the ABR1000
report does not provide the intermediate loop sodium inventory and thus an engineering
judgment was made by the model's creator that satisfied his requirements. This inventory
was assumed to be 533 MT, almost 2 times smaller than was modeled with SAS4a. This
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missing sodium reduces the thermal sink in the RELAP5-3D simulations, accelerating the
heatup of the primary pool.
Figure 5 shows the primary system layout of the reference SFR RELAP5-3D
design. A more detailed examination of the reactor design can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 5- SFR RELAP5 -3D Primary System Model (18)
The reactivity coefficients for the ABR-1000 model are taken from the End Of
Life (EOL) TransUranic (TRU) metal and oxide core designs. These reactivity
coefficients can be found in Table 4 (8). It should be noted that while the oxide core does
have a slightly more negative Doppler coefficient, both TRU designs have the same
sodium density coefficients, which is not typical for metal and oxide core designs (20)
(3). Due to the harder neutron spectrum, most metallic cores have a more positive sodium
density coefficient.
Table 4 - Reactivity Coefficients for Metal and Oxide Fuel ABR-1000 Designs
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Reactivity Coefficient BOC Metal B OxideOC
Sodium Density (&/oC) 0.1 0.12 0.1 0.12
Doppler(0/'C) -0.1 -0.1 -0.12 -0.12
Axial Expansion(0/OC) -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
Core Radial Expansion(4/OC) -0.38 -0.38 -0.31 -0.3
Control Rod Drive Line Expansion (0/cm) -49 -51 -26 -28
11.4 Uncertainty Propagation via RELAP (V.2, V.3)
In nuclear power, special attention is given to designing for low-probability high-
consequence accidents which have the potential for large radioactivity release to the
public. Thus, the nuclear industry has increased modeling complexity to analyze these
accidents and improved their designs to increase system reliability through additional
redundancy and incorporation of passive safety systems. Both of these trends make it
difficult for a risk analyst to determine the failure probability: more complicated
modeling takes longer to complete and higher system reliability means more Monte-
Carlo simulations need to be conducted to approximate the failure probability (21).
Numerous approaches have been made to simplify these problems. Meta-models
such as response surfaces and Gaussian-process programs are created to approximate the
response of the complex systems without the drawback of long run times. Advanced
numerical techniques such as Importance Sampling (IS) and Latin Hypercube Sampling
(LHS) allow for low failure probabilities to be resolved with orders of magnitude fewer
simulations than by traditional Monte Carlo Sampling (MCS). Each of these approaches
has its drawbacks. Meta-model may not capture the finer points of the underlying codes
or may be extremely mathematically complicated. Advanced sampling techniques, such a
IS or LHS, have the potential for either increasing or decreasing the variance. Even with
these drawbacks, both techniques are helping risk analyst better understand the reliability
of the system.
Unfortunately for risk analysis, many regulators want not only the mean but the
95th percentile, or some other conservative estimate, of failure. For sequences where
22
only a few predicted failures are expected after the simulations are conducted, this
request leads to a few interesting questions such as:
- What assumed distribution should the data take?
- How does the data relate to the underlying system if an advanced sampling
scheme is used?
Small pool type sodium reactors are designed to survive most unprotected
transients without cladding rupture. To avoid running a prohibitive number of RELAP5
simulations, the sampling distributions should be biased in such a way as to force
sampling of larger, and thus more limiting, reactivity coefficients while providing an
unbiased estimate of the failure probabilities. By biasing the sampling procedure through
importance sampling, each simulation is no longer assigned the same weight when
calculating failure probabilities and small failure probabilities can be calculated with
fewer simulations.
II.4.A Sampling Random Variables
Let us examine importance sampling by assuming that the conditional cumulative
failure distribution, F(t|X), has a parameter uncertainty distribution rc(X) about X.
Generically, the true value of k is not known and thus is allowed to take a range of values
defined by the probability distribution function 7r(A)dX (e.g., normal, log-normal,
uniform, etc.). The value of X will determine when or if the simulation will result in
cladding failure, represented by F(t|A). If the value of X causes the simulation to result in
cladding failure, F(t|A) will change from 0 to 1 at the failure time t=T. If the value of X
does not cause the simulation to result in failure, as defined by the analysist, F(t|X) will
remain zero. Using these definitions, the time dependent failure probability is defined in
Eq. 11.4.
F(t) = F (t a) r (A) d A 11.4
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Using Monte Carlo simulation, this integral is approximated by a summation of
evaluations of F(t| X) for values of X sampled from r(A). This technique is expressed
mathematically in Eq. 11.5 The difference between F(tj X) and F(t) can be seen in Figure
6.
F (t ) ~ F (t Jli) II.5
i=1
I ~F(t)/F(t / 1i)
0 0
Time Time
Figure 6 - Schematic Representation of F(t/ Xi) and F(t).
F(t/ Xi) is a binomial function which moves from 0 (success) to 1 (failure) at the time t
when the cladding damage fraction (CDF) = 1.0. F(t) is the integral of F(t/ Xi) where
every set of Xi yields a new failure time.
Unfortunately, if F(t) is small then failures may only occur in the tail of 7r(t)
which have a low probability of being sampled. Thus, for the desired values of A to be
significantly sampled, the sampling distribution is to be transformed into a more desirable
distribution function, I(A). This function is known as the importance function. By
multiplying Eq. 11.4 by the unity function f dA and rearranging terms, Eq. 11.6 is
produced (22) (23).
F (t) = F(tjA 7 ) I (A) dA II.6I (A)
Because I(A) is the desired sampling distribution for the Monte Carlo
approximation of F(t), every draw of I(A) is weighted by the ratio of the original and the
desired sampling distribution. This transformation is seen in Eq. 11.7 and Eq. 11.8.
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w(A) =T II.7
F(t) f F(t|IA) I(A) w(A) dA 11.8
Using Monte Carlo, this integral is approximated by a summation of evaluations
of F(t| k) for values of k sampled from I(A) and weighted by w(A), which itself is a
function of k. This technique is expressed mathematically in Eq. 11.9. Note that the
weight of a given sample of k is now a function of k (Anderson, 1999).
N
1
F(t) ~: N A).w(Ai) F(t\Aj) 11.9
Eq. 11.4 can be re-written for a RELAP5-3D model by replacing the dominate
variables in the RELAP5-3D model with probability distributions and adding a 7(. )d(.)
to Eq. 11.4 for every uncertain parameter. For an unprotected transient overpower, Eq. 11.4
is then re-written as Eq. 11.10,
F(t)=
f~ f_f~ f~ f~ f 7 F(t|{p, aDop, aNa' aCRDL, aCRE> aAE}) 11.10
7(aDop)daDop7T(aNa) daNa 7T(aCRDL) daCRDL
wT(aCRE)dcCRL w(caAE)daAE w(p)dp
where the amount of reactivity inserted is p, m(p)dp is a linear distribution between p'
and p", and w(ai)dai is a normal distribution for given distributed reactivity
coefficients; the same weighting scheme is used to bias sampling for all variables. If this
were a loss of flow event, the uncertain variable p will be replaced by the pump
dependent flow halving time t. Both transient types will be discussed in more detail in
Section III.3.A.
The limitation of importance sampling is that the optimal sampling scheme cannot
be known a priori, but as larger values for all distributed values will lead to shorter failure
times the following sampling scheme is selected:
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* 50% of the draws are selected between the 95th and 100th percentile of the
distribution
* 45% of the draws are selected between the 5 0 th and 9 5 th percentiles of the
distribution
* 5% of the draws are selected between the 0th and 50 th percentiles of the
distribution
The importance functions used for linear and normal distributions using the
sampling scheme above can be found in Eq. 11.11 and Eq.II.12 respectively and graphed
in Figure 7.
I (p) =
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(p" - p') 0. 5'
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Figure 7- Comparing n(p) to I(p) and w(a) to I(a)
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Thus the weighting functions w(p) and w(a) can be calculated as in Eq. 11.13
and Eq.II.14:
w(p) = 7T(P)
I(p)
( 1
(p" 
- 251 0.2=
(p" - p') 0.5
p' < p < p' + (p" - p') * .5
1
(p"' - p')
1 0.3 = 1.5,
(P"- p') 0. 4 5
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1
(p" - p') = 0.1,
1 0.5
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p' + (p" - p') * .95 < p < p"
11.13
w(a) = r(a)
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11.14
It should be noted that by design w(p)= w(a) and are independent of p and a
within the weight bins. By performing the transformation in Eq. 11.6, Eq. II.10 can now
be re-written as Eq. 1.15.
F(t) = 11.15
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v
-'p J 00 jF(t|{p,aDopaNa:aCRDLaCRE, aAE)
(I(cDop)I(aNa) * I(aCRDL)I(aCRE) I(cAE)I(p)
(w(aDop)w(aNa)W(aCRDL)W(aCRE) W(aAE)W(p))
daDop daNa daCRDL daCRL daAE dp
Similar to Eq. 11.6, this integral can be evaluated through a Monte Carlo process
as in Eq. 11.16, while Eq. 11.17 calculates the variance (22) (23).
F(t) =
1
Zf_ wi(aDop)Wi(aNa) W(aCRDL)wi(XCRE) Wi(aAF)Wi(p)
wi(aDop)Wi(aNa) wi(aCRDL) wj(CCRE) Wi(aAE)Wi(p)
F (t| lpi, aDop,, aNal>aCRDL1 > aCREiU QAEi
Var(F(t))
1
Wi(aDop) Wi(aNa) Wi(aCRDL) Wi(aCRE) Wi(cAE)Wi(p)
1
=1Wi(aDop)Wi(aNa)Wi(CRDL)Wi(CRE) Wi(aAE)Wi(p
N
~I(wi (aDop)wi(aNa) w(aCRDL)w W(aCRE) wi(cAE)wi(P))2
F (t| {pi, aDop,, aNa> aCRDLi> aCRE, aAEi 12
11.16
11.17
- F(t)2
II.4.B Description of BEAGLE Hierarchy
The Bayesian Experimental Automated Graphical Labor-saving
(BEAGLE) scripts were written to conduct and post-process Monte Carlo simulations via
RELAP5-3D. BEAGLE has three main stages:
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Estimate
1. RELAP Input Generator - Writes a user defined number of RELAP inputs and
defines basic parameters and distributions from which to sample. This stage also
allows for the option to conduct biased importance sampling.
2. RELAP Automation - Automates the process of running every RELAP file
generated by the input generator.
3. RELAP Output Extraction - Reads every RELAP output and transforms minor
edit variables into MATLAB objects.
4. Cladding Failure Calculation - Calculates transient induced cladding damage
fractions and computes the statistical weight of the simulation resulting in failed
cladding.
BEAGLE is structured as a series of MATLAB scripts (24), RELAP executables,
text files and batch files. This structure allows for great flexibility by the user, but results
in complex process maps. The file extension of each script or document is given within
the boxes of each process map and Table 5 indicates what type of script or document
corresponds with a given extension.
Table 5 - BEAGLE File Extension Key
File Extension Description
*.m MATLAB script file: used for calculations and data extraction
*.mat MATLAB data saved as an external files
*.i RELAP input file
*.o RELAP output file
*.r RELAP restart file
*.bat Windows script file: used to loop RELAP runs or index folder locations
(i) RELAP Input Generator
The structure of the Input Generator module is shown in Figure 8. This module
has 3 MATLAB scripts which create a user defined number of input files distributed into
a user defined number of folders. Multiple folders are utilized in order to run multiple
RELAP5-3D simulations on a single computer. This is only recommend for multi-core
processors, because running multiple RELAP5-3D simulations on a single processor will
severely hinder runtime.
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Importance.m is a MATLAB script which determines the weight function that is
combined with the probability distributions for importance sampling. If importance
sampling is not desired, the function in this script should be set to a constant value.
Reactivity Generator.m is the main input/output script for the input generator
model. In this script, the user specifies the number of RELAP files per fold, the number
of parallel RELAP runs desired, the uncertainty distributions for the random variables,
the portion of the distributions desired (mean value, 2 sigma or randomly sampled), and
output options such as printing summary plots and/or input files. A summary plot from
Reactivity Generator for an Unprotected Transient OverPower (UTOP) can be seen in
Figure 9. In this example, the magnitude of reactivity insertion originally uniformly
distributed from $0.3 to $0.9 but the sampling distribution has been biased, as described
in Section II.4.A. The remaining reactivity coefficients are normally distributed without
biasing. All parameters, except the Doppler coefficient, are represented by histograms.
The Doppler values are plotted because RELAP5-3D reads Doppler coefficients as a
temperature-dependent tabular value, not a point estimate. Once complete, Reactivity
Generator saves the importance sampling weights and the values of the sampled
parameters in the file Parsum.mat. This file will be used again in the cladding failure
module.
The last script in the Input Generator module is Auto.m. This file contains the
RELAP5-3D transient file formatted in MATLAB's fprintf statements. Random
parameters are replaced with the variables sampled in Reactivity Generator.m. Auto.m is
called multiple times until every input is written.
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Figure 8 - RELAP Input Generator Module Flow Map
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(ii )RELAP Automation
The structure of the Automation module is shown in Figure 10. The RELAP
automation module is comprised almost exclusively of *.bat files, which is windows
intrinsic scripting language. All transient simulations should start from the same
Steady.State.r file which provides the initial conditions for the transient, including
temperature and fluid flow distributions throughout the core. The MultiRELAP.bat
script contains the location of the input folder, RELAP5-3D executable, and
SteadyState.r file. Activating MultiRELAP.bat will cause the script to run every input
file in the designated folder in a serial fashion using the Run.bat file. The Run.bat is
required because the *.bat scripting language does not allow for arrays. This module is
the most time consuming portion of BEAGLE and running in multiple folders on
multiple processors is highly recommended.
SteadyState.r
M Branches
MultiRELAP.bat +-MultiRELAP.bat 4
Run.bat Run.bat
M/N Times M/N
Times
Relap-Input.i RelapInput.i
RELAP5.exe RELAP5.exe
M/N Files M/N Files
Figure 10 - RELAP Automation Module Flow Map
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(iii)RELAP Output Extraction
The structure of the Output Extraction module is shown in Figure 11. Once all of
the RELAP5-3D simulations for a given transient have finished, the Output Extraction
module can reformat the RELAP5-3D outputs into MATLAB arrays for further post-
processing. The first stage of the Output Extraction module is to comprise a list of
RELAP5-3D outputs. This is accomplished through Multi.bat, which looks through the
operation directory and complies a list of all output folders. Folder.bat then enters each
folder and copies the full directory location of all files ending in *.o into the file List.l.
Multi.bat and Folder.bat interact in a similar manner to MultiRELAP.bat and Run.bat,
due to the same array challenges, as mentioned previously.
Once the list of output file locations is compiled, OutputProcess.m can begin the
process of moving the data from the output text files into MATLAB objects and arrays.
OutputProcess.m extracts the data from List.1 and creates a MATLAB array of file
directories which it sends to Sortdata.m. Sortdata.m then loops through the array of file
locations, sending each location through Reader.m. The number of minor edit variables
tracked in the RELAP5-3D output files needs to be hard-coded into Reader.m.
Unfortunately, RELAP5-3D output files only print minor edit variables in 20 time step
blocks, each separated by hundreds of lines of debugging data. Reader.m was coded to
search the entire input file and properly join each set of data, but the process is only as
robust as was needed to extract the data for this thesis.
Once Sortdata.m processes all of the RELAP5-3D output files, OutputProcess.m
saves the output files into a *.mat file for future reference. The option to plot desired
transient data using Plotter.m appears at the end of OutputProcess.m, but Plotter.m can
be called independently if desired.
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Figure 11 - RELAP Output Extraction Module Flow Map
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(iv )RELAP Cladding Failure Calculation
The structure of the Cladding Failure Calculation module is shown in Figure 12.
ObjectBuilder.m is the primary file in this module. CreepFailure.m calculates the
cladding damage fraction due to thermal creep and fuel/cladding eutectic wastage for
every RELAP5-3D transient simulation. CreepFailure.m outputs the Cladding Damage
Fraction, Radius, and Thickness as a function of time, which ObjectBuilder stores in the
transient object. Once every simulation has been analyzed, the results are sent to
DamagePlotter.m to be graphed. DamagePlotter.m also determines if cladding failure,
local sodium boiling, or bulk sodium boiling occurred during the transient. Using the
statistical weight of each simulation from Parsum.mat, DamagePlotter.m calls Non-
Integer.m to conduct the Bayesian inference on the Damage_Plotter.m results. Non-
Integer.m produces probability density functions, cumulative distribution functions, mean
and 95th percentiles of cladding failure, hot channel sodium boiling and core wide
sodium boiling.
Figure 12 - RELAP Cladding Failure Module Flow Map
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11.5 Evaluating Failure Probabilities with Non-Integer Evidence (V.2, V.3)
The TNF determines the acceptability of accident sequences by examining the
95t percentile estimate of both the frequency and quantity of radiological release (1).
Estimating the 9 5th percentile of accidents sequences can be difficult as many advanced
reactors are designed to have high reliability when confronted with licensing basis
transients. While statistical techniques such as importance sampling exist to estimate the
mean and variance of an estimate, classical statistics does not provide insight to the shape
of the distribution around that estimate. This section proposes a method in which the
evidence derived from importance sampling may be used in Bayesian updating to provide
a posterior distribution with which a 95th percentile frequency or dose can be estimated.
II.5.A Background
The following method is developed to estimate the 9 5 th percentile of thermal
creep-induced cladding failure for a generic SFR. Epistemic uncertainties for reactivity
coefficients, reactivity insertions and pump coastdown rates were propagated using
importance sampling through the RELAP5-3D SFR model.
Once the simulations have been analyzed to determine if failure has occurred, in
this example defined as cladding rupture or sodium boiling, the mean probability of
failure can be estimated by dividing the total weight of the failed simulations by number
of simulations conducted. The risk analyst is then left to ponder how to transform this
evidence into an uncertainty distribution around the calculated probability of failure.
Bayes Theorem may be used to combine the evidence observed from the computer
simulations with a prior distribution, which describes the analyst's beliefs before the
simulations were conducted, to form a posterior uncertainty distribution. This posterior
distribution describes the analyst's new beliefs and can be updated with additional
evidence or propagated through a PRA. Eq.II.18 calculates the mean probability of
failure, P,
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Np3 =iI.18
i=1
th
where Ii is the indicator variable for the i , 1 indicating failure and 0 indicating no
failure, wi is the weight of the ith simulation resulting from the importance sampling
scheme, all over N total simulations. The uncertainty around this estimate, w'(p), is
determined using Bayes Theorem shown in Eq. 11.19,
,w(p) L(E~p)
w'(P) = 1 11.19f0 w(p) L(Elp)dp
where w(p) is the uncertainty distribution around the probability of failure p and L(Elp)
is the likelihood of seeing evidence E given the failure probability is p (22).
II.5.B Method
The first step in Bayesian updating is identifying the form of the likelihood
function. A likelihood function takes evidence, E, and determines what the probability of
seeing that evidence, or put another way the likelihood of the evidence, is given the
underlying probability of the event. It is proposed that the likelihood function should take
the form of a Binomial function, which evaluates the probably of a given Bernoulli
sequence. According to Ang and Tang, a Bernoulli sequence is defined as a sequence that
has two possible outcomes. These outcomes could be occurrence or nonoccurrence of an
event (e.g., the cladding may or may not rupture, the Fraction of Cladding Damage
(FCD), defined in Appendix A, may or may not exceed a specified value) (22). Bernoulli
sequences have the following assumptions:
1. There exist only two possible outcomes.
2. Every trial is statistically independent.
3. The probability of occurrence for every trial is constant.
The analysis conducted on the SFR obeys these assumptions. For example, only
two possible outcomes exist, the simulation may or may not result in a FCD of greater
than 1.0. The FCD is a representation of the eutectic accelerated thermal creep of the
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cladding and a value greater than 1.0 indicates breach of the cladding (19). Under
unbiased Monte Carlo simulations, the values for the reactivity coefficients would be
independently sampled from their corresponding epistemic uncertainty distributions (25).
If importance sampling is used, the biased sampling distributions are chosen a priori thus
still satisfying the statistical independence assumption. It should be noted that Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) cannot be used because every sample is correlated to the
previous sample in MCMC. Because the underlying distributions are the same for each
trial, the probability of occurrence is also the same; the epistemic values sampled just
determine success or failure of the trial. Thus, the third assumption is satisfied.
Each RELAP5 simulation produces a range of outputs including time dependent
temperature, pressure, flow rates, and FCDs for various components. Each of these
parameters will have a distribution due to the epistemic uncertainties, but for now only
the FCD will be examined. In fact, because cladding failure is modeled as a Bernoulli
sequence, the only information, or evidence, extracted from each simulation is whether or
not the FCD exceeds 1.0. It is probable that some of the ignored information could be
used to provide a more accurate estimate of the failure probability, but incorporating this
evidence is left as future work. Thus, the evidence provided from unbiased Monte Carlo
simulations is shown in Eq. 1.20,
N
x = 11.20
i=1
where x is the number of cladding failures, N is the number of simulation, and Ii is an
indicator variable which is 1 if the it' trial results in a FCD greater than 1.0 and 0
otherwise.
If importance sampling is used to bias the sampling distributions, each simulation
will receive a weight corresponding to the portion of the distribution being sampled. This
is requires a relaxation in assumption 3 which states that probability of occurrence of
every run is the same. In one sense, the assumption still holds as the probability of
sampling a given value from the importance distribution is the same from trial to trial.
The assumption is bent because a larger number of samples are taken from the tail of the
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epistemic distribution than justified, causing the results to be weighted to compensate for
the biased statistics. To incorporate importance sampled data, the number of failures, x,
can be defined using Eq.II.21.
N
x = Wi Ii 11.21
where Wi is the total weight of the i'a trial. The ramifications of representing the failure
data in this way will be discussed later.
As the underlying evidence has been defined to satisfy a Bernoulli sequence with
x failures in N trials, the likelihood function will take the form of the Binomial
distribution shown in Eq. 11.22. As was stated previously, the likelihood function
evaluates the evidence based on a given probably of failure, p.
L (xIN, p) = px (l p)N-x 11.22
x! (N - x)!
These definitions are straightforward if the evidence is derived from experiments
or unbiased Monte Carlo simulations, but if the evidence for cladding failure is derived
from importance sampling, the applicability of the binomial distribution is not
straightforward. This difficulty mathematically manifests itself through the factorials in
the binomial distribution, Eq.II.22, which restrict both the number of trials and failures to
integer values. With importance sampling, the number of failures is the sum of the
weights of the failed simulations, as seen in Eq. 11.21.
Apostolakis suggested that, for thought experiments of subjective design,
noninteger values are acceptable for discrete likelihood functions by replacing the
factorials with gamma functions, Eq. 11.23 (26). The resulting likelihood function can be
evaluated for no integer evidence.
L(x|N,p) = p + 1) X( 1 - p)N-x 11.23F(x + 1)F(N - x + 1)
40
This modification is academic, since the likelihood function appears in both the
numerator and denominator of Eq.II.23, thus canceling all constant terms (i.e., factorials
and gamma functions).
The forms of the prior and posterior distributions are typically taken as the
conjugate distribution of the likelihood function, if available (22). Conjugate distributions
have the same functional form as the likelihood function, greatly simplifying the
mathematical complexity of evaluating Eq.II.19. The conjugate distribution for the
binomial function is the beta distribution, as seen in Eq. 11.24. a and fl are chosen based
on prior knowledge of the prior distribution or calculated as a result of the updating
process.
r(a +/3)
n'(p) = pa-1i _1 0 -1 1.24F(a)F(3) (-
By using the constitutive relations between the binomial and beta distributions,
the shape parameters for the posterior beta distribution, Eq.I.24, can be determined using
Eq.II.25 and Eq. 11.26 (22). If no prior evidence is known, the initial values for a and #l
are set to zero.
a' = a + x 11.25
l' = fl + N - x 11.26
At this point, a posterior distribution exists that conserves the mean, but not the
variance, of the importance sampled data. The third assumption for the binomial
distribution assumes that all of the trials have equal weight. This assumption was relaxed
when importance sampling was used to bias the underlying epistemic distributions, thus
causing each simulation to be weighted differently. Most nuclear applications have low
probabilities of failure (e.g., p < 0.1), producing a beta distribution that is heavily skewed
to the right. At low values of total sampled evidence, the resulting posterior distribution
can be so heavily skewed that the mean value falls above the 9 5th percentile estimate.
This behavior disappears as enough evidence is sampled to stabilize the estimate of the
cladding rupture probability.
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II.5.C Validation
Figure 13 shows the mean and 9 5 th percentile estimate of the cladding rupture
probability for an Unprotected Transient OverPower (UTOP) accident scenario in a
metallic fueled pool type SFR as a function of simulations. As can be seen, the 9 5 h
percentile estimate is less than the square root of the variance because the beta
distribution is highly skewed to lower probabilities. This is in agreement with the
sampled evidence where most failures either resulted in no failure or failure with little to
no associated weight. Graphs of the mean value plus or minus the square root of the
variance assume that the data is symmetrically distributed, as in a normal distribution,
and are shown here more for tradition than for an indication of the confidence of the
estimate.
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Figure 13- The Point Estimate (Mean), 95 t Percentile Estimate from Bayesian Updating,
and the Point Estimate plus the Square Root of the Estimate for Unprotected Transient
Overpowers with a 51 0"C (left) and 550")C (right) Core Outlet Temperature.
Because the square root of the variance is greater than the point estimate, the point
estimate minus the square root of the variance is not shown.
II.5.D Summary
Risk-informed regulations, such as the TNF, set requirements on the tails of
uncertainty distributions to limit their effects. This thesis proposes that Bayesian
updating can be used to create uncertainty distributions from computer simulations that
might otherwise be created through engineering judgment. To create uncertainty
distributions without running an unfeasible number of simulations, the Binomial
42
distribution is broadened to incorporate noninteger evidence from importance sampling.
The resulting distributions can be used in a variety of PRA applications.
11.6 Multivariable Regression
The following section discusses the statistical basis for this multivariable
regression. The definitions of significance levels, F statistics, t values, and regression
selection methods are discussed. This methodology is used to create the new
multivariable fuel/cladding eutectic formation rate predictive correlations in Section V.3.
Multivariable Regression is often employed when trends or predictive
relationships are desired from a wide array of data. If there is a reason to believe that a
desired variable (Y) is dependent on the state of other variables (XI, X2,...,Xn), then it
may be reasonable to model Y as follows:
Y = A + BiXi + I CXX + --- + E 11.27
i=1 i=1,j=1
where E represents inherent randomness in the system and is often modeled as a normally
distributed variable. A, Bi, and Ci are coefficients fitted from the data and determine how
large the impact any given term has on the overall equation. Because they are statistically
derived, these coefficients are only based upon data and are treated as statistical
variables, often approximated as normal distributions. Eq. 11.27 is often approximated
by dropping higher order terms. One of the challenges of multivariable regression, due to
an inherent lack of infinite resources and thus data, is that there may not be enough
evidence to statistically resolve every term. If a coefficient has a high probability of being
zero, it is assumed to be zero, thus omitting that term from the overall correlation (27).
An example of a linear fit to data can be seen in Figure 14.
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Figure 14- Linear Trend Fitted to Data
The statistical software JMP is used to conduct least-squares multivariable linear
regression (28). Numerous statistical checks are formed to ensure that the overall data
exhibits a linear trend, as well as that the terms making up the model are statistically
significant. Statistically significant implies that there is enough evidence (data) to believe
the term adds information to the model. In other words, there is a statistical reason to
believe that the term exists. A 0.05 significance level is typically required to justify
inclusion of a term in a linear fit, which indicates that the data only has a 5% chance of
coming from a distribution where the confidence bounds of the slope of the model
include zero. Figure 15 graphically illustrates a generic example of statistical
significance. As noted from example coefficients 2 and 3, it is not the absolute magnitude
of either point estimate or the 2 .5'h percentile (note: 95% Confidence Interval extends
from the 2 .5 th percentile to the 97.5'h percentile) which determines how significant a term
is, but the absolute probability of the term not being zero.
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Figure 15 - Graphical Example of Statistically Significant Coefficients
Before examining the individual terms, the overall model is checked for
significance. The F ratio for the model is examined to ensure that the data does indeed
have a linear trend. The P>F value indicates the significance level associated with the F
statistic, i.e. the probability that the data does not exhibit a linear behavior when a
potential explanatory variables are included in the correlation. If this value is less than
0.05 then a linear model is significant to the 5% level, 0.01 is significant to the 1% level,
and so on. In general, any model with greater than a 5% significance level should not be
trusted. Once the overall model is deemed significant, then the explanatory variables are
examined for significance.
The statistical significance of the explanatory variables is determined through the
t statistic. The t statistic defined as the regression coefficient divided by the standard error
of that coefficient. If this ratio is larger than the t value with n-k-l degrees of freedom,
where n is the total number of data points and k is the number of explanatory variables
used, at the significance level of interest, then the variable is considered statistically
significant. As with the f statistic, terms with a significance level of higher than 0.05
should not be included in the model, if possible.
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In order to isolate the statistically significant terms, a variable selection
methodology must be chosen. JMP offers three options: forward, backward, and mixed.
The forward option starts with a constant term and then examines the remaining
explanatory variables and selects the variable with the lowest significance level. This
variable is added to the model and the significance levels of all remaining variables are
re-calculated to incorporate the expanded model and the loss of a degree of freedom.
JMP continues this process until none of the remaining variables have a probability less
than the probably to enter threshold. JMP defaults this value to 0.25. This process is
considered "greedy" because once a term is incorporated into the model; the effects of
further explanatory variables on that term are not examined and included terms are not
removed.
The backwards and mixed options are very similar to the forward option. The
backward option begins with all the explanatory variables and removes the least
significant variables until no variable exceeds the probably to enter threshold for the
significance level. JMP defaults this value to 0.1. This option is also considered "greedy"
in that it does not look to re-examine terms once it removes them. The last option is a
mixture of the forward and backward algorithms. The mixture option conducts the
forward method until no terms exist and then looks back at the adopted terms and
determines if any variable should be removed using the backward method. Once the
backward method can no longer remove terms, the forward method is used to add new
terms. This iteration continues until no additional terms can be added or removed.
Because the mixture method is the most balanced of the options, it was used to conduct
all of the term selections in this analysis.
11.7 Model Uncertainty
Predictive relationships are only valuable to an analyst if the analyst has faith in
the accuracy of the relationship in predicting new data. Model uncertainly is one class of
methods which attempts to account for model, or in this case correlation, limitations.
Model uncertainty has two primary sub-categories (29) (30):
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1. Model averaging - This sub-category of model uncertainty is intended for
situations where multiple independent models exist but the underlying forms are
uncertain. For example, it is unknown if the underlying data is normally or log-
normally distributed, in which event both models are evaluated and a weighted
average of the results of each model is taken to be the final result.
2. Model error - This sub-category of model uncertainty is intended for situations
where a model is accepted as an approximation of reality and the deviation of the
predicted values from experimental values needs to be bounded.
Since there is no reason to believe that the actual penetration rate is a weighted
average of any of these regression models, we will limit our analysis to model error
quantification. One method for quantifying model error used in fire PRA is to assume
that the ratio of experimental data to model prediction, henceforth referred to as the
validation ratio, is an Aleatory, or inherently random, variable. Next, the analyst must
determine how to model the variable, e.g. is the variable distributed via normal,
lognormal, Weibull, etc., distributions. Because the fuel/clad eutectic penetration rates
must be positive, a distribution that does not include negative values is required.
Additionally, there exists few physical phenomenon which will determine an upper limit
to rate of eutectic penetration, thus any proposed distribution should allow for extremely
large values in the validation ratio.
Historically, the validation ratio has been modeled as a lognormal distribution
with the shape parameters, bm, and sm, which determine the Aleatory nature of model
error. With infinite evidence, bm,, and sn would be known exactly. With finite evidence, a
joint probability distribution which describes epistemic uncertainty of bm and sm is
needed to determine the likelihoods of various combinations of bm and sm,. If additional
evidence is added which supports previous knowledge of bm and sm, the joint distribution
will narrow until it is a delta function at the "true" value of bm and sm. If evidence is
added which conflicts with prior evidence, which is often the case when only a small
number of samples are available, then the epistemic uncertainty grows and a wider span
of bm and sm combinations are possible.
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A process for evaluating the likelihood of distributed parameters given evidence
is Bayes Theorem (Eq. 11.28). Notice that the general mathematical form is consistent
with Eq. 11.19. However, here the validation ratio, bounded between zero and infinity, is
updated with information from experimental data and a model. In Eq. 11.19, it is the
probability which is bounded between zero and one and is updated with data derived by
simulations.
L(R|R*,M)To(R) 1
(R|R*, M) =0 - L(R IR*, M) ro(R) 11.28
fo7 L(R|R*,M)wTo(R)dR k
where w(RIR*, M) is the analyst's understanding of the distribution for the validation
ratio after considering the experimental data, R*, and the model, M. no(R) is the prior
knowledge of the distribution for the validation ratio, and L(RIR*, M) is the likelihood of
seeing the data given a particular value of the validation ratio being true. The
denominator can be written as a normalization constant for simplicity. The form of the
prior distribution is often the Achilles heel of Bayesian analysis because there is often no
prior information to dictate n0o(R). One common prior distribution is the uniform
distribution over a range of potential values of R. Two main problems exist with the
uniform distribution:
I. A range of analyzed R values must be applied. Any distribution of R must
integrate to 1 over all values of R. A uniform distribution cannot extend to infinity
because the area under the curve would be infinity not 1. Thus a Uniform
distribution is defined by its end point, U(1E-5, 2). Any values of R which lie
outside of the prior distribution will not be examined by Eq. 5 regardless of the
likelihood of that R given the data.
2. Biased mean and variance. A uniform prior distribution has a mean and a variance
which will bias the mean and the variance of the posterior distribution.
Fortunately, with enough evidence the effects of the prior distribution will
disappear.
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Understanding these limitations, a uniform prior distribution, nO (R) =
U(10-6, 35), is assumed to describe the analyst's prior belief of the ratio. 106 is set as
the minimum value because the lognormal distribution is defined at values greater than
but not equal to zero. The maximum value is set at 35 in order to examine the full effects
of the tails on the mean of the lognormal distribution.
Next, the likelihood function, L(RIR*), is defined. The lognormal distribution
was shown to adequately describe the validation ratio data and thus the lognormal
likelihood described in Eq. 11.29 is used.
1 -l*ln(R)-bm)L(R|R*, M) = L(R|R1R2 ... R, bm,sm) 1 e In(- se) 11.29
~IR sm
The R in Eq. 11.29 must remain a random variable in order to evaluate the
likelihood over the range of R in 7ro(R). It should be noted that the validation ratio data,
R*, is not a variable in Eq. 11.29 and bm and s, are still unknown. Thus, Eq.II.29 should
be rewritten in such a way that R* informs the choice of bm, and sn through another
embedded Bayes Theorem. First, Eq. 11.30 is generalized as an average over the joint
probability distribution of bm and smn, JT(b, sm IR*), which is still undefined.
L(RR*, M) = ffbmsmL(RIbm Sm)T(bm smIR*)dbmdsm
1 (- *ln(R)-bm) 
13
ffbrme 2 Sm )T(bm, smIR*)dbmdsm
bm7nsm V27R sm
where nT(b, smIR*) can be informed by the data, R*, and prior assumptions on bm and sm,
T(O(b, sm), through Eq. 11.31:
7T (bMSM I R) L (bm, smIR*)7To (bm, sm)
ffbm,sm L(R*|bm, sm)7ro(b, sm)dbmdsm 11.31
1
- L(bm,smIR*)WO(bm,sm)
where the likelihood function takes the form of Eq. 11.32:
49
L(bm,Sm|R*) L(bm,sm|R1,R 2,..., Rn)n (1 In(Ri)-bm 11.32
e Sm2
i=1/afZRisme
Again, the prior distribution for bm, and sm need to be assumed. Due to lack of
information, the prior distributions for bm, and sm are assumed to be independent uniform
distributions as defined in Eq. 11.33.
7ro(bm, sm) = 7To(bm)Wo(sm) = Ub(-4,2)Us(10 6 , 2.5) 11.33
There now exists a fully defined set of equations which can be solved to create a
distribution for the model error distribution of interest, w(RIR*, M). While WINBUGS is
an excel based program that performs Markov Chain Monte Carlo with Gibbs Sampling
and has be used to solve Eq.1.28 through Eq.II.33 for fire PRA applications, the Model
UncertainTy Tool (MUTT), a series of MATLAB scripts, has been created to create
model uncertainty distributions for fuel/cladding eutectic validations. The MUTT code
can be found in Appendix D.
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III METAL AND OXIDE FUEL COMPARISON (V.2)
Because of the favorable experience of EBR-II with metallic fuel and some
potential advantages of metallic fuel for a burner reactor that is recycling minor actinides,
the reference design for this study employs metallic fuel (13). Internationally, however,
oxide fuel is recognized as at least the near-term preferred fuel option for sodium-cooled
fast reactors (10) (31). Thus, the trade-off to be considered is whether an oxide-fueled
core would have better or worse safety characteristics and what the relative cost would be
of generating electricity. Most of the analysis work described in this section relates to a
comparison of accident scenarios and their relative consequences for the two different
types of fuel design. Response to accident scenarios can have a direct impact on the
capital cost of a nuclear power plant if expensive mitigative systems are required. Fuel
cycle costs are likely to be a greater fraction of power generation costs in cycles
involving some form of reprocessing and recycling than they are for the current
generation of once-through nuclear power plants. There are substantial differences in
reprocessing technologies for the oxide and metallic fuels, but there is very limited
information on the cost of the pyroprocessing process used for metallic fuels. Fuel type
can indirectly affect thermodynamic efficiency related to allowable core outlet
temperature, as well as system availability.
Hence, as part of the risk-informed examination of the SFR, a trade-off case study
of the in-core performance of metal- and oxide-based TRU bearing fuels is examined.
Due to large uncertainties associated with the cost of electrochemical reprocessing as
primarily used for metallic fuel, and aqueous reprocessing as primarily used for oxide
fuel, as well as their impacts on fuel cycle costs, a definitive cost-benefit comparison
cannot be completed at this time. Instead, this case study focuses on in-core differences
that should be considered when comparing metal and oxide fuel performance. Table 7
overviews the categories used to compare metal and oxide fuel. A discussion of the
ranking rationale for each criterion can be found in Section 111.2.
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111.1 Introduction
U.S. and Korean reactor designers, such as GE, ANL and the Korean Atomic
Energy Research Institute (KAERI), tout a number of benefits of using a metallic fuel in
the SFR (13) (2) (32). These benefits include metal fuel's:
" hard neutron spectrum for improved transmutation and breeding characteristics,
e high thermal conductivity (and thus low stored energy in the fuel) for faster
accident response,
e aversion to re-criticality during postulated beyond-design-basis Energetic-
Scenarios and
" predicted lower manufacturing and reprocessing costs when incorporating minor
actinides for recycling.
French and Japanese reactor designers believe that oxide fuel provides a
comparable number of benefits and that it should continue to be employed until more
advanced carbide fuels are developed. These benefits include oxide fuel's:
* softer neutron spectrum for reduced radiation damage to cladding and other
structural components,
e larger Doppler and smaller sodium density reactivity coefficients for reduced
impact of large reactivity excursions,
* large experience base of oxide fuels from LWRs, FFTF, Ph6nix, Superph6nix, and
many other SFR's and
e existing reprocessing and fabrication capabilities of MOX Pu bearing fuels.
Comparison studies between oxide and metal fuel have primarily examined their
response to low-probability, beyond-design-basis accidents which include failures of the
reactor protection systems (33) (20). These studies show that the short thermal time
constant of metallic fuel, resulting from the high thermal conductivity of the fuel, sodium
bond, and cladding, allows for thermal expansion of the control rod drive lines and core
support plates to passively terminate the transient quickly. Oxide fuel has a relatively
long thermal time constant, due to the low conductivity of the fuel and the fuel/cladding
gap, which, coupled with the positive reactivity introduced as the fuel cools, tends to
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extend the length of transients. Extended transients are not desired because the extra
energy generated must be removed, often through safety grade heat removal systems
which add cost and complexity to the reactor design. Until the reactor power equals the
heat removal rate, overall system temperatures increase. These observations indicate that
metal cores may have a smaller conditional probability of core damage states or sodium
boiling because they have lower primary coolant equilibrium temperatures for a majority
of transients. However, considering the low values of the frequencies of these scenarios
as estimated by the designers (typically <10-8/yr or less), in a highly risk-informed
licensing process, such as the NUREG-1860 approach, response to severe accidents of
this type might not be a major factor in the selection of fuel type (1). A summary of
various transient properties and responses of metal and oxide fuel to low-probability
transients are listed in Table 6.
It has been demonstrated through operation of previous reactors (e.g., EBR II,
PHENIX) that both metal and oxide fuel can be used successfully in SFRs. The primary
cost or benefits that can be derived from the fuel choice are in manufacturing,
reprocessing, specific power, burnup, and conversion ratio. Fuel performance after a fuel
disruption event could also be a discriminating factor, if deemed necessary by the
regulator.
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Table 6 - Oxide and Metal Fuel Comparison (33) (20) (34)
Fuel Type / (ULOF) Unprotected (UTOP) Unprotected (ULOHS) Unprotected Cladding Considerations
General Properties Loss-of-Flow Transient Over-Power Loss-of-Heat-Sink Applicable to all
(Failure of Primary Pumps) (Control Rod Withdrawal) (Loss of Steam Generators) Transients
Metal
" High conductivity
" Fast thermal
response
" Low stored energy
in fuel
" Small shutdown
reactivity insertion
" Hard neutron
Spectrum
e Power coefficient
vested mainly in
coolant
de
Low conductivity
Slow thermal
response
" Large stored energy
in the fuel
* Large shutdown
reactivity insertion
" Relatively soft
neutron spectrum
" Power coefficient
mainly vested in
fuel
KeyPointsn
Short flow halving times
possible due to:
e Fast thermal response
" Low stored energy in fuel
" Small shutdown reactivity
insertion
Sodium boiling probability is
extremely low (<< 04 /event)
Key Points
Long flow halving times
required due to:
* Long thermal response
" Large stored energy in fuel
" Small shutdown reactivity
insertion
Core must be designed to avoid
sodium boiling
Key Points
Initial transient
" Small Doppler initially
allows for elevated
system temperatures
" Expected reactivity
insertions leave large
margin to potential
damage states
Low probability of core
damage if primary pumps
trip due to high system
temperature.
Key Points
Initial transient
" Large Doppler dampens
transient power spike
quickly
" Expected insertions
leave very large margin
to potential damage
states
High probability sodium
boiling and/or core damage
if primary pumps trip due to
high system temperature.
Key Points
Faster Power Reduction
* Fast thermal response
" Strong negative reactivity
o Radial expansion
o Control Rod Drive Line
Expansion
* Low (+) Doppler effect as
fuel cools
Lower long term equilibrium
temperatures achieved
" FCMI low due to soft
fuel
" FCCI (Eutectic
Formation) starts
between 650-725'C
o Rate of eutectic
formation does not
significantly contribute
cladding breach below
9000C
" Low melting point
eutectics will not freeze
in coolant channel
" No exothermic fuel-
coolInt renction
Key Points
Slower Power Reduction
* Strong (+) Doppler effect as
fuel cools delays shutdown
" Slow thermal response
Structural problems may occur
due to
" High sustained equilibrium
temperatures
* Long time scales
Oxi
0
0
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In this assessment, design basis events are those that establish the design requirements
for safety related systems, structures, and components. Historically, systems were designed to
assure that these accidents would not result in severe fuel damage or uncoolable geometry (8)
(35). Events that result in conditions that are outside the envelope of the design basis event
conditions are referred to as beyond design basis events. These events have the potential to
result in severe fuel damage. For sodium-cooled fast reactors, there is a subcategory of beyond
design basis events that could result in energetic disruption of the core. We refer to these as
Energetic Scenarios (ES). The potential for severe fuel damage events to lead to ES depends in
part on the manner in which molten fuel debris transports after fuel failure. If the fuel debris
forms blockages within the core region allowing fuel material to collect, there is a greater
potential for recriticality than if the fuel debris is swept from the core region (36).
Table 7 - Metal and Oxide Fuel Comparison
1 = favoring metal, 5 = favoring oxide, 3 = neutral.
General Category Specific Category Rank
Transient Events without fuel damage 3
rane Severe fuel damage events without potential for ESSevere fuel damage events with potential for ES 2
Operating Maximum Coolant Outlet Temperature (without ODS clad) 3
Constraints Maximum Coolant Outlet Temperature (with ODS clad) 4Maximum Achievable Burnup 4
111.2 General Assessment
The relative performance of metal and oxide fuel has been examined by fast reactor
designers since the 1960s (13). The following section outlines the operating constraints for metal
and oxide fuel and then describes historical and current safety characteristics of metal and oxide
fuel. The safety cases for metal and oxide fuels will then be compared using the criteria set forth
in NUREG-1860.
In the NUREG-1860 approach, licensing basis events (LBEs) are developed by grouping
accident scenarios according to common characteristics, including their potential offsite
consequences. Although LBEs are in many respects analogous to Design Basis Accidents or
Design Basis Events, as used in current licensing practice, an LBE can involve any degree of fuel
damage. If the consequences are greater than 500 rem, the licensee must demonstrate that either
the mean frequency of such an event is less than 10~8/ry or the 95th percentile is less than 10-7/ry.
III.2.A Operatingz Constraints
The proposed core outlet temperatures for the next generation sodium reactors indicate a
potential temperature limitation for metallic cores. General Electric's S-PRISM and the
Westinghouse SFR design are both proposing metallic fuel with a fairly low core outlet
temperature (510-530 C). JSFR and EFR are both oxide fueled cores and propose operation at a
higher core outlet temperature, around 550 C. This indicates that, considering only thermal
efficiency, the SFRs employing metal fuel are currently 0.5% less efficient and thus have a
1.25% higher busbar electricity cost (see the Thermodynamic Efficiency Case Study (Section
V.11) for more details). Table 8 summarizes the core outlet temperature for 4 currently proposed
sodium reactors. A summary of the cladding options and limitation discussed in this section can
be found in Table 9.
Table 8- Comparison of Proposed Outlet Temperatures for Oxide
(10)
and Metal Fueled SFRs (7)
Design Fuel Type Tout (0C)
S-PRISM Metal 510
Westinghouse Metal 530
JSFR Oxide 550
EFR Oxide 545
Table 9 - SFR Cladding Summary
Cladding Classification Temperature Limit Burnup Limit
HT9 Martensitic 6400C 200 dpa
PNC-FMS Martensitic 6500C 150-200 dpa
D9 Austenitic 6750C 100 dpa
15-15Ti Austenitic 6750C 130 dpa
PNC1520 Austenitic 6750C 160 dpa
ODS ODS 7000C >200 dpa
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Current SFR core outlet temperatures appear to be limited by cladding performance.
Martensitic steels such as HT-92 are currently favored by US and Korean designers for both
metal and oxide fuels due to their low swelling at high burnups (> 200dpa, 20 at%). This low
swelling comes at the cost of creep resistance, which limits HT-9 cladding temperatures to below
620-640 0C (37). While the IFR program stopped fuel testing in the mid 1990s, continued
research into martensitic steels has continued in France and Japan. One of the most promising
evolutions of HT-9 is the Japanese PNC-FMS'. PNC-FMS shows the same low swelling rate as
HT-9 (PNC-FMS has been irradiated to 150dpa), exhibits improved creep resistance, as can be
seen from Figure 16, and can be operated at a cladding mid-wall temperature of 6500C. Above
this temperature, coarsening of carbides and nitrides in the cladding rapidly decreases cladding
performance and may lead to cladding failure (38).
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Figure 16- Creep Rupture Time for Various Martensitic Cladding Candidates (38)
While US and Korean reactor designers focus on martensitic steel, work on advanced
austenitic steels continues in France and Japan. The US's primary austenitic steel, D94 , achieved
peak cladding temperatures of 675'C. D9 has been tested above 130dpa without failure, but
reduced ductility above 100dpa limits the attractiveness of this cladding. Swelling limits other
promising austenitic steels, such as 15-15Ti5 and PNC1520 6, to 130 to 160dpa respectively,
HT9 composition: 0.2C-I2Cr-0.6Ni- L.OMo-0.5W-0.3v-0.38Si-0.6Mn3PNC-FMS composition: 0.15C- I ICr-0.5Ni-0.5Mo-2W-0.2v-0.05Nb-0.05Si-0.5Mn-0.05N4D9 composition: 0.05C-14Cr-15Ni-1.5Mo-0.9Si-1.7Mn-0.23Ti, 50ppm Boron
s 15-15Ti composition: 0.1C-15Cr-15Ni-1.2Mo-0.6Si-1.5Mn-0.4Ti-0.03P, 50ppm Boron
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which is below the desired 200dpa goal (38). A comparison of the swelling characteristics of
martensitic and austenitic cladding tested in EBR-II can be seen in Figure 17.
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Figure 17- EBR-II Swelling Experiments for Potential IFR Driver Fuel (39)
The JSFR design hinges upon the development of ODS7 cladding, which promises to
operate maintain sufficient creep resistance beyond 200dpa and above a peak cladding
temperature of 700'C by adding ceramic molecules, typically Y20 3, to the cladding (40). Early
tests from FFTF and BOR 60 currently show good creep and swelling behavior up to 750 0C, but
the testing database for this cladding is limited and only extends up to 115dpa. Continued testing
of this cladding is currently scheduled in JOYO to provide a licensing basis for replacing
MONJU's driver cladding with ODS. The primary technical barrier for adoption of the ODS
cladding is economic fabrication methods including welding of the end plug to the fuel pin (38).
With the proper smear density to reduce fuel/cladding-Mechanical-Interactions (FCMI)
any of the above cladding options can be utilized for both oxide and metal fuels (13) (37).
Metal fuels have an additional temperature limitation in that they form a low melting point
6 PNC1520 composition: 0.05C-15Cr-2ONi-2.5Mo-0.8Si-1.7Mn-0.02STi-O.lNb-0.025P, 40ppm Boron
ODS com position: 0.053C-10.78Cr-7.72Mo-0.02Si-0.015Mn-0.46Ti-.1Y203-0.06220-0.009N-0.001S
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eutectic with iron-based cladding materials. The eutectic formation has two properties of interest:
the liquidus temperature and rate of eutectic formation. Both these properties are complex
functions of actinide content, cladding type, zirconium content, burnup and linear power, but
even for the most limiting case examined by ANL (41), U-26%Pu-10%Zr, the liquidus
temperature of 650C remains above the creep failure temperature for martensitic cladding. Thus,
metal and oxide fuel should have the same operating temperature limits for martensitic cladding.
Whether or not metal fuel will limit the operating temperature for austenitic or ODS steels
depends on the composition of the fuel and clad, and will be discussed in the next section. The
addition of a liner between the cladding and the metal fuel has the potential of completely
preventing eutectic formation, thus allowing metal and oxide fuel operating conditions to be
primarily governed by cladding performance. This elimination of eutectic formation can come
with safety implications, as will be discussed in the transient performance Section II.3b, of this
case study.
While most of the fuel/cladding chemical interactions (FCCI) have been almost
completely resolved through a lowered oxygen-to-heavy-metal ratio (42), the same is not true
with metal fuel due to the abrupt end of the IFR program in 1994. The following sub-sections
will overview the current state of knowledge for metallic fuel FCCI.
(i) Cladding Temperature Limit Implications of the Metallic fuel/cladding Eutectic Formation
A complex underlying phenomenology determines the eutectic liquidus temperature. The
combination of cladding and fuel constituents creates a wide variability in the liquidus
temperature, as can be seen in Table 10. Liquidus temperature predictions become more difficult
with the addition of lanthanides and rare earth fission products. Thus, the only method for
determining the liquidus temperature is through experimentation, which leaves the analyst
vulnerable to the effects of limited data.
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Table 10- Liquidus Temperatures from Direct-Couple Data After 300-700 Hours at Temperature
(41)
Melting Temperature ('C)
304 316 HT9 D9
U-8Pu-1OZr >760 790 740 750
U-19Pu-OZr >780 790 >780 >730
U-26Pu-10Zr - <775 650 650
U-15Pu-1lZr >800 >800 >800 >800
During the IFR program, direct-couple (a.k.a. diffusion-couple but this thesis will use
direct-couple for consistency) testing was one of the methods employed to determine the liquidus
temperature for metallic fuel/cladding combinations. The schematic in Figure 18 illustrates the
changes observed during fuel/cladding restructuring in fresh fuel which the liquidus temperatures
reported in Table 10 attempt to define. Initially, interstitial atoms such as carbon, oxygen, nickel,
chromium, and especially nitrogen migrate into the fuel. These atoms have an affinity for
zirconium and form a zirconium-rich layer between the fuel and the cladding. This zirconium
layer acts as an imperfect barrier to iron, uranium, and plutonium migration. Some melting is
expected in the zirconium-depleted fuel region, although the partially-melted fuel has been
observed to transform into a load bearing foam which has little safety impact. On the other side
of the zirconium-rich region, melting is expected as uranium and plutonium start to form a
eutectic with the iron in the cladding. The stainless steels 304 and 316 both have a high- nitrogen
concentration, which is credited for causing the higher liquidus temperatures seen for these
claddings in Table 10. The high affinity between nitrogen and zirconium is believed to promote
the formation of a thick zirconium diffusion barrier between the fuel and cladding. Additional
tests have been conducted in which a nitrogen-rich layer has been applied between the fuel and
cladding in an attempt to force a zirconium-rich layer to form more effectively in HT9 fuels.
Since this barrier is imperfect, it is theoretically possible that, if the sample is heated for an
extremely long period of time, enough iron, uranium, and plutonium migration will occur to
lower the liquidus temperature of stainless steels 304 and 316 further. Unfortunately, furnace
testing was only conducted up to 700 hours and thus it is impossible to determine what would
have happened under further testing (41).
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Figure 18- Schematic of Direct-Couple Fuel/Cladding Restructuring after Heating (41)
Since the IFR program ended, there has been additional direct-couple testing conducted
in both the US and Korea. The direct-couple testing in the US primarily examines the effects of
plutonium bearing metal fuel on potential high temperature cladding, such as ODS, TI 128 and
9800H , at their peak design temperatures (7000C). In order to determine the effect of fission
products on FCCI without access to irradiated fuel, two fuel forms were used: U-19Pu-OZr and
U-l9Pu-9Zr-2Nd-2.5Mo-2.5Ru. The neodymium was added to represent lanthanide diffusion
and chemical behaviors, and molybdenum and ruthenium are added to represent noble metal
diffusion and chemical behaviors. Samples were tested for 25 hours and then cooled and
examined with SEM. The fresh fuel samples showed the expected high zirconium layer and no
liquid phase for the advanced cladding tested. The samples with the synthetic fission products
lacked the high zirconium layer after 25 hours and extensive diffusion occurred between the fuel
and the cladding. Additionally, ODS showed extensive liquid phase transformation, while no
conclusive evidence for liquid phases was found for 800H, the only other steel tested with the
synthetic fission product fuel (43) (44).
The KAERI has also been using direct-couple tests to examine potential diffusion barriers
for 25 hours at 800'C. These barriers are applied by vapor deposition of either zirconium, (Cr-Ni
alloy-Zr) or Ti-(Cr-Ni alloy-Zr) between the U-1OZr and HT9. The zirconium forms a coherent
diffusion barrier while Ti, Cr, Ni forms a non-coherent precipitate layer which combines with the
zirconium to form a highly effective secondary barrier against FCCI and drastically reduces
T112 composition: 0.011C-10.54Cr-0.32Mo-0.15Si-0.62Mn-0.320-0.54Nb-0.39Ni-0.19V-0.63Al
800H composition: 0.069C-20.42Cr-0.13Si-0.76Mn-31.59Ni-0.50Al-0.57Ti-0.42Cu-0.014P-0.001S
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cladding wastage (45). The extent to which these barriers will hold up under irradiation is
currently unknown and should be investigated in the future.
We can conclude from these recent direct-couple tests that ODS steel does not undergo
liquid phase transition at 700"C with fresh fuel, partially due to the high zirconium region that is
allowed to form. The addition of "fission products" prevents this high zirconium layer and
extensive liquid phase transition is seen for ODS clad, although other high temperature steels do
not undergo liquid phase transition. The effect of rapid zirconium layer formation and gradual
fission product buildup, as would be seen in a reactor, is unknown at this time. It is possible that
the high zirconium layer would reduce lanthanide buildup in the clad, raising the liquidus
temperature. As ODS cladding is designed to be operated at high temperatures, special attention
should be given to both high temperature-low linear power behavior, as well as the ability of
vapor deposit diffusion barriers, such as those examined by KAERI, to prevent fission product
buildup in the clad.
While the direct-couple tests explain the fresh fuel, or simulated burned fuel diffusion
characteristics at elevated temperatures, they do not include the effects of long term temperature
gradients and gradual lanthanide buildup with burnup. It should be noted that for most irradiated
fuel tests, the fuel/cladding interface temperature is typically low, < 600 0C, the plutonium
content is medium-to-low, <19 wt% Pu, and then the fuel rod segment is heated post-irradiation
for 1 to 36 hours in order to gauge transient FCCI behavior. Even so, it is possible to gain some
insight on how burnup will affect the liquidus temperatures reported in Table 10. Due to the low
operating temperatures, the high zirconium buffer region takes a long time to form an effective
barrier, allowing uranium, plutonium and iron migration to dominate the liquidus temperatures.
At higher burnups, lanthanides have had a chance to penetrate deep into the cladding and
dominate FCCI. By this time, a high zirconium layer has had a chance to f6rm thus retarding
additional diffusion which might lower the liquidus temperature further. Once this zirconium
layer has formed, the liquidus temperature is determined by iron which has already penetrated
into the fuel and lanthanides and actinides which have penetrated into the clad. The existing
testing indicates that the liquidus temperature from irradiated fuel decreases with burn-up, as the
liquidus temperature for U-19wt%Pu-Zr HT9 fuel dropped to 6500C at 11% burnup (34) (46)
(47).
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Figure 19- Schematic of Fuel(U-19%Pu-10%Zr)/Cladding Restructuring with Burnup (34)
The degree to which the liquidus temperature decreases with burnup seems to be a
function of linear power, which controls the rate of lanthanides build up in the cladding
(controlled by burnup and linear power) with respect to the rate of the protective zirconium layer
formation (controlled by time at temperature), as shown in Figure 19. The high thermal
conductivity of sodium ensures that the peak cladding temperature occurs at the top of the core,
where the linear heat rate is the lowest. The linear heat rate dictates the temperature gradient in
the fuel, which is the primary driving force for lanthanide migration into the cladding. Because
the linear heat rate is at a minimum at the top of the core, the lower temperature gradients
provide less of a driving force for lanthanides to enter the cladding. Lanthanides dominate FCCI
at high burnup, so the liquidus temperature is the highest where the lanthanide concentration is
the lowest, at the top of the core. Short core designs, i.e., EBR-II, have fairly flat axial power
distributions and thus this trend is not easily seen in the EBR-II fuel tests. FFTF was designed
with a taller core and the D9 cladding IFR- 1 lead test assembly demonstrated the variation of
liquidus temperature from linear heat rate. Because there was only one metal fuel test assembly
in FFTF and little available high burnup furnace data from EBRII, it is difficult to completely
separate out the effects of burnup from those of linear power within a given assembly for D9
clad. Still, combining the FFTF D9 data with the EBR-II HT9 data does support a linear heat rate
dependency on liquidus temperature, as can be seen in Figure 20.
To further examine the dependency of liquidus temperature on linear heat rate shown in
Figure 20, two curves have been plotted on both the HT9 and D9 graphs. The first curve is the
conservative liquidus temperature curve (solid). This curve istes td aa step function and
connects the tests conducted at the highest linear power for a given temperature in which no
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liquefaction is experienced at a lower temperature. Thus, the 14.7kW/ft, 6750C HT9 EBR-II test
is not included in this curve, since multiple tests conducted at combinations of equal or lower
temperatures and linear powers show that liquefaction should occur in this region. Whether or
not this curve is actually conservative can only be determined with further fuel testing. The
optimistic curve (dotted) connects the most extreme tests, in terms of linear power and test-
temperature, which are with non-liquefaction tests in which no experimental results are
inconstant with the curve. Thus, for the HT9 EBR-II tests, the optimistic curve connects the test
at 11.7kW/ft, 7000C with the test at 15.3kW/ft, 650C. It should be noted that the conservative
curve is only conservative when compared to the optimistic curve because longer time-at-
temperature tests may yield liquefaction below this curve. The optimistic and conservative
curves are only an indication of a possible trend, and further fuel testing needs to be conducted at
much longer time-at-temperatures before these curves can be validated.
Unfortunately, due to the short heating times of these furnace tests it is impossible to
definitively know the steady state liquidus temperature for either cladding at high burnup. Thus,
to be conservative, many core designers limit their peak cladding temperature to 650'C
regardless of linear power. While this might be a practical assumption in the short term,
additional fuels testing may allow the peak cladding temperature to be raised to 7000C or greater
depending on linear power at the top of the core for advanced cladding, such as ODS. Currently,
no database for metallic fuel with ODS clad exists. Thus it is impossible to determine if ODS
will be more or less susceptible to eutectic penetration than HT9 or D9 cladding. Beyond the
limited database of high burnup fuel/cladding interactions, the unknown interplay between the
ceramic Y20 3, which exists in ODS cladding but not in traditional steels, and the metallic fuel
makes any attempt to extrapolate a eutectic temperature impossible (34) (46) (47) (41).
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Figure 20- Liquidus Temperature Variations with Linear Power for U-19%Pu-O%Zr.
HT9 cladding irradiated in EBR-I to 10.4±0.7 at% burnup (left). D9 cladding irradiated in FFTF
to 9.4 at% burnup (right). Times refer to furnace hold time at indicated temperature. Tests
resulting in liquefaction (melting) are indicated by diamonds, tests resulting in no liquefaction
are indicated by squares. (34) (46) (47)
Some reactor designers have taken the metal fuel liquidus temperature to be 650'C
regardless of fuel composition, cladding choice or linear power, thus imposing a 500C
temperature penalty compared to ODS cladding oxide fuel (3) (48). This temperature penalty
seems to be imposed either due to the liquidus temperatures of U-26Pu-1OZr fuels found in
direct-couple tests, or due to the 650 0C liquidus temperatures found in the high linear power tests
described by Cohen (34). While Cohen reports the FCCI results of the high burnup-high linear
power elements DP-17, DP-21, he did not report results of the higher burnup but lower linear
power element T-608. The T-608 element showed less cladding wastage and a higher liquidus
temperature than either of the higher linear power elements. This element was examined at the
same time as the DP tests to determine the effects of linear power on FCCI and the test results
can be found in the Annual IFR.Progress Report from 1993. When the T-608 data for HT9
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cladding is coupled with the IFR-1 test data for D9 cladding, there seems to be evidence to
support the notion that a bounding 650C temperature limit may be overly conservative. Further
irradiation test data will be needed to resolve this issue. Both sets of liquefaction data are plotted
in Figure 20. The following quote, from the 1993 IFR annual progress report, emphasizes the
required conservative nature of setting the liquidus temperature limit given the lack of data (46):
"Even though the data show that the eutectic threshold temperature is higherforfresh
fuel... a eutectic threshold temperature of 1200OF (650 0C) has been applied irrespective of
burnup, cladding type or exact quantity of plutonium or other actinides in the fuel. The
reason for adopting this position is in order to bound the effects of fission product
(especially lanthanides)and actinide carryover which will be experienced in current
unknown amounts when the fuel is recycled through the preprocessing and the recycled
fuel returned to EBR-lI, -i.e., to set conservative criteria prior to the availability of data..."
Thus, in order to operate cladding above 650C, additional fuel testing would be required.
Regardless, additional testing would be required to operate at temperatures above 650 0C because
the primary candidate cladding for metal fuel, HT-9, is creep limited below 650"C. The large
variability in fuel/cladding combinations would require extensive fuel testing for high
temperature cladding candidates, and this testing should include high temperature, low linear
power tests to prevent unnecessary exclusion of the high temperature operation.
(ii) Operating Conditions Conclusions
Taking into account all of the available cladding limits, primarily due to creep and
fuel/cladding eutectic, the following guidelines can be formulated:
* Due to the large dependence of the fuel/cladding liquidus temperature on cladding
choice, it is impossible to set a eutectic limit for a cladding without empirical data.
" For U.S. tested cladding, i.e. SS304, SS316, D9, HT9, and variations of U.S. tested
cladding which most likely have similar eutectic behavior, i.e., PNC-FMS, 15-15Ti,
creep limits will limit cladding performance, not eutectic liquefaction. Thus, the value of
3 (neutral) is given to outlet temperature (without an ODS clad) category in Table 5.
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" With metal fuel, high Pu regions of the core, i.e., >20 at%, may or may not require
restricted cladding temperatures due to burnup effects when using U.S. tested cladding
other than SS316 since no high burnup eutectic data exist and direct-couple tests show an
initially low liquidus temperature. If deploying advanced cladding, such as ODS, high Pu
regions may be restricted to a peak cladding temperature of 650 0C unless additional
zirconium is added to the fuel matrix to increase the liquidus temperature or a diffusion
barrier is employed to prevent eutectic -formation. Thus, the value of 4 (slightly favoring
oxide) is given to outlet temperature with ODS cladding category in Table 7.
" Due to a lack of high burnup metallic fuel data, the value of 4 (slightly favoring oxide) is
given to the achievable burnup category in Table 5. Lead test assemblies from EBR-II
show the potential for HT9 to be burned past 20 at%, but not enough data exist at this
time to form a licensing basis beyond 11 at% burnup.
Additionally, Chapter V of this thesis overviews how the rate of fuel/cladding eutectic
formation can predicted more accurately than traditional modeling correlations, both of which
assume that the formation rate is only dependent upon the temperature of the fuel/cladding
interface. New correlations are developed using multivariable regression, and model uncertainty
is used to create uncertainty bounds for existing and new predictive correlations.
III.2.B Transient Response
The fuel in a sodium reactor is not arranged in the most reactive configuration. Thus
accidents which change the geometry or remove coolant have the potential to cause runaway
reactivity excursions. Excursions which lead to the release of fuel outside the cladding are
referred to as core disruptive accidents (CDAs). If these excursions produce mechanical energy
due to sodium boiling or fuel vaporization, they are referred to as Energetic Scenarios (ES) and
may have enough energy to damage the vessel head and thus provide a pathway to radiation
release. The following sections outline the historical and present response to ESs for metal and
oxide fuel.
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(i)Overview of Energetic Scenarios
CDAs are low-probability hypothetical accidents that result in a core geometry change.
CDAs are of concern in fast reactors because the fuel is generally not arranged in its most
reactive configuration and core compaction can lead to large reactivity insertions. If the net
reactivity insertion is larger than $1, the resulting prompt reactivity excursion may allow the fuel
to vaporize and the resulting pressure shock waves will cause the core to disassemble. If the
CDA reaches the point of fuel vaporization, it is referred to as an ES (49).
The "work energy" is the maximum amount of work done on the reactor vessel resulting
from ESs (49). There is no appreciable work energy from non-ESs because the fuel does not
vaporize and sizeable pressure waves within the vessel are avoided. Structural components, such
as the reactor vessel and containment, must be able to withstand the work energy if the public is
to be protected against these very low probability accidents. Making ESs highly unlikely may
allow for the possibility of reduced design requirements for the containment and reactor vessel.
(ii) Traditional Energetic Scenario Modeling
Early ES analyses were conducted using the Bethe-Tait methodology. This procedure
removes all of the coolant from the core and assumes that the core collapses on itself through
gravity. The corresponding reactivity insertion vaporizes the fuel until the core disassembles.
Many negative feedback mechanisms such as core expansion or removal of fuel during the
accident are neglected. Using this methodology, reactivity ramp rates of $60/s were
hypothesized yielding extremely large work energy values. As the scientific community began
to understand more about the SFR core behavior and became more certain about feedback
mechanisms, the work energy values for SFR cores exponentially decreased, as can be seen in
Figure 21. As a result it is almost impossible to compare work energy values from different
historical studies meaningfully.
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Most current ES studies assume an unprotected transient and ignore specific feedbacks in
order to force the fuel vaporization. These studies have been performed as recently as 2002 and
provide some insight into how metal and oxide fuels behave during ESs. In an analysis by Singh
of an Unprotected Loss of Flow Accident initiating an ES, metal fuel released less work energy
than oxide fuel per fraction of the core that was melted before fuel vaporization occurred (36).
This result was attributed to the larger negative Doppler power feedback in the metal fuel and the
neglecting of negative feedbacks derived from fuel movement. Even though metal fuel has a
smaller Doppler temperature coefficient than the oxide fuel, its low specific heat allows for a
stronger negative feedback per unit power than the oxide fuel, which takes more energy to raise
its temperature.
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(iii )Mechanisms Preventing Metals Fuels from experiencing Energetic Scenarios
Many metallic fuel proponents take exception to the traditional view that any fuel type
can undergo an ES. The basis for their view is the following hypothesis: inherent feedback and
metallic fuel motion and sweep-out will stop accidents in the CDA phase. Actinides and
Lanthanides in metallic fuel can form a low melting point eutectic with the cladding starting at
650'C, which makes the cladding more vulnerable to creep stresses. During the pre-disassembly
phase of an ES at high cladding temperatures (>900'C) the eutectic will quickly lead to failure of
the cladding, releasing molten fuel into the coolant. However, the low fuel melting temperature
of the metallic fuel (-1080'C) will ensure that any flow paths clogged by re-solidified fuel will
unblock as the sodium in the blocked pathway re-melts the fuel. Under full flow conditions with
the pump pressure slightly pressurizing the sodium, the eutectic will typically breach the
cladding before substantial coolant bulk boiling occurs, stopping the transient before the positive
sodium void coefficient can cause an additional power excursion. However, under low flow
conditions without the pressure head from the pump, the temperature of sodium can increase to
the boiling point of 8810C, indicating that some boiling in the hot channel may occur before the
eutectic breaches the cladding wall. SAS4A results indicate that in this time period, the axial
movement of fuel within the cladding leads to a rapid decrease in reactivity that counteracts the
reactivity insertion from sodium boiling. If the molten fuel leaving failed fuel is swept out of the
core, the negative reactivity produced by losing fuel from the core will cause the reactor to
quickly shut down before fuel vaporization could occur (50).
In a loss of flow event, the coolant will not have the driving force to carry away the
molten fuel in streamers. A minor energetic release can occur when, after the molten fuel leaves
the cladding due to a driving force from fission gases in the plenum and gases dissolved in the
fuel, some of the fuel travels through the core, thus possibly causing prompt criticality. The
potential for prompt criticality is the greatest in an initial core loading where no high-burnup pins
exist, thus allowing for the initial cladding failures to occur with minimal fission gas pressure to
drive the fuel out of the core. SAS4a simulations have determined that, during highly
conservative simulations, the resulting thermal energy from this power spike will not exceed
50MJs before enough fuel leaves the core to cause the reactor to shut down and stop additional
melting. Additionally, a 3000C margin to fuel vaporization was maintained in all simulations,
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thereby limiting work energy to vaporized sodium bubbles (51). This energy level is too small to
cause damage to the vessel, which would lead to measureable offsite consequences (52). Studies
that have examined the amount and distribution of fuel collecting on the bottom of the vessel
have shown that re-criticality should be avoided with large margins (50) (51). Further testing of
metal fuel's post cladding failure behavior at low flow rates will be required to verify these
simulations.
Some proposed metallic fueled reactor designs, such as the S-PRISM, are not designed
with an additional in-core ES mitigation system based on the perception of inherent prevention
of ESs. By removing ESs from the containment design constraints, the current machinery dome
may be able to be replaced with a more flexible and less costly containment design, such as the
one proposed for S-PRISM (35). This containment would have to contain potential sodium
spills, seismic events, and guard against airplane crashes and other missile impacts. These design
goals may be achievable through a minimally re-enforced thick concrete structure, thus allowing
for more flexibility in the containment design and implementation, which could save
construction costs.
Some reactor designers have proposed the addition of a Vanadium liner between the
metal fuel and cladding to prevent eutectic formation at high temperatures. These designers wish
to utilize advanced austenitic or ODS cladding to achieve high outlet temperatures and increase
thermal efficiency (4). This approach would likely remove the eutectic fuel removal pathway
from the metal fuel safety case, although additional testing needs to be performed to determine if
the Vanadium liner deteriorates above 900'C where eutectic formation enters the safety case.
Even if the liner were to deteriorate quickly at these temperatures, it is probable that the liner
would impede the exodus of the fuel from the clad. This could decrease the rate at which
negative reactivity is inserted into the reactor, slowing shutdown and increasing the chance of
fuel vaporization, and thus energetic releases.
(iv )Mechanisms Preventing Oxide Fuels from experiencing Energetic Scenarios
There is evidence that oxide fuels may also be able to benefit from fuel removal as a way
to prevent ESs. SIMMER III is a code package originally created by LANL and further
developed at the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe and the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development
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Institute. SIMMER III performs a more mechanistic analysis of fuel motion out of the core
during ESs than SAS4a. SIMMER simulations, with supporting experiments, have shown that a
significant portion of the molten oxide core (upwards of 50%) can potentially be removed from
the core through the control rod guide tubes before fuel vaporization occurs. This process
requires the molten oxide fuel to first breach the cladding and then intra-assembly ducts before
finally leaving the core. These barriers may delay oxide fuel removal from the core to the extent
that there is some energy release but not to the extent predicted by traditional analysis (53) (54)
(55).
The potential of ESs in oxide cores has led some proposed SFR designs, such as the
JSFR, to consider additional systems to mitigate their consequences. The JSFR has two such
additional systems: a core catcher and inter-assembly streaming channels. During a severe
accident oxide fuel could slump to the bottom of the vessel and form a critical geometry in that
region, leading to fuel vaporization (10). In order to prevent the oxide fuel from experiencing re-
criticality, the JSFR incorporates a core catcher that is intended to spread the molten fuel in a
coolable subcritical geometry. Core catchers add expense, especially considering the low
probability of their use. If ESs resulting in potential re-criticality can be removed from design
considerations, the core catcher could be excluded from design.
The JSFR is also considering the inclusion of streaming channels within the fuel
assemblies (Figure 22). These assemblies would sacrifice fuel pins in order to provide a space
for molten oxide fuel to leave the core during a severe accident. The streaming of the fuel out of
the core would shut the reactor down before the oxide started to vaporize and produce significant
work energy (40). However, by removing fuel from the streaming assemblies there is either a
fuel cycle penalty or penalty of lower power density since additional assemblies are required to
compensate for the streaming paths.
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(v) Comparison of Metal and Oxide-Fueled Designs
This section will compare the safety performance of metal and oxide cores for a spectrum
of accident scenarios. The consequences of design basis events, postulated accidents to which
the single-failure criterion is applied, have essentially the same consequences for the two
different types of core. They also have very similar margins to severe accident conditions.
Events without severe fuel damage in Table 7 are given a value of 3 (neutral) Beyond Design
Basis Events are any events that exceed the design basis conditions. They may or may not lead
to severe fuel damage. Similarly, severe fuel damage may or may not lead to an ES.
For historical reasons, SFR accident analyses have focused on a set of Beyond Design
Basis Events referred to as unprotected accidents. In this case, unprotected means scenarios that
include failure of the reactor protection system. Because of sodium's excellent heat transfer
properties and the unpressurized nature of SFR reactor coolant systems, it is difficult to identify
scenarios that result in fuel damage, if the reactor protection system works. From a risk
standpoint, unprotected sequences are not necessarily risk significant, because of their low
probabilities. It is important to also recognize that severe fuel damage can occur for other
scenarios in which the reactor protection system functions. For example, the Fermi I accident
73
indicates the importance of design features to prevent core damage from flow blockage. Three
general categories of unprotected accidents will be discussed:
e Unprotected Transient Overpower (UTOP)
* Unprotected Loss of Flow (ULOF)
* Unprotected Loss of Heat Sink (ULOHS)
There are two typical proposed initiators of an unprotected transient overpower. One
cause is a malfunction of the reactor protection system which withdraws the control rods to their
stops which may or may not be misaligned to allow for varying degrees of reactivity insertion.
These transients favor metal fuel because the slow method of reactivity insertion allows the
delayed feedbacks of control rod driveline and core radial expansion to help reduce the peak
power experienced during the transient. The other initiator is due to sodium voiding within the
core. While this initiator is more difficult to physically justify, it favors oxide fuel's stronger
Doppler coefficient and larger margin to fuel melting. For extremely large reactivity insertions
which raise oxide fuel past the point of melting, oxide fuel has a difficult time escaping the core
to remove reactivity thus posing the potential for ESs (36). Metal fuel's rapid fuel/cladding
eutectic formation rate at high temperatures allows it to remove liquid fuel from the core quickly,
thus ending the transient (51) (13). If metal fuel is forced to remain in place by a liner or massive
flow blockage, metal fuel has the potential to undergo an ES as well (36).
Unprotected loss of flow accidents also come in two different categories: ULOF with or
without pump coastdown. Pump coastdown can come from inertia from a mechanical pump or
from a flywheel attached to an EM pump and is tailored to sufficiently minimize the rate of flow
reduction to allow the reactor to power down via reactivity feedbacks. Due to the large operating
temperature of an oxide fuel and the slow thermal time constant to remove the stored energy,
oxide cores are typically designed to achieve a longer flow halving time than metal cores. A
ULOF without coastdown is the most commonly modeled way for an oxide core to experience
an ES. The fuel/cladding eutectic formation typically prevents metal cores from experiencing ES
under these circumstances, but under certain assumptions ULOFs without coastdown could
potentially result in ES for metal fuel (36) (51) (20) (33).
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The last major unprotected accident category is the unprotected loss of heat sink. These
accidents could for example involve failure of the condenser pumps, which removes the primary
heat sink. The reactor continues to operate at power, which slowly reduces as the system
temperature rises. The only heat removal path available to the reactor is the safety grade decay
heat removal system. The low operating temperature of metal fuel allows the reactor to shut
down and the system to stabilize with large margins to sodium boiling and creep failure of the
structural supports. Oxide fuels, with their high operating temperatures, take longer to reduce
power causing more energy to be deposited in the primary system. This can result in high system
temperatures which can threaten the core structural supports or even result in sodium boiling (20)
(33).
When examining inherent reactivity response to beyond design basis accidents, metal fuel
emerges as a strong favorite. Because of metal fuel's consistently better accident response,
except for extremely large and quick reactivity insertions where the fuel is confined by a
cladding with a barrier that prevents eutectic formation, the severe fuel damage event without
potential for ES category is assigned the value of 1. The severe fuel damage event with the
potential for ES category is assigned the value of 2 because metal fuel still outperforms oxide
fuel in all but the most extreme cases.
II.3 Technical Evaluation
The NUREG- 1860 safety case for a generic SFR core is made in Section IV and extended
to higher temperatures for metal and oxide fuel in the Thermodynamic Efficiency case study.
Thus, the basic safety case for metal and oxide fuels is described in Chapter V and (14);
consequently the overall safety case will not be described here. In lieu of a full safety case, the
following topics will be discussed:
1. Relative accident response for bounding accidents
a. UTOP comparison for metal and oxide fuel
b. ULOF comparison for metal and oxide fuel
2. Steady state liquidus limit for U-19Pu-OZr for an unspecified high-temperature cladding
at 1 lat% burnup.
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III.3.A Relative Accident Response for Bounding Licensing Basis Events
This section will compare the relative performance of metal and oxide fuel for the UTOP
and ULOF sequences. To simplify the comparison of fuel types, only the 510'C and 554'C
steady state core average outlet temperatures are examined for the metal and oxide fuel
comparison. These temperatures were chosen since they represent the current and maximum
potential core outlet temperatures of metallic fueled SFRs (see Chapter IV for more details). In
order to determine the probability of cladding failure and/or sodium boiling, the importance
sampling method described in Section 11.4 was used to create hundreds of RELAP5-3D
simulations of metal fuel and oxide fuel performance for both transients.
(i)Evaluation of Transient Uncertainties for Metal and Oxide Fuel
In order to estimate the probability of failure for Transient Overpower (TOP) and Loss of
Flow (LOF) LBEs, many simulations have been conducted with uncertain parameters sampled
from underlying epistemic distributions. For both oxide and metal cores experiencing TOP and
LOF events, ANL studied the epistemic reactivity coefficient uncertainties for SFR cores. They
report the epistemic uncertainties as normal distributions with the following standard deviations
(25):
* Doppler (cYDop= 20% aDop)
* Na density (GNa= 20% aNa)
* Axial expansion (cYa =30% aAE)
* Core radial expansion (aCyRE= 20% UCRE)
* Control rod drive line expansion (GCRDL= 2 O%(XCRDL)
Due to a combination of lack of knowledge and difficulty of simulation, many important
uncertainties are not included in the following analysis. Because these uncertainties are not
modeled, conservative values are assumed in an attempt to provide a conservative estimate of the
conditional failure probabilities. Some of the excluded uncertainties that should be included in
future analysis include:
e Reactivity insertion rate
e Thermal conductivity of fuel and clad
e Creep and eutectic formation rates
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e Power peaking factors
(ii)Statistical Methods Used to Predict Release Frequencies for Metal and Oxide Fuel
This section summarizes the information found in 11.4 and 11.5 and is only intended to
help the reader understand how the failure probabilities are calculated in Sections iii and iv.
Pool type sodium reactors are designed to survive most unprotected transients without
cladding rupture. To avoid running a prohibitive number of RELAP5 simulations, the sampling
distributions should be biased in a way which forces sampling of larger, and thus more limiting,
reactivity coefficients while providing an unbiased estimate of the failure probabilities. By
biasing the sampling procedure through importance sampling, each simulation is no longer
assigned the same weight when calculating failure probabilities.
The mean and variance of the failure probability calculated through Importance Sampling
(IS) can be found through Eq. 111.1 and Eq.III.2,
E[P] = Wi(p) ( wi (a) F (fp, adop, -. ,]aCRE
Var(E[p])
N M 2
= N- 1 N { Wi(p) (iij(ai)F ({piadop,, ... , aCRE i
i=1 j=1j III.2
- E[p]2
where wi (a, )is the weight of the j1' importance reactivity coefficient and M is the total number
of importance sampled reactivity coefficients (23).
Because the TNF has requirements on both the mean and the 95th percentile of the
radiation release, and thus cladding failure, distributions around the cladding failure probabilities
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are required. The likelihood function for cladding failure is binomial: either the cladding fails or
remains intact. The prior and posterior distributions for cladding failure take the form of the beta
distribution. These distributions are expressed by Eq. 111.3 and Eq. 111.4, respectively (22).
L(xIN,p) = (N) px(l _ p)N-x 111.3
F(q +r)
rc(pfq,r) = 1p4-1( - p)r-1F(r)F(p) III.4
L(x IN, p) is the likelihood of x failures in N trials, p is the probability of failure, F(.) is
the gamma function, and q and r are the shape parameters of the beta distribution.
This method has been described in more detail in the general methodology section of this
thesis, Section 11.5.
(iii) UTOP
This section will outline the relative performance of oxide and metal fuel to the bounding
licensing basis UTOP event, as described in the thermodynamic efficiency case study (Chapter
IV.2). In this account, the time dependant progression of system temperature for both fuels will
be examined, focusing on steady state temperatures reached at the end of the transient. It should
be noted that the following analysis was conducted using the reactivity behavior of metal and
oxide TRU fuel with the same uncertainties and statistical sampling described in the
thermodynamic efficiency case study.
In order to model the UTOP, the following assumptions were made. First, the reactor
power and control system malfunctions and corrects for a false low power indication by raising
the control rods to their stops. These stops are assumed to be previously misaligned by the
reactor operator, allowing reactivity insertion to between $0.7 and $0.9 instead of the nominal
$0.3 limit. The prompt reactivity feedbacks, i.e., Doppler (-), sodium density (+), and the delayed
reactivity feedbacks, i.e., control rod driveline expansion (-) and core radial expansion (-), all
respond to counteract the initial reactivity insertion. This initial response is labeled as Section A
in Figure 24 through Figure 29. Next, the inlet temperature starts to rise, thus increasing the
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temperature of the entire core, including the coolant, fuel, control rod driveline and fuel
assembly spacers. Because the overall temperature feedback of both the oxide and the metal
cores are negative, negative reactivity continues to build up thus reducing thermal power levels.
This inlet temperature rise is exacerbated because NUREG-1860 does not allow credit to be
taken for non-safety grade systems during accident analysis. Thus, the primary heat sink was
disabled by tripping the condenser pump at the start of the transient; leaving only decay heat
removal operational. This power decrease is labeled Section B. The final stage of the accident
occurs when the cold pool heats up to 535'C, or 579'C for the hotter core, which trips EM pumps
to prevent overheating. The pump trip effectively turns what is already a UTOP-ULOHS into a
ULOF as well. The progression of this transient is illustrated in Figure 23. As heat removal from
the core transitions from forced convection to natural circulation, the reactor decreases power
dramatically leading to one of the following end states:
* The reactor power decreases to decay heat levels and the decay heat removal system
successfully provides long term cooling.
e The reactor power decreases to decay heat levels and the decay heat removal system
successfully provides long term cooling, but not before thermal creep causes cladding
failure.
* The reactor power does not decrease fast enough, allowing peak sodium temperatures to
reach their full-flow boiling point, which is approximately 9250C due to the pressure head
of the pumps. From the onset of hot channel sodium boiling it can be assumed that minor
core damage occurs, but RELAP5-3D does not have the capability to accurately model
the accident progression beyond this point.
e The reactor power does not decrease fast enough; allowing channel averaged sodium
temperatures to reach their boiling point. From the onset of boiling in the core outlet it
can be assumed that major core damage occurs, but RELAP5-3D does not have the
capability to accurately model the accident progression beyond this point.
79
ParametersPower to flow Negative power
sampled Condenser is-match coefficient
Control rods pump causes core to stabilizes reactor
withdrawal to trips* heat-up power at higher
stops power
Power to flow Negative powerCold pool Prtiary 1 mis-match coefficient
heats to pum1ps trip causes core to reduces reactor
heat-up power
*Non-safety grade components cannot be taken credit for in safety analysis
Figure 23 - Block diagram of UTOP LBE Progression.
Section A in Figure 24 through Figure 29 covers the initial phase of the transient, which
is the response to the reactivity insertion. The reactivity insertion rate is dictated by the
maximum speed of the control rod driveline motors, limiting the reactivity insertion rate to
$0.16/s. At this speed, energy is able to transfer into the coolant quickly enough that the metal
core's stronger control rod driveline and core radial expansion feedbacks are able to limit peak
power and reactivity insertion to below that of the oxide core. Had the insertion rate been much
quicker, the oxide core's slightly stronger Doppler coefficient poper 0.-2-
S
PDopper = -0.10 ), would have caused the immediate power increase to be smaller than the
metal core, although the stabilized power level for the metal fuel would have been lower than for
the oxide fuel. In summary, the immediate impact of the initial transient is that the fuel and
coolant temperatures increase more dramatically for the oxide fuel than for the metal fuel in this
range.
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Figure 24-Metal (left) and Oxide (right) Reactivity Response to LBE UTOP Divided into Three
Sections: A) Response to initial power increase, B) Feedback from inlet temperature rise, C)
Response to pump trip
Section B in Figure 24 through Figure 27 covers the pool heat-up phase of the transient,
which is the response to the loss of primary heat removal. Due to the oxide core's higher post
UTOP power level, inlet temperature effects start to dominate the oxide core's response to the
transient more dramatically than for the metal core. Due to the relatively low fuel temperature in
metal fuel, the negative feedback effects from additional core expansion and driveline insertion
are only counteracted by a weak Doppler swing as the fuel cools approximately 2000C due to
decreased thermal power. In contrast, oxide fuel cools 400-600C during this period, adding 2 to
3 times more positive reactivity than metal fuel, which acts to counteract the negative reactivity
from core and control rod expansions as the inlet temperature continues to rise.
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Figure 25 - Metal Hot Channel Temperature Response to UTOP
Three Sections: A) Response to initial power increase, B) Feedback from inlet
temperature rise, C) Response to pump trip. C.O.T. refers to the initial Core Outlet Temperature.
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Figure 26 - Oxide Hot Channel Coolant Temperature Response to UTOP
Divided into Three Sections: A) Response to initial power increase, B) Feedback from inlet
temperature rise, C) Response to pump trip. C.O.T. refers to the initial Core Outlet Temperature.
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Figure 27 - Metal Core Outlet Temperature Response to UTOP
Divided into Three Sections: A) Response to initial power increase, B) Feedback from inlet
temperature rise, C) Response to pump trip. C.O.T. refers to the initial Core Outlet Temperature.
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Figure 28-Oxide Core Outlet Temperature Response to UTOP
Divided into Three Sections: A) Response to initial power increase, B) Feedback from inlet
temperature rise, C) Response to pump trip. C.O.T. refers to the initial Core Outlet Temperature.
Section C in Figure 24 through Figure 27 covers the transition to natural circulation phase
of the transient, which is the response to the loss of primary coolant pumps. This phase is
initiated when the EM pumps reach their trip point and turn off, providing only coastdown flow
and natural circulation to cool the core. The thermal power then drops until the coolant and the
fuel are near thermal equilibrium. The oxide fuel has to cool an additional -700C to near
equilibrium with the coolant temperature. Unfortunately, the process of reaching a fuel/coolant
equilibrium temperature results in raising the coolant temperature past the boiling point in the hot
channel in the majority of simulations and past the boiling point in the core outlet in a small
fraction of simulations. As RELAP5 does not model sodium boiling, it is possible that the
positive reactivity from hot channel sodium voiding would have pushed some of the non-core
averaged boiling simulations to experience core averaged boiling. For metal fuel, the fuel and
coolant temperatures stabilize near 650-700'C with large margins to hot channel or core sodium
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554*C C.O.T.
boiling. For oxide fuel, fuel temperatures start to level off between 800 and 1 0000 C and the
coolant temperatures level off between 750 and 950"C. Thus, with oxide fuel there is little to no
margin to hot channel or core-wide boiling. This temperature difference is caused because some
of the oxide simulations terminate before the reactor power transitions completely to decay heat.
The residual power is low and able to be removed by the DRACS, but prevents the fuel and
coolant temperatures from equalizing.
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Figure 29-Metal (left) and Oxide (right) Peak Fuel Temperature Response to UTOP
Divided into Three Sections: A) Response to initial power increase, B) Feedback from inlet
temperature rise, C) Response to pump trip
Metal fuel's response to the UTOP transient is benign, with cladding failure and sodium
boiling avoided in all simulations for 510 0C and 5540C. Thus, a failure probability cannot be
calculated for metal fuel at these temperatures. Because oxide fuel simulations resulted in
cladding failure and sodium boiling, the mean and 95 'h percentiles can be directly calculated.
These values are reported in Table 11.
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Table I I - Oxide UTOP Failure Probabilities
Core Outlet Failure Path Mean 95th Percentile
Temperature Pr(Failure I UTOP) Pr(Failure I UTOP)
5100C Cladding Rupture 0.995 0.999
5100C Hot Channel Boiling 0.991 0.997
5100C Core Average Boiling 3.3x10-5 2.9x10-5
5540 C Cladding Rupture < 1.0 < 1.0
5540C Hot Channel Boiling < 1.0 < 1.0
5540 C Core Average Boiling 0.089 0.11
While the thermodynamic efficiency case study, Chapter IV, shows that both metal and
oxide cores meet the regulatory structure of NUREG-1860 when the UTOP conditional
probability of failure is applied to bound the TOP accident response, the metal core does so in a
much more benign fashion than the oxide core. The oxide core is only able to satisfy the
Frequency Consequence Curve because of the benign offsite release of the full core boiling end
state and the low initiating frequency of the TOP event. While unprotected transients have
initiating frequencies lower than 10-7/yr, and thus would not be a traditional LBE, these
transients may be selected as a deterministic LBE by the NRC. Under these circumstances,
additional scrutiny would be given to the oxide fuel's response considering the high likelihood of
sodium boiling.
(iv) ULOF (USBO)
This section will outline the relative performance of oxide and metal fuel in the bounding
licensing basis ULOF event, as described in the thermodynamic efficiency case study (Chapter
IV.2). In this account, the time dependent progression of both fuels will be examined, focusing
on steady state temperatures reached at the end of the transient. It should be noted that the
following analysis was conducted using the reactivity behavior of metal and oxide TRU fuel with
the same uncertainties and statistical sampling described in the thermodynamic efficiency case
study.
In order to model the ULOF, the following assumptions were made. First, all four
primary reactor coolant pumps trip, coasting down from forced to natural circulation using the
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pump's internal inertia. It is assumed that the reactor protection system fails, preventing the
control rods from inserting into the reactor, which would quickly reduce reactor power. Instead,
the reactor begins to decrease thermal power as the prompt reactivity feedbacks, i.e., Doppler,
sodium density, and the delayed reactivity feedbacks, i.e., Control Rod Driveline Expansion and
Core Radial Expansion., all respond to counteract the heating of the core. Next, the inlet
temperature starts to rise, adding additional negative reactivity and reducing thermal output. This
temperature rise is exacerbated because NUREG- 1860 does not allow credit to be taken for non-
safety grade systems during accident analysis. Thus, the primary heat sink was disabled by
tripping the condenser pump at the start of the transient; leaving only decay heat removal
operational. At this point, the ULOF is identical to a unprotected station blackout (USBO). This
transient is described in pictorially in Figure 23. As heat removal from the core transitions from
forced convection to natural circulation, the reactor decreases power dramatically leading to one
of the following end states:
" The reactor power decreases to decay heat levels and the decay heat removal system
successfully provides long term cooling.
" The reactor power decreases to decay heat levels and the decay heat removal system
successfully provides long term cooling, but not before thermal creep causes cladding
failure.
* The reactor power does not decrease fast enough; allowing peak sodium temperatures to
reach their full flow boiling point, which is elevated due to the pump pressure head. From
the onset of boiling in the hot channel it can be assumed that minor core damage occurs,
but RELAP5-3D does not have the capability to accurately model the accident
progression beyond this point.
* The reactor power does not decrease fast enough; allowing bulk sodium temperatures to
reach their boiling point. From the onset of boiling in the core outlet it can be assumed
that major core damage occurs, but RELAP5-3D does not have the capability to
accurately model the accident progression beyond this point.
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Figure 30- Block diagram of USBO LBE Progression.
Figure 31 through Figure 34 are pertinent time dependent parameter plots for metal and
oxide fuel performance during the USBO. From Figure 31 and Figure 32, it can be seen that
metal fuel has a stronger inherent negative reactivity effect during the course of the transient.
This can be attributed to the relatively small fuel temperature swing experience by metal fuel,
Figure 33, when compared to oxide fuel, Figure 34. Oxide fuel has a stronger negative Doppler
coefficient than metal fuel, thus a large amount of positive reactivity is inserted into the core as
the fuel cools. While the total reactivity in the oxide core remains negative, the oxide core takes
longer from fission power levels to transition to decay heat power levels than the metal core,
yielding universally hotter system temperatures. These hotter temperatures can be seen from the
peak and bulk coolant temperature plots in Figure 35 through Figure 38.
Metal fuel experiences coolant boiling in the hot channel in only two simulations at
554'C, whereas over a quarter of the oxide fuel simulations experience coolant boiling in the hot
channel at 554 0C. It should be noted that the core outlet temperatures for the oxide fuel
simulations are still increasing with time at the end of the simulations. While it may be tempting
to continue these simulations over a longer time interval, this would pose a fruitless endeavor.
From Figure 36, it can be seen that the peak coolant temperatures have stabilized by 120-150
seconds into the transient. The bulk coolant temperatures are unlikely to increase past the peak
coolant temperatures for a given simulation, and the results at this point are already non-
conservative as RELAP5-3D does not handle sodium boiling correctly. Thus, even though some
of the peak coolant temperatures have already passed the boiling point in this RELAP
simulation, no additional positive reactivity is inserted due to sodium voiding. Attempting to
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extend the simulation thus turns into an exercise in interpreting false data. The failure
probabilities for metal and oxide fuel for the USBO accident can be found in Table 12.
Table 12 - Estimated Failure Probabilities for Metal and Oxide Fuel during a USBO
Boiling
Location
Mean
Pr(Boiling I USBO)
95th Percentile
Pr(Boiling I USBO)
-II
Hot Channel
Hot Channel
Hot Channel
Hot Channel
Core Outlet
Core Outlet
< 1.8x10-
1.8X 10-4**
6.2x10-5
0.046
<3.7x10-4
3.x 0-
3.7x104 0.002
* Refers to sum of the weights of simulations resulting in Sodium Boiling
** This failure probability has not converged. Actual failure probability is likely higher than
this value
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Figure 31 - USBO Time Dependent Reactivity for Metallic Fuel
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Type
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5540 C
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5540C
Metallic
Metallic
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N/A
N/A
1.7x10-4
0.067
<0.002
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Figure 32 - USBO Time Dependent Reactivity for Oxide Fuel
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Figure 33 - USBO Peak Fuel Temperature for Metal Fuel
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Figure 34 - USBO Peak Fuel Temperature for Oxide Fuel
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Figure 35 - USBO Hot Channel Outlet Temperature for Metal Fuel
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Figure 36 - USBO Hot Channel Outlet Temperature for for Oxide Fuel
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Figure 38 - USBO Core Outlet Coolant Temperature for Oxide Fuel
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While the thermodynamic efficiency case study, Chapter IV, shows that both metal and
oxide cores meet the regulatory structure of NUREG-1860 when the USBO conditional
probability of failure is applied to bound the LOF accident response, the metal core does so in a
much more benign fashion than the oxide core. The oxide core is only able to satisfy the
Frequency Consequence Curve because of the benign offsite release of the full core boiling end
state. While unprotected transients have initiating frequencies lower than 10-7/yr, and thus would
not be a traditional LBE, these transients may be selected as a deterministic LBE by the NRC.
Under these circumstances, additional scrutiny would be given to the oxide fuel's response
considering the high likelihood of sodium boiling.
I L3.B Determination of Metal Fuel Liquidus Temperature Limitations at JHat% Burnup
Due to the relatively low liquidus temperature found in high burnup U-19Pu-1OZr fuel
with HT9 clad, it has been suggested that the peak cladding temperature limit for this fuel is
650 0C (32) (34). This conservative limit was applied due to the results of Cohen's analysis of
11.1 at% burnup metallic fuel, the results of which can be seen in Figure 20. EBR-II, due in part
to a short core, has a relatively flat flux profile and most irradiations conducted were designed
with linear powers that bound the outer envelope of the IFR design space. Typical SFRs have
much lower linear powers, almost by a factor of 2, and thus liquidus limits found at 15kW/ft may
not apply to reactor designs with a peak linear power of 8.5kW/ft. EBR-II tests plotted in Figure
V.3.7 hint at the potential for a higher liquidus temperature for linear powers below 11kW/ft and
the potential for a correlation between linear power and liquidus temperature was supported by
the IFR-1 test assembly with D9 cladding U-19Pu-1OZr. The following analysis determines
whether liquidus temperature would prevent HT9 cladding U-19Pu-1OZr from reaching ODS
creep temperature limits of 700 0C. This assumes that ODS steel will not form a lower liquidus
temperature with metal fuel than HT9 clad, an assumption that cannot be verified without ODS
cladding metal fuel testing.
Figure 39 shows the nominal and axial temperature profiles for the hot channel of an
85cm tall 0.7 conversion ratio core. The hot channel was designed with the nominal linear power
profile in Figure 39, a nominal hot channel temperature rise of 185'C, and the inlet temperature
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is set to allow the 2-a peak cladding temperature to be 700C. Hot
the same manner as in the thermodynamic efficiency case study.
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Figure 39- Axial Temperature Profiles for a Representative Metallic Core.
Nominal values are shown on the left and hot channel factors values are shown on the right.
The peak axial power, 8.8kW/ft, is less than the EBR-II data shown in Figure 20. Thus,
applying the EBR-II data directly would imply a liquidus temperature limit of 700C throughout
the core. Because of the lack of data in Figure 20, and in order to see the effect of axially varying
liquidus temperature on potential peak cladding temperatures, a conservative 30% axial
overpower value was used to determine the liquidus temperature, as can be seen in Figure 40. As
can be seen, the margin to liquidus temperature decreases in the peak axial power regions, but
the margin does not decrease to zero until the top of the core. If 650C was used as a constant
liquidus temperature for this core, the top 35% of the cladding would be experiencing eutectic
erosion of the clad, as can be seen in Figure 41.
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Figure 40- Axial Power Profile for Representative Metallic Core.
130% overpower used to provide a conservative estimate of the liquidus temperature
97
250
Constant 6500C Liquidus Temperature, Nominal Power
Liquidus Trend, Nominal Power
200 Conservative Liquidus Trend, Overpower
Optimistic Liquidus Trend, Overpower
CD
150
a)
a 100
C2 I
_5
-50
-100 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Axial Position (cm)
Figure 41- Axial Margin to Liquidus Temperature.
130% overpower used to provide a conservative estimate of the liquidus temperature
The preceding analysis shows that even though high linear power HT9 cladding U-19Pu-
10Zr can undergo liquefaction above 6500C, the potential exists to operate lower linear power
regions at higher temperatures. CuiTently this discussion is limited because only limited data
exists at lower linear power levels for HT9 clad U-19Pu-10Zr. Additionally, martensitic cladding
experiences creep rupture above 6500C without eutectic thinning making the ability to avoid
eutectic formation above 650"~C irrelevant. This analysis should only be used to guide future
metallic fuel research to examine both low and high linear power levels for advanced fuels which
may be able to operate above 6500C.
1I1.4 Economic Evaluations
In general, capital cost tends to be the largest element of power generation cost. In
Nitta's analysis of SFR costs, the cost of the containment structure for a full containment system
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is indicated to represent 4.7% of the capital cost of the plant (56). Thus, the ability to select a
less robust containment could have a significant economic advantage for one fuel type over
another. On the other hand, if the need to protect against external threats requires a robust
containment anyway, the differential cost of protecting against Energetic Events could be
minimal.
Power plant efficiency can have a substantial effect on capital cost as indicated in
Chapter IV of this thesis. At the current state of cladding development, both metal and oxide fuel
have the same core outlet temperature limits and potential burnup limits, which are primarily set
by choice of cladding. The differences in the approach to reprocessing for oxide and metal fuels
are substantial. It was not within the scope of this thesis to attempt to estimate the cost of a
pyroprocessing facility for metal fuel to compare against the aqueous processes used for oxide
fuels. Each type of process has its advantages. At this point, we cannot associate an economic
advantage to either.
111.5 Conclusions
Additional fuel testing will be required to create a licensing basis for irradiating U-Pu-Zr
fuel past 11 at%, but lead test assemblies showed that metallic fuel has the potential of being
irradiated beyond 20 at% burnup with HT-9 clad. A full economic and fuel cycle comparison
was not included for this case study because of a lack of reliable information on reprocessing
costs, but both fuel forms have the potential for high temperature and high burnup performance
and are believed to be licensable under the NUREG-1860 licensing structure. Additionally, the
lack of radioactive material release limits below a mean frequency of 10~8/yr, or a 9 5 1h percentile
of 10~7/yr, may allow for ESs to be removed from the design basis and allow for a reduced
pressure containment such as proposed by S-PRISM. The savings from moving to reduced
pressure containment may allow for a 4.7% savings of the total capital cost for the SFR.
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IV THERMODYNAMIC EFFICIENCY (V.3)
Improving the efficiency of a design or process is often considered the Holy Grail for
designers and engineers. If a project's economic competitiveness is questioned, efficiency gains
are seen as a way to increase reduce capital cost by raising power output while using the same
basic structures and inputs as the original design. With an electricity generating facility,
increasing the thermodynamic efficiency increases the electricity produced with ideally
minimum impact on fuel, capital, and operation and maintenance costs. The following section
examines how thermodynamic efficiency may be increased in the Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR)
through a combination of:
* increasing the core outlet temperature for metal and oxide fuel,
e removing the intermediate loop,
* replacing shell and tube heat exchangers with Printed Circuit Heat Exchangers (PCHEs)
(57),
0 switching from a Rankine to a Supercritical-CO2 power conversion cycle.
IV. 1 Introduction
This case study examines how to maximize the economic benefit from implementing
various combinations of the four design alternatives above to raise thermodynamic efficiency for
the SFR. These potential modifications are initially studied in series, but once their individual
technical feasibility and safety constraints are analyzed, combinations of these alternatives will
be analyzed. Finally, the economic impacts of the design alternatives are analyzed to determine
their effect on the busbar cost of the SFR.
The most direct way of increasing thermodynamic efficiency is to raise the core outlet
temperature. In an ideal Carnot power conversion cycle, the thermodynamic efficiency, rj, is
related to the absolute temperature of the heat source, Tf, and the heat sink, Te, by Eq.IV. 1.
r = 1 C IV.1
Th
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While in practice Carnot efficiencies can never be achieved, the basic trends indicated by the
Carnot cycle can be generalized to other power conversion cycles. Specifically, in order to
increase thermal efficiency, the designer needs to increase the temperature of the heat source or
decrease the temperature of the heat sink. The heat sink temperature is typically an exogenous
variable, often dictated by geographical location, cooling tower design and weather cycles, and
thus is hard for the designer to adjust. In contrast, one of the key design variables chosen by the
reactor designer is the core outlet temperature. As Eq. IV.1 suggests, increasing the core outlet
temperature will increase the thermodynamic efficiency.
It should be noted that for a direct cycle, the core outlet and turbine inlet temperatures are
equal. However, for an indirect cycle the Th of interest is not the core outlet temperature but the
turbine inlet temperature. These two temperatures differ due to energy losses to the environment
in the primary, intermediate, and power conversion loop piping as well as inefficiencies in heat
exchanger designs. One of the important locations where energy is lost in the system is in the
intermediate heat transfer loop. The intermediate loop is used in the existing SFR designs to keep
the primary radioactive sodium separated from the water of the steam Rankine power cycle. This
separation is done in order to avoid a sodium-water exothermic reaction with the radioactive
primary sodium coolant in the event of a steam generator tube rupture.
By raising the core outlet temperature and reducing temperature losses in the system, the
turbine inlet temperature is elevated, yielding an efficiency increase that is a function of the
Power Conversion System (PCS) employed. This case study will examine variations in core
outlet temperature, heat exchanger type, and choice of PCS, as well as the potential for the
elimination of the intermediate loop, as shown in Figure 42.
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Figure 42-The Arrangement of Components in the SFR Balance of Plant and the Options
Available for each Component. S-and-T refers to Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers and SC Water
refers to the supercritical water power conversion cycle (58).
These choices are summarized in analogy to a fault tree in accident space, as shown in
Figure 43.
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Figure 43- The Design Choices Affecting Efficiency that are Considered in this Study.
All design options examined for 510 C are repeated for 530'C (58).
Figure 43 is intended to reflect the range of options for developing a balance of plant for
an SFR. The primary IHX could be a PCHE or a shell-and-tube design, or the intermediate loop
could be eliminated. The secondary IHX could be either PCHE or shell-and-tube, and the PCS
could be a S-CO 2 , conventional Rankine, or supercritical water cycle. The range of system
pressures in the steam cycle can also vary substantially. In this study, two core outlet
temperatures will be compared: 510"C and 530"C and the steam cycles will be assumed to
102
510
operate at 15.5 MPa and 23 MPa (supercritical), with the results extrapolated to higher
temperatures.
IV.2 General Assessment
Before the detailed safety and economic consequences of the design modifications can be
addressed, a general assessment of the safety constraints for the 4 design alternatives must be
considered. The constraints for the 4 proposed design modifications are:
" core temperature and radioactive material release limits for metal and oxide fuel,
e design restrictions caused by removing the intermediate loop,
e limits for PCHE implementation,
" limits to S-CO 2 power conversion cycle implementation.
IV.2.A Core Temperature and Radioactive Material Release Limits for Metal and Oxide Fuel
The core outlet temperature is limited by steady state cladding limits, transient limits on
core structural temperature, and temperature limits on the vessel and sodium piping. The
following sections detail these limits.
(i)Steady State Fuel-Clad Temperature Limits for Metal and Oxide Fuel
Steady state cladding temperature limits are designed to ensure that fuel will be highly
reliable under expected conditions. Typically, this is done by ensuring that the 2a hot channel
factor cladding temperatures are below material limits of the clad. HT-9 is a martensitic alloy
commonly chosen by the IFR/ALMR/PRISM program in the US for both their oxide and metal
core designs and the KALIMER program in Korea for their metal core design (50) (32). HT-9 is
typically chosen due to its low swelling under long term irradiation compared to austenitic
cladding materials, e.g. D9 and SS-316 (41). Unfortunately, this reduced swelling is achieved at
the cost of increased thermal creep at high temperatures.
To limit thermal creep, HT-9 is typically limited to steady state cladding mid-wall
temperatures below 640C (38) (59). The other operating limit for any steel cladding used with
metallic fuel is due to the fuel-clad eutectic formation. Eutectic formation has been experienced
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in metallic pins at peak cladding temperatures above 650'C at high burnup (34). For steady state
operations, this inner wall cladding limit typically corresponds to a cladding mid-wall limit of
645-648'C. Thus, HT-9 is thermal creep limited, which applies the same limit to both oxide and
metal fuel. If the cladding was chosen based on high temperature performance instead of high
burnup performance, metallic fuels would still be limited to the 6450C cladding mid-wall
temperature range due to eutectic formation, unless a protective liner was employed, while oxide
fuel would be able to successfully reach higher temperatures.
(ii) Transient Temperature and Release Limits For Metal and Oxide Fuel
Transients that have the potential to limit the outlet coolant temperature for the SFR are
broadly defined in two categories:
* Transient OverPower (TOP)
" Loss Of Flow (LOF)
When determining transient limits in conjunction with NUREG-1860, a designer needs to
consider events that will trigger the onset of additional radiation release. Even in hermetically
sealed vessels, leakage of less than 0.1% of cover-gas per day to the containment is expected, so
it is assumed that any fuel failure will contribute to some, albeit small, offsite consequences (60)
(61). According to Denning et. al., a reactor vessel plenum overpressure of greater than lMPa
may result in failure of the primary system seal, which can release activated sodium into the
containment. A IMPa overpressure of the vessel head may occur during channel averaged
sodium boiling and/or failure of over a 3d of the core fuel pins if a design does not have a Vessel
Plenum Overpressure Relief System (VPORS). It is likely that a VPORS would be incorporated
in the vessel head to prevent such a seal failure, but inclusion of such as system may be optional.
The following analysis will consider both options. It is unlikely that an internal event, even an
energetic scenario, will be able to produce enough energy to fail the primary pressure boundary,
which is a more severe end state than failing a seal on the primary system (55) (46). External
events, such as earthquakes and aircraft impacts, are the most likely causes of containment and/
or primary system failure. From Denning et. al., Table 13 gives the 9 5 h percentile end states
used when calculating LBEs.
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Table 13- 9 5 th Percentile End States for RELAP5 Transients (61)
End State .ri a 95th % Dose for FCC curveEnd StateCriteria
Label VPORS No VPORS
Minor Fuel Clad Damage Fraction > 1.0 << 0.001 rem << 0.001 remDamage
Fuel Fuel Temperature > 1120"C
Damage Hot Channel Sodium Boiling << 0.001 rem << 0.001 rem
> 925"C
Sodium Core Outlet Sodium
Boiling Temperature > 925"C «0.001 rem 0.22 rem
Energetic Structural Supports Fail
Scenario Inlet Temperature >730oC «0.001 rem 4.0 rem
(iii)Piping and Vessel Temperature Limits
The core outlet temperature has been proposed up to 575"C, the core outlet temperature
designated for the BN-1800 design which uses Cr 18 Ni 9 steel for vessel, piping and heat
exchanger materials (10). In general, the temperature limits for structural steels are still being
assessed. During the design of the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, 316L(N) SS was chosen for
components operating at temperatures higher than 500"'C due to its high creep resistance.
304L(N) SS was chosen for the remainder of the plant because 304L(N) is 20% less expensive
than 304L(N). This cost estimation takes into account that 304L(N) piping tends to be 15%
thicker than 316L(N), and thus more 304L(N) is needed for the same amount of piping (62).
IV.2.B Design Restrictions Caused by Removing the Intermediate Loop
For a pool design, elimination of the intermediate loop requires placement of the primary
to power conversion cycle heat exchangers inside the pool. This has consequences in both safety
considerations and sizing of the heat exchangers within the vessel. As a safety concern, designers
are commonly cautious regarding placement of a steam generator or large CO 2 plenum inside a
pool of sodium, even if it is double-walled. The failure of the heat exchanger plenum could
constitute a single failure leading to core damage due to the positive reactivity insertion resulting
from coolant voiding. Some designs have created double pool levels which prevent such a gas
bubble from entering the core (63). The impracticality of eliminating the intermediate loop in a
pool design was also the result of the very tight space for the Secondary-IHX within the reactor
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vessel. By using the dimensions of the base case Primary-IHX as the maximum dimensions of
the single IHX for this case, the heat transfer to the PCS is severely limited. Steam generators
and S-CO 2 heat exchangers require more heat transfer area than the small heat exchanger can
provide. Consequently, the option of eliminating the intermediate loop is considered to be
practical only for loop-type SFRs.
IV.2. C Limits for PCHE Implementation
HEATRICTM Printed Circuit Heat Exchangers (PCHEs) are considered as a replacement
for both the intermediate loop heat exchanger and the steam generator (57). They are the heat
exchanger of choice when considering compactness and ruggedness. PCHEs are formed by
diffusion bonding plates with etched channels. Alternating plates for hot and cold fluids allow
very large heat transfer area in a relatively compact volume.
The overall performance of PCHEs is of interest because steam generator tube leaks have
been problems for several SFRs. The small channel diameter and the robust design of PCHEs
should reduce the frequency and severity of steam generator leaks. Also, every shell-and-tube
design used in this study is modeled as a double-walled tube with a helium gap. The use of
double walled tubes or hybrid PCHEs will improve the availability of the entire reactor system.
At this time, PCHEs can be implemented as a viable alternative to shell and tube heat exchangers
with no limiting conditions within the expected SFR operating range (58).
IV.2.D Limits to S-CO Power Conversion Cycle Implementation
According to the Gen-IV Component Design and Balance of Plant Project Management
Board, six challenges remain to be solved before the S-CO 2 cycle is ready for commercial
deployment (64).
1. A commercial scale (defined as greater than 600MWth) demonstration plant must be built
2. Proper scaling of all necessary system parameters need to be demonstrated
3. Appropriate stability and control of the cycle needs to be demonstrated near the critical
point of CO2.
4. Transient performance must be verified (i.e., rapid power transients or reactor SCRAM)
5. Sodium-CO 2 chemical interactions must be better understood
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6. Long-term material compatibility between structural materials and S-CO 2 must be
confirmed.
Work in many of these areas has been performed at MIT. As mentioned above, modeling
of the S-CO 2 cycle still requires validation, especially in the development of control techniques
for transient operation. Significant progress has recently been made in transient modeling, but
additional work will have to enter the experimental realm (65). A full recompression cycle test
loop is required in order to test the performance of the cycle under system transients.
Compact turbomachinery is a benefit of the S-CO 2 recompression cycle, but more
detailed studies of the expected costs must be performed in order to quantify the economic
advantage of this cycle beyond that achieved from efficiency improvements alone. Cost
estimates for turbomachinery and heat exchangers will allow for comparisons with Rankine and
supercritical water cycles. Then, the entire economic benefit of the S-CO 2 cycle can be
understood. As a first order economics estimate, the S-C02 cycle should require 1/6 the raw
materials as an equivalent Rankine power conversion cycle, thus an ntb-of-a-kind S-C02 cycle
can be taken to be 1/6t" the cost of an equivalent Rankine cycle (12).
The corrosion of stainless steels in an S-CO 2 environment must be investigated further.
Corrosion will affect the lifetime and reliability of heat exchangers and the failure modes of
every PCS component. The AGR program has operated S-CO 2 cycles reliably at outlet
temperatures of up to 650 0C, but at a 4.3 MPa operating pressure. The S-CO 2 power conversion
cycle for an SFR would likely operate at 20MPa, increasing creep, fatigue, and corrosion rates.
Early work in the field indicates that operating temperatures should not go above 700"C because
dissociation of the S-CO2 at these temperatures may lead to corrosion of the turbine blade and
structural components (66).
IV.3 Technical Evaluation
This section will illustrate how the preceding 4 design alternatives can be examined
within NUREG-1860's Frequency Consequence Curve (FCC). The initial design alternative of
raising core outlet temperature will be examined using RELAP5 simulations for both metal and
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oxide fuel types (17). Removing the intermediate loop is commented on but not analyzed
because a detailed design, comprising both plant layout and potential accident sequences, was
not available for analysis. Switching to a S-CO 2 cycle without removing the intermediate loop
does not require a detailed safety evaluation because NUREG-1860's FCC only considers the
response of safety grade components. Thus, the S-CO 2 cycle will perform exactly like a Rankine
cycle for the safety analysis. Since the power conversion system is non-safety grade, any design
changes to these systems have no direct impact in the response to Licensing Basis Events
(LBEs).
In order to raise the core outlet temperature, the fuel rod must be shown to be reliable at
the elevated temperature. Hence all relevant LBEs must be shown to lie within the acceptable
region of the FCC, and the operating temperature must be below vessel and piping limits. The
following sections outline the analysis required to ensure that these limits are satisfied.
IV.3.A Determining the Steady State Core Outlet Temperature for Metal and Oxide Fuel
The fuel cladding is the most vital and one of the most stressed components in the
reactor. The cladding forms the second barrier to radiation release, making the reliability of the
cladding safety significant. At the same time, the cladding is located in the middle of the reactor
core; exposed to high levels of radiation damage, stressed by fission gas, deformed by
fuel/cladding chemical and mechanical interactions and operated at temperatures above the onset
of thermal creep. For all of these reasons, statistical and deterministic safety margins are used to
ensure that adequate margin is provided between the operating conditions and the cladding
failure regime. Many methods have been developed to combine these margins and set operating
limits, but the most commonly accepted method is the horizontal method, which separates direct
and statistical uncertainties and combines them separately (16) (15) (47), discussed in Section
11.2. By employing the horizontal method on a metal and oxide fueled pool type reactor with HT-
9 cladding, the maximum allowable steady state operating temperature for each of these fuel
types is determined.
Using the 640'C cladding mid-wall temperature limit from HT-9 and assuming the same
linear powers for metal and oxide fuel, it can be seen from Figure 44 that the maximum core
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44 that the maximum core outlet temperature from a fuel reliability standpoint is a little under
550"C for both core designs. Since creep is a function of both temperature and pressure, the
creep temperature limit may be increased if the plenum pressure can be significantly decreased,
although this is effort left to future work. It should be noted that the Russian BN-1800 proposes a
nitride fueled core that has a proposed core outlet temperature of 575C. Unfortunately, no
additional justifications were given to show how this outlet temperature is achievable (i.e., no
cladding type or peak temperatures were provided) (9). The removal of the pellet cladding
eccentricity direct and statistical uncertainties for the metallic fuel did not cause a significant
reduction in the corresponding 2a peak cladding temperatures when compared with oxide fuel.
This outlet temperature is in line with the standard core outlet temperatures of most currently
proposed SFR designs for oxide fuel (10). The importance of incorporating hot channel factors
should be emphasized, because not including these safety factors would cause a designer to
believe that the HT-9 creep limit would correspond to a feasible steady state core outlet
temperature of 6070C, as can be seen in Figure 44. This analysis uses the horizontal methodology
detailed in Section 11.2 and the supporting spreadsheets can be found in Appendix E.
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Figure 44- Steady State Limits and Corresponding Core Outlet Temperatures for HT-9.
Because HT-9 is creep limited, the core outlet temperature for both metal and oxide fuel is
554'C. The conventional 650 0C fuel/cladding eutectic limit for metallic fuel is also given. For
typical linear power designs, this temperature limit may be as high as 7000C (see Figure 20).
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IV.3.B Determining! the Transient Core Outlet Temperature for Metal and Oxide Fuel
In order to demonstrate that raising the core outlet temperature will satisfy the transient
requirements set forth in NUREG- 1860, both the mean and 95th percentile of the frequency and
magnitude of radiation release for a given LBE are required. Calculation of radioactivity release
can be difficult, but for extremely low probability accidents, where the mean frequency of core
damage is below the FCC frequency threshold of 10-8/yr and/or the 95th percentile is below
10-7/yr, there is no release limit. Thus, if the core damage frequency can be established to be
below the threshold frequency, the system response is considered acceptable without dose
calculations, and any additional analysis required by the NRC will be considered beyond design
basis. If this requirement is too stringent or would cause the designer to add additional systems
and thus increasing costs, then dose estimates will be required for the associated end states of
those sequences. For an SFR with a broken primary system seal and a functioning containment
operating at its designed leak rates, the highest radiation release state is 4 rem (61), which falls
within the unacceptable region at release frequencies larger than 10~4/yr. The optimal
configuration of design parameters can be selected through the following procedure:
1. Determine the largest of the mean and 95"' percentile frequency of radiation release for
the most limiting LBE.
2. Adjust the core outlet temperature and add or remove redundant safety features until the
radiation release frequency and magnitude is within the acceptable region of the FCC.
3. Check to ensure that the changes to the reactor configuration did not inadvertently place
LBEs, which originally had lower failure probabilities, into the unacceptable region
above the FCC. If so, repeat Part 2 with the new limiting accident group.
(i)Evaluation of Transient Uncertainties for Metal and Oxide Fuel
The UTOP and ULOF transient uncertainties are described in Section III.A part (i).
(ii)Statistical Methods Used to Predict Release Frequencies for Metal and Oxide Fuel
The statistical methods used to predict mean and 95'h percentile radioactive material
release frequencies can be found in Section III.A part (ii).
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(iii)Licensing Basis Event Transients for Metal and Oxide Fuel
For the sodium fast reactor, three general categories of transient exist that can challenge
the integrity of the primary system:
" Transient Overpowers (TOP)
e Loss of Flow (LOF)
* Loss of Heat Sink (LOHS)
The FCC is only evaluated for safety grade components. Since the primary heat sink is
not safety grade, it cannot be taken credit for while attempting to meet the TNF. Thus, there are
only two categories of LBEs which will be examined to determine the temperature limits of the
SFR:
" Transient Overpower with Loss of Heat Sink (TOP/LOHS)
" Loss of Flow with Loss of Heat Sink (LOF/LOHS)
(iii.a) Transient Overpower with Loss of Heat Sink for Metal and Oxide Fuel
TOPs are one of the primary transients analyzed for sodium reactors (20) (33). The
following discussion will detail how TOP analysis is conducted for a proposed LBE. In addition,
the effects of core outlet temperature on the TOP LBE analysis are also discussed. Because all
events are treated as LOHS accidents in the FCC, TOP/LOHS sequences have the same initiating
frequency as TOP sequences and will be referred to as TOP for simplicity.
(iii.a.]) Transient Overpower Initiator Frequencies
In general, any TOP can be defined by answering three questions:
I. What is the total reactivity being inserted into the reactor?
2. What is the rate of reactivity insertion during the transient?
3. What is the frequency of achieving this combination of total reactivity and reactivity
insertion ramp rate?
Determining the answers to these questions is difficult due to the low probability of a
large power excursion. Because the ALMR PRA is the most up-to-date SFR PRA available, the
ALMR reactivity insertion distribution was used to determine the magnitude and the rate of
reactivity insertion. In the ALMR PRA, the cause of reactivity insertion is a malfunctioning
reactivity controller system that registers a low core power level. Thus, the computer pulls the
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control rods out of the core until they reach their control rod stops, which are set to allow for a
maximum reactivity insertion of 30C. For larger reactivity insertions, misalignment of the
control rod stops is assumed to be due to human error with the resulting reactivity insertion
distribution presented in Table 14.
Table 14- ALMR TOP Reactivity Insertion Distributions (67)
Frequency Reactivity Reactivity
of TOPs Insertions Insertion Rate
3x105/yr $0.3-0.5 $0.03/s
2x10 6/yr $0.5-0.7 $0.03/s
1x10 7/yr $0.7-0.9 $0.03/s
It should be noted that the frequencies in Table 14 are dependent on the core conversion
ratio. Lower conversion ratios increase the cycle reactivity swing, causing the differential control
rod worth to be larger for burner reactors than for unity conversion ratio closed cycle reactors.
The differences in the frequencies in Table 14 come from spatial misalignment of the control rod
stops, with any given misalignment becoming more severe because the differential rod worth
increases in magnitude. Conveniently, the SFR RELAP5-3D model and the ALMR PRA both
describe an approximately 0.7 conversion ratio burner reactor, allowing use of the reported
frequencies without modification.
In general, the ALMR PRA provides a realistic approach to reactivity control in a burner
reactor design since the control rod stops limit the amount of reactivity available for TOPs.
Larger reactivates can be achieved if the control rod stop breaks, but the conditional probability
of the rod stop flange breaking can be assumed to be de minimis.
Finally, as previously mentioned, by assuming the primary system and containment both
leak at their respective design basis rates, the worst potential 95th percentile estimate of radiation
release is 3.0 rem. This release level is acceptable at frequencies below 104 /yr, and thus any
conditional failure probability applied to the lowest TOP initiating frequency, at 3x10 5 /yr, will
produce an LBE point in the acceptable region. The following analysis is presented for two
reasons. First, NUREG- 1860 requires the calculation of LBE points. Second, future reduction in
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containment requirements may lead to larger release states for external events, which are not
considered in this study. With these motivations, the following TOP analysis is conducted.
(iii.a.2) Bounding The Transient Overpower
Unprotected transients are defined as transients where the reaction protection system
fails to insert the control rods into the core. These events are normally not included in LBEs
since the failure probability of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is small enough to push
unprotected accidents under the 1 0-7/yr mean frequency FCC cutoff. For example, the failure
probability for the RPS during a TOP is 3x10- /demand and is 1x10 7 /demand for all other
transients (67). The high reliability of the RPS means that only protected TOPs and LOFs need
to be analyzed. While this greatly simplifies the number of transients that need to be protected
against with safety grade systems, most SFRs are extremely robust to transients, and calculating
a failure probability for protected transients can be difficult. In general, any protected transient
is going to be less severe than its unprotected counterpart, so if a failure probability is estimated
for an unprotected transient then it can be reasonably assumed that the protected transient has a
lower probability of failure.
Thus, the $0.7-$0.9 reactivity insertion bin was analyzed as an Unprotected TOP (UTOP)
to determine a bounding probability of failure for a TOP. For TOPs, it can be assumed that
probability of cladding failure increases as the magnitude of reactivity insertion increases,
keeping all other variables constant. This inequality is written in Eq.IV.2.
Pr(Clad Failure|$0.3 - $0.5 TOP)
< Pr(Clad Failure|$0.5 - $0.7 TOP) IV.2
< Pr(Clad Failure|$0.7 - $0.9 TOP)
The same relations exist for unprotected transient overpowers, as is written in Eq.IV.3
Pr(Clad Failure|$0.3 - $0.5 UTOP)
< Pr(Clad Failurel$0.5 - $0.7 UTOP) IV.3
< Pr(Clad Failure|$0.7 - $0.9 UTOP)
Since an unprotected accident is an accident where the Reactor Protection System (RPS)
fails to function, the probability of cladding failure for a protected transient overpower with $X
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of reactivity inserted is always smaller than for an unprotected transient overpower of with $X of
reactivity, as is represented in Eq.IV.4.
Pr(Clad Failure|$X TOP ) < Pr(Clad Failure I$X UTOP) IV.4
Thus, Eq.IV.5 gives a general inequality bounding the frequency of cladding failure for
$0.3 - $0.5 TOPs.
f(Clad Failure $0.3 - $0.5 TOP)
= f ($0.3 - $0.5 TOP) * Pr(Clad Failurel $0.3 - $0.5 TOP) IV.5
< f($0.3 - $0.5 TOP) * Pr(Clad Failure|$0.7 - $0.9 UTOP)
If failures still cannot be calculated by increasing reactivity insertions or moving from
protected to unprotected transients, then examining the accident at higher steady state
temperatures may be considered. Thermal creep increases in a logarithmic fashion with
temperature increases, thus evaluating the accident at a higher outlet temperature is guaranteed to
increase the probability of failure. If the resulting hybrid LBE falls into the acceptable region of
the FCC curve, then no further action is required. If the hybrid LBE falls into the unacceptable
region of the FCC curve, then a less severe bounding accident, employing a greater number of
simulations, must be designed and employed to bound the accident response.
(iii.a.3) TOP Results for Metal and Oxide Fuel
In the $0.7-$0.9 TOP event, the control rods withdraw from the core until they reach the
control rod stops which have been misplaced to allow for a $0.7-$0.9 reactivity insertion. When
the outlet temperature rises above 560C, the reactor protection system should trip, causing the
secondary control rods to insert into the core and shut down the reactor. All bounding accidents
assume that the SCRAM system has failed and thus the TOP continues with only passive
feedbacks used to shut the reactor down. Since all LBEs are assumed to be LOHS LBEs, the cold
pool quickly heats up. When the cool pool reaches 510 C, the main coolant pumps trip to protect
themselves, causing the accident to additionally become a loss of flow accident. With the pumps
off, the coolant flow decreases faster than reactor power, thus causing the fuel, clad, and coolant
to heat up. This heatup can lead to cladding rupture or local coolant boiling unless natural
circulation can keep the system temperatures low enough to prevent creep rupture of the clad.
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The calculated cladding creep rupture probabilities of the $0.7-$0.9 UTOP analysis are
listed in Table 15a for core outlet temperatures of 510'C, 554"C, and 5950C. Note that 595 0C is
above the thermal creep limit set in Section IV.3a, and thus is only used to bound the accident
response. The 595'C core outlet temperature was chosen to allow enough failures from the
metallic fuel to be simulated in order to stabilize the mean and 9 5th percentile estimates of
conditional cladding failure. For oxide fuel, the protective shutdown of the pumps produces
extremely high cladding temperatures, causing substantial creep rupture at almost all evaluated
outlet temperatures. The failure weight listed in Table 15a is used as the value of x with the prior
value for q assumed to be zero and the total number of simulations is taken as N with the prior r
assumed to be zero.
Table 15a - $0.7-$0.9 UTOP Creep Rupture Statistical Summary for Metal and Oxide Fuel
Fuel # of Failure* Mean 95th PercentileCore Outlet Fue . o Faiur Pr(Clad Rupture I Pr(Clad Rupture
Type Simulations Weight UTOP) I UTOP)
510"C Metallic 280 0.0 << 3.2x10 4  << 1.9x10 3
554 0C Metallic 280 0.0 << 3.2x10 4  << 1.9x10 3
595"C Metallic 280 0.09 3.2x10 4  l.9x10 3
510 0C Oxide 400 398.2 0.995 0.999
5540C Oxide 400 400.0 < 1.0 < 1.0
5950C Oxide 400 400.0 <1.0 <1.0
Refers to sum of the weights of simulations resulting in cladding rupture
Additionally, many of the oxide TOP simulations result in hot channel and core outlet
sodium boiling, both end states for potential radiation release listed in Table 13. Table 15b lists
the number of simulations, total failure weight, mean and 9 5 'h percentile of the conditional
probability of local and bulk sodium boiling given a $0.7-$0.9 UTOP. No boiling was produced
by the simulation for the metallic cores with steady state core outlet temperatures ranging from
510 C to 595 0C.
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Table 15b - $0.7-$0.9 UTOP Sodium Boiling Simulation Summary for Oxide Fuel
Core Outlet Boiling # of Failure Mean 95th Percentile
Location Simulations Weight* Pr(Boiling I Pr(Boiling I
UTOP) UTOP)
510 C H.C.B.** 400 159.0 0.40 0.44
554 0C H.C.B. 400 396.3 0.991 0.998
595 0C H.C.B. 400 400.0 <1.0 <1.0
510 C C.A.B.** 400 0.0 <<6.1x10 5  <<1.6x10-4
554 0C C.A.B. 400 0.0184 6.1x10 5  1.6x10 4
5950C C.A.B. 400 34.8 0.12 0.15
Refers to sum of the weights of simulations resulting in boiling
* H.C.B.=Hot Channel Boiling, C.A.B.=Core Outlet Boiling
(iii.a.4) TOP LBEs on the FCC for Metal and Oxide Fuels
Table 15 details the probability distributions for creep rupture, local sodium boiling and
bulk sodium boiling for the TOP/UTOP transients. Because the aforementioned distributions
arise from binomial evidence, which only indicates the exceedance of a threshold value, overlaps
between distributions are taken into account. For example, large scale boiling is always preceded
by boiling in the hot channel, thus the probability distribution of arriving at the hot channel
boiling end state must factor out the simulations that result in core outlet boiling, as written in
Eq. IV.6. To factor out the overlapping probability, the probability of core outlet and hot channel
boiling is defined as the product of the probability of core outlet boiling given hot channel
boiling and hot channel boiling, as is written in Eq. IV.7, where the probability of core outlet
boiling and core outlet and hot channel boiling are known and the probability of hot channel
boiling given core outlet boiling is unity.
Pr(Core Outlet and Hot Channel)
= Pr(Core Outlet|Hot Channel Boiling) IV.6
* Pr(Core Outlet Boiling)
Then the probability of hot channel boiling given no core outlet sodium boiling can be
calculated using the decomposition rule in Eq. IV. 11, where the horizontal bar indicates that the
event did not occur.
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Pr(Hot Channel Boililng) =
Pr(Hot Channel Boiling|Core Outlet Boiling)
* Pr(Core Outlet Boiling) IV.7
+Pr(Hot Channel Boiling |Core Outlet Boiling)
* Pr(Core Outlet Boiling)
Using these equations, the probability distribution of the less severe end state, hot
channel boiling without core outlet boiling, can be backed out from the probability distributions
around both hot channel boiling and core outlet boiling. To create a distribution around the less
severe end state, Monte Carlo methods must be used to sample from the distributions defined in
Table 15. The same technique can be used to separate out the probability of creep rupture
without local boiling from the probability of creep rupture with hot channel boiling and the
probability of hot channel boiling.
Figure 45 shows the UTOP LBEs plotted on the Frequency Consequence Curve. Because
of the low initiating frequency for this transient, all end states fall underneath the FCC cutoff.
Thus, a VPORS will not be required to mitigate the consequences of a UTOP for either fuel
choice. Both oxide and metal cores respond adequately to TOP at outlet temperatures at least up
to 595"C. The LBE release frequencies were calculated by multiplying the UTOP initiating
frequency by the conditional probability of arriving at an end state shown in Table 16. It should
be noted that the probability of Hot Channel Boiling (H.C.B.) goes down for oxide fuel between
5540C and 5950C because some simulations that were H.C.B. entered the Core Average Boiling
(C.A.B.) end state at the higher temperature.
Table 16 - Summary of Conditional End State Probabilities (mean/95th%)
OK C.F. H.C.B. C.A.B.
Metal 595C 0.9997/- 3x10
4 /2x 10--
Oxide 510 C 5x10 /0.011 0.51/0.55 0.49/0.53 -/-
Oxide 554'C -/- 9x10-3/0.018 0.990/0.997 5x1 0 5/9x10 3
Oxide 595'C -/- -/- 0.92/0.93 0.087/0.11
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Figure 45- Frequency Consequence Curve with UTOP LBE Points Plotted for Metal and Oxide
Fuel at a Variety of Core Outlet Temperatures.
(iii.b) Loss of Flow with Loss of Heat Sink for Metal and Oxide Fuel
Loss Of Flow (LOF) accidents are challenging sequences for the sodium reactor, and are
often studied as a precursor to energetic core distributive accidents (54) (55) (36). While the
small SCRAM failure probability for accidents not initiated by the RPS (~10-7/demand) pushes
these accidents below the TNF cutoff frequency, loss of primary coolant flow still has the
potential to cause minor core damage (67). The following sections outline the possible initiators
and LBE analysis for LOF events at both a 5100C and 550'C core outlet temperature. Because all
events are treated as LOHS accidents in the FCC, LOF/LOHS sequences have the same initiating
frequency as LOF sequences and will be referred to as LOF for simplicity.
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(iii.b.] )Loss of Flow Initiator Frequencies
The loss-of-flow accident sequences enumerated in the ALMR PRA are listed in
(67). Three accident sequences have initiating frequencies that are greater than the 10-
7/yr TNF cutoff:
* Failure of 1 to 2 pumps (assumed failure of two pumps of four for conservatism)
e Station blackout event resulting in the loss of all pumps
e Failure of 2 pumps and their coastdown motors.
Of these events, failure of 1-2 pumps and station blackout events both require importance
sampling to determine whether or not the likelihood of cladding failure is on the order of 10-5 to
107 /demand. Failure of 2 pumps and their coastdown motors only requires that the failure
probability be below 0.1 to reach the frequency cutoff, which can be determined without
importance sampling.
Table 17 - Loss-of-Flow Accident Frequencies for the ALMR. (67)
Initiating Frequency Required Probability of
(yr-')* Cladding Rupture
1-2 pumps fail 0.5 2.00 x10 7
SBO 0.007 1.43 x10 5
2 pumps fail w/o C.D. Motors 6.5 x10-7  0.154
SBO w/o 2 C.D. Motors 9.1 x10-1 1.00
SBO w/o 4 CD Motors 4.73 x10-' 1.00
Initiating Frequency refers to the frequency of pump failures, station blackout
events (SBO), and coastdown (CD) Motor failures.
The Required Probability of cladding Rupture refers to the failure probability
needed to place cladding failure below the 10-7/yr TNF threshold.
The metallic reactor design is designed to have a pump coastdown halving time of 5s,
which is typical of metal cores. The oxide core is designed to have a 20s flow halving time to
prevent large power-to-flow mis-matches which have the potential to cause short term sodium
boiling due to the large stored energy of the oxide fuel. Other probabilistic analyses have
indicated that flow coastdown can be represented as a normal distribution with a standard
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deviation set to 10% of the nominal value (11). This probabilistic representation of pump
coastdown characteristics is used in the following analysis.
(iii.b.2) Bounding the Loss of Flow
Just as with the loss of flow analysis, the unreliabilities for protected accidents are too
small to calculate directly using the statistical techniques outlined in Section ii of this chapter.
Thus surrogate bounding accidents are designed to provide an upper bound to the probability of
failure. If the hybrid LBE falls into the acceptable region of the FCC curve, then no further
action is required. If the hybrid LBE falls into the unacceptable region of the FCC curve, then a
less severe bounding accident has to be designed and employed to bound the accident response.
(iii.b.3) Station Blackout Results for Metal and Oxide Fuel
Of the three LOF accidents, Station BlackOut (SBO) is the only accident which leads to
cladding failure at frequencies above the TNF cutoff. In the station blackout event, a/c power to
all pumps in the plant is simultaneously lost. All bounding accidents assume that the SCRAM
system has failed and thus the SBO becomes an Unprotected SBO (USBO) and continues with
only passive feedbacks used to shut the reactor down. Since all LBEs are assumed to be LOHS
LBEs, the cold pool quickly heats up. Without the pumps, natural circulation is required to
remove the heat generated in the fuel. When the power to flow ratio rises above 1.3, the reactor
protection system should trip, causing the control rods to insert into the core and shut down the
reactor. All bounding accidents assume that the SCRAM system has failed and thus the SBO
continues with only passive feedbacks used to shut the reactor down. With the pumps off, the
coolant flow decreases faster than reactor power, thus causing the fuel, clad, and coolant to heat
up. This heatup can lead to cladding rupture or local coolant boiling unless natural circulation
can keep the system temperatures low enough to prevent creep rupture of the clad.
The results of the USBO analysis are seen in Table 18a for core outlet temperatures of
510"C, 554"C, and 620"C. Note that 620"'C is above the thermal creep limit set in Section
IV.3.A, and thus is only used to bound the accident response. 620'C was chosen because enough
failures were calculated for the metallic fuel at this core outlet temperature to stabilize the mean
and 95 th percentile estimates of cladding failure. It should be noted that oxide cores are designed
to have a longer flow coastdown than metallic cores, which should make the loss of flow
transient less damaging, but the forced loss of non-safety grade heat sink causes the longer
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coastdown time to extend the transient. The additional power generated can only be removed by
the decay heat removal system, and thus the oxide core experiences higher long term
temperatures than the metallic cores.
Table 18a - USBO Creep Rupture Statistical Summary for Metal and Oxide Fuel
Core Fuel # of Failure* Mean 95* Percentile
Outlet Type Simulations Weight Pr(Clad Rupture I USBO) Pr(Clad Rupture I USBO)
510 C Metallic 405 0.0 << 2.6x105  << 1.1x10'
554C Metallic 405 0.0 <<2.6x10' << 1.1x105
620T"C Metallic 405 0.008 2.6x105  1.1x10 5
510 0C Oxide 350 137.9 0.39 0.43
554 0C Oxide 350 342.3 0.978 0.988
620 0C Oxide 350 349.3 0.998 0.999
Refers to sum of the weights of simulations resulting in cladding rupture
Additionally, many of the oxide unprotected SBO simulations result in local and bulk
sodium boiling; both end states for potential radiation release listed in Table 13. Table 18b lists
the number of simulations, total failure weight, mean and 9 5Ih percentile of the conditional
probability of local and bulk sodium boiling given an unprotected SBO. A statistically significant
number of boiling simulations was not simulated for the metallic cores with steady state core
outlet temperatures ranging from 510'C to 554 0C, but the probability of local boiling for a core
outlet temperature of 620"C was calculable. No metal fuel simulations result in bulk boiling, but
the probability of bulk boiling should be less than the probability of local boiling.
Table 18b - USBO Sodium Boiling Simulation Summary for Metal and Oxide Fuel
Mean 95t PerCentile
Core Fuel Boiling # of Failure* Pr(Boiling I Pr(Boiling e
Outlet Type Location Simulations Weight USBO) USBO)
510 0C Metallic H.C.B.*** 405 < 4.4x104** N/A
5540C Metallic H.C.B. 405 1.8x10-4* 1.8x104** N/A
620"C Metallic H.C.B. 405 26.2 0.065 0.086
510 0C Oxide H.C.B. 350 0.022 6.2x10 5  1.7x10 4
5540C Oxide H.C.B. 350 16.3 0.046 0.067
6200C Oxide H.C.B. 350 148 0.42 0.46
510 0C Oxide C.A.B.*** 350 < 0.13 <3.7x10 4  <0.002
5540C Oxide C.A.B. 350 0.13 3.7x10 4  0.002
6200C Oxide C.A.B. 350 26.2 0.075 0.10
Refers to sum of the weights of simulations resulting in Sodium Boiling
This failure probability has not converged. Actual failure probability is likely higher
than this value
H.C.B.=Hot Channel Boiling, C.A.B.=Core Average Boiling
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(iii. b. 4) Station Blackout Results
Figure 46 shows the USBO LBEs plotted on the Frequency Consequence Curve. While
both oxide and metal cores respond adequately to USBOs at outlet temperatures up to 620'C, the
metal core provides much greater margin to the FCC than the oxide core. It should be noted that
hybrid LBE methodology would still allow for oxide fuel to operate at a steady state core outlet
temperature of 5540C without a VPORS as only 0.2% of the oxide simulations reach bulk boiling
at this temperature. When combined with the 0.007/yr initiating frequency for the LOF, the
frequency of radioactive material release for this highly conservative hybrid methodology is still
below the FCC frequency limit (1.4x10 5 /yr < lxl10-3/yr).
The LBE release frequencies were calculated by multiplying the SBO initiating
frequency by the conditional probability of arriving at an end state shown in Table 19. The
probability of arriving at an end state are calculated by using Eq. IV.6 and Eq. IV.7 and thus
exclude simulations which also include a more severe end state. It should be noted that the
probability of Cladding Failure (C.F.) goes down for oxide fuel between 554 0C and 6200C
because some simulations that were C.F entered the Hot Channel Boiling (H.C.B.) end state at
the higher temperature.
Table 19 - Summary of Conditional End State Probabilities (mean/95th percentile)
OK C.F. H.C.B. C.A.B.
Metal 620"C 0.94/0.95 -1- 0.065/0.086 -1-
Oxide 510" C 0.61/0.65 0.39/0.44 6x10 4 /3x10 3  -/-
Oxide 554"C 0.022/0.036 0.93/0.95 0.046/0.066 5x1 0-5/9x 10-3
Oxide 620"C 0.002/0.007 0.58/0.62 0.35/0.39 0.07/0.10
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Figure 46- Frequency Consequence Curve with USBO Points Plotted for Metal and Oxide Fuel
at a Variety of Core Outlet Temperatures.
(iv)Suminary of Safety Analysis Limits on Core Outlet Temperature
The UTOP points and USBO LBEs illustrate that even with highly unreliable, or highly
uncertain, reactor protection systems, the TNF should allow operating temperatures less than or
equal to 550"C for both metal and oxide fuel. Thus, the core outlet temperature should be set at
the steady state limit of 550'C.
IV.3.C Safety Analysis of Vessel and Piping for Elevated Temperatures
In a pool type reactor, all piped sodium is in the intermediate loop and thus non-
radioactive. Thus, sodium pipe leaks are not governed by the FCC and no formal safety analysis
is conducted in this case study. In general, even non-radioactive sodium leaks have caused close
regulatory scrutiny and sodium pipes will be rigorously analyzed to ensure reliability. This report
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did not perform a detailed safety study on thermal stresses applied to the vessel and piping
materials.
IV.3.D Safety Impacts of Removing the Intermediate Loop
The primary safety impacts concerning the primary cycle are that, in the event of a heat
exchanger or steam generator break, the steam or other working gas may:
* enter the core causing a reactivity excursion due to the positive sodium void worth of
SFR cores
* pressurize the primary vessel causing a break in the vessel head or seal leakage
These consequences are all but eliminated with an intermediate loop, because the
intermediate loop is non-radioactive and provides an additional boundary to the primary system.
Eliminating the intermediate loop is only practical for loop-type designs. Eliminating the
intermediate loop, though effective in increasing efficiency, has safety implications, and there
are other options for increasing efficiency without additional safety concerns. If the intermediate
loop were eliminated in the pool design, the SFR will be in violation of NUREG-1860 because
rupture of the IHX plenum could constitute a single failure that could lead to core damage (1). In
the loop design, primary sodium must be pumped out of the vessel and into the IHX via primary
sodium piping. The loop design introduces the large LOCA as a credible accident sequence, and
therefore must be evaluated for its safety consequences in the PRA.
IV.3.E Safety Impacts of Switching to PCHEs
Due to robustness of PCHEs, no detailed safety analysis was conducted for PCHEs
compared to standard shell and tube heat exchangers.
IV.3.F Safety Impacts of Switching from a Rankine to a S-CO Power Conversion System
As the balance of plant is non-safety related, no detailed safety analysis was conducted
for the S-CO 2 cycle compared to the Rankine cycle. The potential need for a redan system to
prevent gas from entering the core if the intermediate loop is removed has been discussed in
Section IV.3.D.
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IV.4 Economic Benefit and Ranking of Design Alternatives
This section presents an analysis of how each of the design modifications affects the
thermodynamic efficiency of the plant. Then, any efficiency changes will be analyzed to
examine the effect on the levelized cost of electricity.
IV.4.A Design Alternatives Analyzed for Efficiency Impacts
Section IV.4.A reviews the results of an efficiency study conducted by Ludington in
support of NERI contract (DE-FG07-07ID14888), the same contract which supports this thesis.
A detailed description of the underlying analysis can be found in (58). The option space
described in Figure 42 has been tabulated in Table 20. Twenty-four cases were examined, but
only 18 are displayed in Table 20. The last six cases (numbers 19-24) correspond to the
elimination of the intermediate loop for a pool design, which was determined to be impractical
for safety and efficiency reasons.
Table 20 - Cases Considered for the Thermodynamic Efficiency Study.
PCHE refers to Printed Circuit Heat Exchangers and S-and-T refers to Shell and Tube Heat
Exchangers (58).
Case Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
P-lHX S-lHX Type PCS
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ICEPHFPo/op Wtr(55MaPool/Loop
Pool/Loop
Pool/Loop
Pool/Loop
Pool/Loop
Pool/Loop
Pool/Loop
Pool/Loop
Pool/Loop
Pool/Loop
Pool/Loop
Pool/Eoop
Loop Only
Loop Only
Loop Only
Loop Only
Loop Only
Eoop Only
Water (15.5 MPa)
CO2
Water (23 MPa)
Water (15.5 MPa)
CO2
Water (23 MPa)
Water (15.5 MPa)
CO2
Water (23 MPa)
Water (15.5 MPa)
CO2
Water (23 MPa)
Water (15.5 MPa)
CO2
Water (23 MPa)
Water (15.5 MPa)
CO2
Water (23 MPa)
PCHE
PCHE
PCHE
PCHE
S-and-T
S-and-T
S-and-T
S-and-T
S-and-T
S-and-T
----------
--- - - -
PCHE
PCHE
PCHE
S-and-T
S-and-T
S-and-T
PCHE
PCHE
PCHE
S-and-T
S-and-T
S-and-T
PCHE
PCHE
PCHE
S-and-T
S-and-T
S-and-T
Table 20 shows the results of the efficiency comparison for a constant core outlet
temperature of 510"C and 530"C. The temperature listed in Table 20 is the turbine inlet
temperature.
Table 21 - Efficiency Comparison of
5100C Core Outlet Temperature
T (turbine inlet) Efficiency
("0C) (%)
SFR Cases for
5300C
A Efficiency
From Case 10
@ 510-C
a Core Outlet Temperature of 51 00 C and
5300C Core Outlet T
T (turbine inlet)
(oC)
emperature
Efficiency
(%)
A Efficiency*
From Case 10
@ 5100C
1 504.4 40.7 0.4 525.6 41.2 1.5
2 501.9 41.1 0.8 522 41.9 2.6
3 503.1 -41.2 0.9 526.1 -41.8 2.2
4 505.2 40.7 0.4 526 41.2 1.5
5 500.4 41.1 0.8 520.3 42 2.8
6 475.9 -40.4 0.1 505.9 -41. 2.1
7 486.4 40.3 0.0 505 40.7 0.9
8 483.1 40.1 -0.2 502.5 41.1 2.0
9 487.5 -40.8 0.5 507.1 -41.3 1.6
10 486.2 4 0. 3 0.0 506.6 40.7 0.9
11 481.2 40.1 -0.2 500.9 41.1 2.0
12 433.5 -38.8 - 1.5 477.6 40.5 2.2
13 507.4 40.8 0.5 525.6 41.2 1.4
14 504.2 41.2 0.9 524.1 42 2.7
15 509.8 -41.4 1.1 529.7 -41.9 2.2
16 508.4 40.8 0.5 5 27.6 41.2 1.4
17 502.6 41.2 0.9 522.4 42.1 2.9
18 473.6 -40.3 0.0 507.5 -41.3 2.2
*The effect of temperature changes on efficiency is linearly extrapolated to 550 0C.
The reference case (case 10) is an efficiency improvement over the base SFR design due
to the enlarged heat transfer surface of a straight tube steam generator. Beyond this efficiency
increase, it is a possible to gain an extra 2.0 % efficiency by using the S-CO 2 cycle and
increasing the core outlet temperature to 530"C. If core outlet temperature is restricted to 510"C,
the efficiency can be improved by about 0.9 % if S-CO 2 or supercritical water cycles are used
and the P-IHX is changed to a PCHE design or eliminated altogether.
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Case
Number
IV.4.B Evaluating Economic Impact of Efficiency Increases
Increasing the core outlet temperature increases the plant thermal efficiency, which in
turn reduces the per MW cost of the reactor. Using generic cost equations to estimate costs for a
nuclear reactor, it can be seen that every component of the busbar cost, e (mills/kWhre), of a
nuclear reactor (capital, fuel, and O&M) is inversely proportional to the plant thermal efficiency,
r/ (12). Thus, the effect of varying the plant efficiency by a small amount can be approximated
through Eq. IV.8.
6 ecapital O5l Si 6 efuel 6n ( 6eo&M _ -I IV.8
ecapital 7I efuel 1I eO&M T]
Assuming an initial thermal efficiency of approximately 40% (5), 1 % efficiency increase
will result in a fractional efficiency increase of 0.025 (0.01/0.4). Capital, fuel, and O&M costs
all decrease proportionally with efficiency increases, decreasing the busbar cost by 2.5%.
(i)Raising the Core Outlet Temperature to 5540 C for Metal and Oxide Fuel
For the base design with a Rankine steam cycle and standard shell and tube heat
exchangers an a core outlet temperature of 510'C, Case 10 in the previous analysis, efficiency
increased with outlet temperature at a rate of approximately 0.025%/"C. Thus, increasing the
core outlet temperature to its steady state limit of 550 0C will produce a 0.9% increase in thermal
efficiency. Using the rule of thumb defined above, this efficiency increase correlates to a 2.2%
decrease in busbar electricity cost.
(ii) Efficiency Impacts of Removing the Intermediate Loop
Next, the impact of removing the intermediate loop, a.k.a. Case 16, is considered. As
mentioned earlier, this design alternative is only feasible from a safety case with a loop type
design. It should be noted that the cost of a loop reactor is assumed to be the same as the cost of
a pool reactor for this analysis. Starting from the base design with a Rankine steam cycle and
standard shell and tube heat exchanger, removing the intermediate loop, while keeping a shell
and tube steam generator, allows for a 0.5% efficiency increase. Looking only at the effect of
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efficiency and taking the cost of both designs to be constant, this single change can thus decrease
the busbar electricity cost by approximately 1.25%.
(iii)Efficiency Impacts of Replacing Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers with PCHEs
Next, the impact of switching heat exchanger designs to PCHEs, a.k.a. Case 1, is
considered. Starting from the base design with a Rankine steam cycle and standard shell and tube
heat exchanger, the PCHEs reduce temperature loss in the heat exchangers, thus increasing
efficiency by 0.4%. Looking only at the effect of efficiency and taking the cost of both designs to
be constant, this single change can thus decrease the busbar electricity cost by approximately
1%.
The relative costs of PCHEs and shell-and-tube heat exchangers will need to be
thoroughly studied, in order to understand the long term benefit of choosing one design over the
other. The performance of PCHEs relative to their cost is also important, and information on the
failure modes and repair costs for all components need to be obtained, or at least estimated in the
absence of experience.
(iv) Efficiency Impacts of Moving to a S-CO2 Power Conversion System
Next, the impact of moving to the S-CO 2 cycle, a.k.a. Case 11, is considered. Starting
from the base design with a Rankine steam cycle and standard shell and tube heat exchanger, the
turbine inlet temperature is too low to benefit from switching to a S-C02 cycle. In fact, a 0.2%
decrease in efficiency is expected, although this difference may be within the model uncertainties
of the codes used. Thus, from an efficiency standpoint, there is not a reason to move to a S-CO2
cycle under these conditions. This design alternative will be revisited in Section IV.5 when the
S-CO 2 cycle is combined with higher outlet temperatures.
The potential for reduced capital cost with the S-CO 2 cycle must also be noted. Previous
work indicates that a S-CO2 power conversion cycle would require six times less material than a
traditional Rankine cycle (12). When applied through G4ECONS, the estimated cost of the
secondary side decreases by a third. When cost savings is propagated through the entire plant, a
savings of 12% of the direct capital cost can be expected. Since capital costs are roughly 71% of
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busbar costs, a 12% reduction in capital costs yields a 8.5% reduction in busbar costs. The effect
of capital cost savings on busbar costs were estimated by Christopher Nitta in support of NERI
contract (DE-FG07-07ID14888). A detailed description of the underlying analysis can be found
in (56).
Taken in total, replacing the Rankine cycle with a S-CO 2 power conversion cycle will
yield an expected 8.4% busbar cost reduction. This number considers both the 8.5% decrease in
busbar due to capital and the 0.5% increase in efficiency.
(v)Ranking Design Alternatives
Table 22 ranks the economic impact of the design alternatives. As can be seen, switching
to the S-CO 2 cycle is the most effective method of reducing busbar and capital cost. It should be
noted that the S-CO 2 busbar saving did not arise from increasing efficiency, which was the
original motivation for examining the cycle in this case study, but due to reduction in the capital
cost of the S-CO2 power conversion cycle.
Table 22- Ranking Design Alternatives Based on Decrease in Busbar Cost
Design Alternative
Raising Outlet Temperature to 554'C
Removing Intermediate Loop
Adopting PCHEs
S-CO 2 power conversion cycle
* Does not include capital cost
Case # Rank
10 2
16 3
4
11 1
savings from removing intermediate loop
Decrease in Busbar Cost
-2.8%
-1.25%*
-1%
-8.4%
IV.5 Further Potential Improvements Based on Available Margins
None of these design options are mutually exclusive and thus they can be cc
achieve an even greater efficiency increase. For brevity, the following desi
combinations will be considered:
1. Raising the core outlet temperature, changing both primary and secon
exchangers to PCHEs, and adopting the S-CO2 power conversion cycle
2. Combining the design options in option 1 with removing the intermediate loop.
mbined to
gn option
dary heat
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IV.5.A Adopting All Proposed Design Alternatives Except Removing the Intermediate Loop
Removing the intermediate loop is controversial and thus this section examines the
potential efficiency gains that can be made without removing the intermediate loop. This
modification corresponds to Case 2 in Table 21. Case 2 suggests that efficiency will increase
with core outlet temperature by 0.04%/C, thus arriving at a 42.9% thermodynamic efficiency
when the core outlet temperature is taken to 554"C. As the base case thermodynamic efficiency
was 40.3%, by raising the core outlet temperature, changing both primary and secondary heat
exchangers to PCHEs, and adopting the S-CO 2 power conversion cycle, thermodynamic
efficiency was increased by 2.6%. Using the rule of thumb derived earlier, a 2.6% increase in
thermodynamic efficiency corresponds to a 6.5% reduction in busbar costs.
Taken together with the direct cost savings from adopting the S-CO 2 cycle, adopting
these alternatives will yield a 14.4% cost reduction. This number considers both the 8.5%
decrease in busbar due to capital and the 6.5% decrease in the adjusted busbar cost due to
efficiency gains.
IV.5.B Adopting All Proposed Design Alternatives
This section examines the potential efficiency gains that can be made by adopting all of
the proposed design modifications. This modification corresponds to Case 14 in Table 21. Case
14 suggests that efficiency will increase with core outlet temperature by 0.04%/'C, thus arriving
at a 43.0% thermodynamic efficiency when the core outlet temperature is taken to 554"C. As the
base case thermodynamic efficiency was 40.3%, by raising the core outlet temperature, changing
both primary and secondary heat exchangers to PCHEs, and adopting the S-CO 2 power
conversion cycle, thermodynamic efficiency was increased by 2.7%. Using the rule of thumb
derived earlier, a 2.7% increase in thermodynamic efficiency corresponds to a 6.8% reduction in
busbar cost of electricity.
Taken together with the direct cost savings from adopting the S-CO 2 cycle, adopting
these alternatives will yield a 14.5% cost reduction. This number considers both the 8.5%
decrease in busbar cost due to capital and the 6.6% decrease in the adjusted busbar cost due to
efficiency gains.
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IV.5.C Ranking All Design Alternatives
Table 23 ranks the economic impact of the design alternatives. As can be seen,
combining all of the design alternatives produces the greatest reduction in busbar cost (Rank 1).
It should be noted that the case of all the design alternatives except for removing the intermediate
loop is almost as effective at reducing busbar costs, and considering the added cost associated
with the increased regulatory burden of removing the intermediate loop, removing the
intermediate loop may not confer a significant economic incentive.
Table 23 - Ranking Design Alternatives Based on Decrease in Busbar Cost
Design Alternative Case # Rank Decrease in Busbar Cost
Raising Outlet Temperature to 550 0C 10 3 -2.8%
Removing Intermediate Loop 16 4 -1.25%*
Adopting PCHEs 1 5 -1%
S-CO 2 power conversion cycle 11 6 -8.4%
All Alternatives but Removing the I.L. 2 2 -14.4%
All Design Alternatives 14 1 -14.5%
* Does not include capital cost savings from removing intermediate loop
IV.6 Assessment and Conclusions
By moving the licensing process focus to a predominately risk informed regulatory
structure supported by deterministic requirements, the TNF can change the way SFR designers
approach ensuring reactor safety. Emphasis is shifted away from protecting against extremely
low probability accidents and toward ensuring the lowest core damage probability for more
likely accidents such as protected Transient Overpowers and Loss of Flow accidents.
The proposed methodology for evaluating design alternatives takes advantage of the
unique probabilistic aspects of the TNF to reduce the cost of the SFR. Steady state cladding
temperature limits prevent HT-9 cladding for metal or oxide fuel from moving far beyond 5500C,
and all major internal LBEs are satisfied for these temperatures. In regard to increasing
thermodynamic efficiency, there is no practical difference between metal and oxide fuels within
NUREG-1860. No additional system constraints exist to prevent the outlet temperature from
moving to 550 0C. Combined with removing the intermediate loop, changing to PCHE heat
exchangers, and moving to a S-CO 2 power conversion cycle, busbar costs can be expected to
decrease by 14.5%. It should be noted that when all of the design alternatives are implemented,
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removing the intermediate loop does not confer a significant amount of efficiency gain, and a
14.4% reduction in busbar costs can be expected with the intermediate loop in place.
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V IMPROVED MODELING OF THE RATE OF METAL FUEL/CLADDING EUTECTIC FORMATION
RATE
In metal fuel with an iron based cladding, the fuel and cladding constituents diffuse into
each other forming a low melting point fuel/clad eutectic at high temperatures. The solid-to-
liquid phase transition temperature (or liquidus temperature) for this eutectic formation varies
from 650C to 775C, depending on the fuel and cladding combination. Above the liquidus
temperature the rate of further fuel/clad eutectic formation increases by orders of magnitude. The
liquid fuel/clad eutectic acts to thin the clad, thus reducing the load bearing capabilities of
cladding. This cladding thinning has two implications:
1. Under typical beyond-design-basis transients, i.e. Unprotected Transient Overpower
(UTOP), Unprotected Loss of Flow (ULOF) and Unprotected Loss of Heat Sink
(ULOHS), the eutectic formation reduces cladding reliability by decreasing cladding
thickness, thus accelerating thermal creep by increasing fission pressure induced stress on
the remaining load bearing cladding.
2. Under extremely low probability beyond-design-basis transients, which would typically
lead prompt criticality and then fuel vaporization, i.e. instantaneous removal of all
sodium from the core region or sudden loss of flow in some designs, rapid eutectic
penetration will allow the eutectic formation to breach the cladding and the molten fuel to
quickly leave the core region before enough energy is release to cause fuel vaporization
(51).
Due to these safety issues, the phenomenon governing the fuel/clad eutectic has been
experimentally examined since the 1960s. For simplicity, these experiments have been
segmented into four general categories for further discussion: uranium dripping tests, EBR-I1
safety tests, EBR-II furnace tests, and FFTF furnace tests (34) (68) (69) (46) (47) (70) (Tsai H. ,
1990) (71). From these tests, observations have quantitatively been made concerning potential
dependencies on the rate of eutectic formation. In order to quantify these dependencies,
correlations are made from the test database which takes into account first and second order
interactions between potential variables. Finally, model uncertainty is used to judge the
predictive nature of current and newly proposed predictive relationships.
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V.1 Fuel/Clad Eutectic Database
This section conducts an overview of the metallic fuel/cladding eutectic experiments
conducted from the 1960s to 1994 which were designed to examine the rate of liquid phase
eutectic penetration into the cladding during accident sequences. In addition to reviewing the
quantitative test results, qualitative dependencies on the rate of eutectic formation determined
from these experiments are explored. Potential dependencies on the liquidus temperature are
examined, especially in regard to high-burnup fuel. Because constituent diffusion rates increase
by orders of magnitude after the solid-to-liquid phase transition (46), eutectic penetration can
effectively be neglected below the liquidus temperature.
V.L.A Methodology
Currently, the fuel/cladding eutectic penetration rate tests are distributed over many
papers in the open literature and the underlying fuel specifications for each test, such as initial
plutonium enrichment, beginning of life (BOL) linear power and burnup, also span many
references. This review will differentiate between each major category of eutectic testing as
described in Section (i). The initial conditions for the fuel before and during each test are
described in Section (ii). Additionally, one of the parameters of interest, BOL linear power, was
typically not explicitly provided in the open literature and thus was estimated from similar tests.
The procedure for this estimation is described in Section (iii).
(i)Parameters of Interest
The fuel/cladding eutectic experiments were conducted over 40 years. During that time,
different fuel forms, cladding options, and experimental procedures were used as technology
improved and sodium reactor designs matured. The range of fuel/cladding eutectic experiments
can be divided into four general categories:
1. Uranium Dripping Tests - 306SS test slugs were dipped into molten uranium to
determine eutectic penetration rates,
2. EBR-II Safety Tests - In-reactor tests where the sodium flow rate was purposely
restricted in an assembly to cause higher than nominal temperatures to enable eutectic
formation,
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3. EBR-II Furnace Tests - UZr and UPuZr fuels were irradiated in EBR-II over a range of
claddings, plutonium enrichments, burnups, and linear powers and subsequent eutectic
tests were conducted in a high temperature furnace,
4. FFTF Furnace Tests - A full length IFR Driver Fuel pin, U 19%PU 10% Zr, was
irradiated in FFTF to 9.5at% burnup and subsequent eutectic tests were conducted in a
high temperature furnace.
(ii) Parameters of Interest
Since the 1960s, metallic fuel proponents have been running experiments to determine
the safety implications of the formation of fuel/cladding eutectic. These experiments have
demonstrated that cladding choice, fuel composition, burnup, initial plutonium loading, linear
power, test temperature and time at test temperature all influence the rate of fuel/cladding
eutectic formation. It is interesting to note that the steady state irradiation temperature of the fuel
and cladding were not found to significantly affect the rate of eutectic formation during off-
normal conditions (34). The ranges for the variables examined during the metallic fuel testing
program are presented in Table 24.
Table 24 - Tested Parameters of Governing Fuel/cladding Eutectic Formation
Parameter Options
Cladding composition 316SS, D9, HT9
Fuel composition U, UZr, UPuZr
Burnup (0-17at%)
Initial Pu Loading (0-26wt%Pu)
BOL Linear Power (0-15.7 kW/ft)
Test Temperature 6500C - 1000C
Time at Test Temperature 0-24hrs
(iii)EBR-I1 Linear Power Estimation
By the 1990s, Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) fuels researchers determined that both the
fuel/cladding eutectic liquidus temperature and the rate of formation depend on the steady state
linear power for that portion of the pin. Unfortunately, earlier studies omitted either the BOL or
burnup-averaged linear power of the test sections. For most tests, enough evidence exists to
estimate the steady state linear power of the test segments, albeit with large uncertainties.
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Through knowledge transfer efforts conducted by ANL and INL, the axial position (72) and peak
linear power (37) for a majority of the test sections are available. This information can be
combined with a normalized power profile created using 27 data points from the DP- 16, DP- 17
and DP-21 samples in the X441 EBR-II test assembly (46). These data points are plotted in
Figure 47 and the resulting 6 th order polynomial fit with a R2 of 0.98 is presented in Eq. V.1. It
should be noted that this fit only applies to EBR-II test pins and still has unresolved errors
associated with the fitting data. Predictive errors may exceed 10% of the estimated linear power,
especially in the bottom half of the assembly where the fitting data is sparse. Linear power
estimates determined using this fit will be noted with the superscript f in this paper.
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Figure 47 - Linear Power Profile
V.J.B Fuel/Clad Eutectic Data
for the DP-16, DP-17 and DP-21 Samples in the X441 EBR-II
Test Assembly. (34)
The following section overviews the experiments conducted in each of the four general
fuel testing categories. Trends and dependencies correlated to the fuel/cladding eutectic
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formation during each testing period are discussed and the test results of interest are displayed in
tables for each section.
(i) Uranium Dripping Tests
The uranium dripping tests were conducted to support severe accident analysis for the
first loading of EBR-II (73) metallic driver fuel. Uranium metal melts at 1235'C but the U-Fe
system can form two low melting point eutectics, U-77at%Fe which melts at 1080'C and U-
34at%Fe which melts at 725 0C. The kinetics of these three systems should be different, thus all
three systems were examined. The dipping tests involved heating the molten uranium system to
within 5'C of the desired test temperature and then dipping a pre-heated 760 tm (±5%) 304SS
test sample into the uranium system bath. The sample was held in the bath until the eutectic
penetrated through the entire thickness of the sample, at which point the sample was removed.
Because the U-34at%Fe system has the lowest melting point, it is the most safety
significant dataset. The pure uranium melt data shows slightly faster penetration (within 15%)
than the U-34at%Fe results while the U-77at%Fe penetration rates were two orders of magnitude
slower than the U-34at%Fe results. Because of the lower eutectic formation temperature, the U-
34at%Fe system dataset was chosen to represent expected eutectic behavior for the Bauer
correlation which is used in safety analysis codes such as SAS4A (19).
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Figyure 48 - Uranium Drip Test Penetration Rates for the U-34at%Fe Eutectic System with
Experimental Error Bars
As can be seen from Figure 48, the eutectic penetration rate increases in an Arrhenius
manner with increasing temperature between 725TC and 1080TC (9.9x10~4 K_ and 7.4x 10-4 K-1)
Above this temperature, the UFe2 layer between the cladding and the liquid front disappears
allowing for accelerated eutectic penetration. These eutectic penetration rates are listed in Table
25. Additional melt experiments above 1100T with Type 430SS and Armco iron confirm that
the breakdown of the UFe2 layer is not cladding dependent (74).
Table 25 - Uranium Drip Test Eutectic Penetration Data between Uranium and SS304 (73)
Temperature ("C) Penetration Rate (pm/s)
740 0.0043
850 0.32
950 1.3
1050 3.6
1070 3.8
1085 540
1115 1100
1150 690
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1187 490
1233 210
1244 130
1300 170
(ii) EBR-II Safety Tests
The Mark-I driver fuel for EBR-II, and the subsequent Mark-II driver fuel, was
composed of 95 wt% uranium and 5 wt% fissium alloy, a collection of noble metals left in the
fuel after the melt-refining and injection casting process .(13). Early eutectic tests were conducted
by heating pre-irradiated fuel elements in a high temperature furnace until cladding rupture
occurred. It was assumed that eutectic penetration was the only failure mechanism, and thus
failure only occurred due to complete eutectic penetration of the cladding. Thus while reporting
effective eutectic penetration rates, these studies actually reported an integral damage quantity
which the studies suggest are a combination of eutectic penetration with thermal creep, fission
gas pressure and irradiation damage (75).
The first EBR-II driver fuel tests which used Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM)
images to determine the eutectic penetration of irradiated cladding came during qualification
tests before EBR-II could conduct its Loss-of-Flow and Loss-of-Heat-Sink without SCRAM
tests (70). In the qualification experiment, the XY-22 assembly was orificed to restrict sodium
flow enough to create a peak cladding temperature of 6000 C when the reactor was operating at
24MWth. The control rods were then quickly withdrawn to raise reactor power to 45MWth. The
reactor maintained this power for 2520 seconds until a fuel pin breach was detected and the
reactor was quickly powered down. The results of this test are presented in Table 26. It should be
noted that the amount of eutectic penetration during the test decreases with increasing burnup
and the two high burnup test sections showed no liquid phase formation. This test indicates that
eutectic penetration becomes less of a concern with higher burnup fuel, a result which was
confirmed during later IFR fuel testing. Unfortunately, neither the burnup-averaged linear power
nor the axial positions of the test elements were provided. This omission makes it impossible to
determine if linear power dependencies exist for this test.
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Table 26 -EBR-II Driver Fuel Test Results for UFs with 316SS Cladding and a Peak Linear
Power of 7.62 kW/ft (70)
Assembly/ Average Test Penetration Burnup Eutectic
Element Temperature Rate (sm/s) (at%) Formation?(00)
XY-22/ E-23 769 0.040 0.0 Yes
XY-22/E-33 778 0.030 2.42 Yes
XY-22/E-24 793 0.020 3.95 Yes
XY-22/ E-32 759 0.005 7.5 No
XY-22/ E- 16 793 0.005 7.69 No
(iii)EBR-II Furnace Tests
The majority of ANL fuels testing in the 1980s and 1990s was devoted to qualifying UZr
and UPuZr fuel for use in the IFR program. Thus, a majority of the fuel/cladding eutectic
formation testing was also conducted for these fuels. These tests extended over the largest span
of parameters including burnups up to 17at% and plutonium enrichments up to 26wt%. This
section will first cover UZr fuels and then move on to plutonium bearing fuels.
UZr fuels were the next evolution of metallic fuel after the UFs EBR-II driver fuel.
Zirconium was added to the uranium to help stabilize the alloy, reduce irradiation induced
swelling and act as a diffusion barrier (13). Most of the fuel/cladding eutectic data for this fuel
was derived from pins irradiated in EBR-II test assemblies. Once the desired burnup was
reached, the pins were removed from EBR-II and transferred to the Fuel Behavior Testing
Apparatus (FBTA) to be chopped into test sections and placed in a high temperature furnace for
elevated temperature testing. After the high temperature testing was complete, the samples were
examined using a SEM which determines the penetration depth in a sample to within 10pm (76).
This uncertainty is primarily due to axial variation in the sample and is not limited by the SEM
system. Figure 49 shows the basic trends of the UZr FBTA tests. Due to the limited dataset very
few concrete conclusions can be made, but two points should be noted (46) (71):
1. The effect of burnup on the rate of eutectic penetration is not simple. From Figure 49, it
can be seen that increasing burnup for UZr with 316SS cladding appears to decrease
eutectic penetration rates from 750'C to 850'C by a constant factor with little change in
the penetration rate's sensitivity to temperature. UZr with D9 cladding exhibits more
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complex behavior, with burnup decreasing high temperature eutectic penetration rates
and increasing low temperature eutectic penetration rates.
2. The phenomenon governing the liquidus temperature also seems to be complex. No UZr
pin experienced eutectic formation below 725"C, the eutectic point for the binary U-Fe
system, and the 88-11 test showed no eutectic formation at 750C. While longer tests may
yield lower eutectic temperatures, it is reasonable to assume that the liquidus temperature
is also a complex function of cladding type, burnup, linear power and fuel composition.
Table 27 summarizes the UZr fuels tests. Many of the eutectic penetration rates were
extracted from poor quality log-log plots and thus may only be accurate to within ±10% of the
listed penetration rates. Figure 49 only plots fuel/cladding tests where the temperature
dependency of a given cladding type and burnup is available.
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Figure 49 - Trends for UZr FBTA 1-hr Eutectic Penetration Rate Tests
The main objective of the fuels testing program was to qualify IFR driver fuel which would have
would have to incorporate initial TRansUranic (TRU) isotope loading. In order to qualify TRU
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fuels, ANL first had to qualify Pu bearing fuels. The tests conducted in support of qualifying Pu
fuels are summarized in Table 28 and
Table 29. It should be noted that test 90-01 was identified by ANL as an outlier (71) and
thus conclusions drawn from this data point should be made with caution. This test element
experienced excessive swelling near the mid-plane of the pin, allowing the fuel to expand to
meet the new inner cladding surface. This expansion caused the high zirconium buffer layer
between the inner, low zirconium fuel and the cladding to break down. Thus, low zirconium fuel
was allowed to interact directly with the cladding and excessive fuel/cladding interaction was
experienced. In order to verify that test 90-01 is not representative of typical fuel behavior, an
additional sample was tested at the same temperature (750 0C) from a higher elevation in the pin.
That additional test, 90-02, was more consistent with the existing fuel/cladding eutectic database.
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Table 27 - EBR-II UZr Fuel/Cladding Eutectic Test Summary'0
Test 
. Axial Linear TestAssembly/ Tet Burnup Cladding Poito Power Let Penetration EutecticTetN. Temperature (a% ye Position Power Length Rt p/) FrainTest No. (0C) (at%) Type (x/L) (kW/ft)0 t  (hours) Rate (sm/s) Formation?
X425/88-02 850 3* HT9 0.87 11.8 1 0.049 Yes
X425/88-04 800 3 HT9 0.46 14.6 1 0.046 Yes
X425/88-05 750 3 HT9 0.48 14.5 1 0.019 Yes
X425/88-06 700 3 HT9 0.52 14.2 1 0.046 No
X425/88-13 725 3 HT9 0.56 14.5 1 0.019 No
X423/89-06 750 5 316SS 0.52 12.7 1 0.024 Yes
X423/89-08 850 5 316SS 0.45 12.9 1 0.070 Yes
X423/89-13 800 5 316SS 0.61 12.4 0.2 0.013** Yes
X423/89-13 800 5 316SS 0.58 12.4 0.4 0.013** Yes
X423/89-05 800 5 316SS 0.55 12.6 1 0.025* Yes
X423/89-15 800 5 316SS 0.64 12.1 2 0.008** Yes
X423/89-16 800 5 316SS 0.67 12.0 4 0.005 Yes
X420/88-09 725 6 D9 0.89 8.6 1 0.002 No
X420/88-08 750 6 D 9 0.91 8.4 1 0.0058 Yes
X420/88-07 800 6 D9 0.93 8.2 1 0.049 Yes
X429/88-20 800 8 HT9 0.27 12.4 0.13 0.028* Yes
X429/88-21 800 8 HT9 0.30 12.6 0.25 0.032** Yes
X429/88-19 800 8 HT9 0.25 12.2 0.5 0.022 ! Yes
X429/88-1 8 800 8 HT9 0.2 11.9 1 0.029"* Yes
X429/88-17 800 8 HT9 0.23 12.0 2 0.027" Yes
X421/89-02 800 9 316SS 0.48 11.9 1 0.032 Yes
X421/89-03 850 9 316SS 0.52 11.7 1 0.042 Yes
X421/89-04 750 9 316SS 0.45 11.9 1 0.014 Yes
X420/88-1 1 750 10 D9 0.76 10.5 1 0.0047 No
X421/88-12 800 10 D9 0.78 10.4 1 0.014 Yes
X421/88-14 800 10 D9 0.74 10.7 1 0.019 Yes
X421/90-08 725 17 D9 0.78 10.9 1 0.001 No
X421/90-07 750 17 D9 0.82 10.1 1 0.013 Yes
*Fuel/Clad gap had not closed prior to high temperature testing. **Corrected penetration rates to remove
instantaneous liquefaction due to steady state diffusion. *** It is unclear if this test is 90-04, 90-05 or 90-06
with corresponding /L locations of 0.51, 0.87 and 0.53.
10 Extracted by the autor from: (72) (71) (41) (41)
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Table 28 - EBR-II UPuZr Fuel/Cladding Eutectic Test Data Summary"
Test Plutonium Axial Linear Test Penet- Eutectic
Assembly/ Temper- Loading Burnup Cladding Position Power Length ration Form-
Element ature ("C) (wt% Pu) (at%) Type (x/L) (kW/ft) (hours) Rate ation
(pm/s) ?
X420/86-66 800 19 23D9 N/A* 11.0* 0.083 0.043 Yes
X420/86-56 920 19 2.3 D9 N/A* 11.0* 0.083 0.14 Yes
X420/86-59 975 19 2.3 D9 N/A* 11.0* 0.083 0.42 Yes
X420/86-54 1000 19 2.3 D9 N/A* 11.0* 0.083 0.68 Yes
X420/86-55 1100 19 2.3 D9 N/A* 11.0 0.083 2.9 Yes
X430/90-17 800 26 2.3 HT9 0.80 12.8 "1 1 0.015 Yes
X425/87-74 700 19 3 HT9 0.69 13.4 F" 1 0 No
X425/87-75 750 19 3 HT9 0.71 13.2 " 1 0.014 Yes
X425/87-76 780 19 3 HT9 0.74 13.3 "' 1 0.017 Yes
X423/88-22 700 26 4.7 316SS 0.54 12.6 1t 1 0 No
X423/88-23 750 26 4.7 316SS 0.60 12.3 " 1 0 No
X423/88-24 800 26 4.7 316SS 0.57 12.5 fi 1 0.009 Yes
X423/88-26 850 26 4.7 316SS 0.63 12.2 "' 1 0.0021 Yes
X423/89-12 800 26 4.7 316SS 0.80 11.1 fi 0.4 0.017 Yes
X423/89-09 800 26 4.7 316SS 0.70 11.8 fil 1 0.010 Yes
X423/89-10 800 26 4.7 316SS 0.73 11.6 it 2 0.0079 Yes
X423/89-11 800 26 4.7 316SS 0.78 11.3 f' 4 0.0051 Yes
X423/88-25 670 26 4.7 316SS 0.45 12.9 li 7 0 No
X423/88-28 710 26 4.7 316SS 0.4 13.0 fi 7 0 No
X423/88-27 740 26 4.7 316SS 0.48 12.9 it 7 0 No
X423/89-01 770 26 4.7 316SS 0.42 13.0 7 0 No
X441/92-05 725 19 5.6 HT9 0.48 14.8 fi 7 0.0029** Yes
X441/92-03 740 19 5.5 HT9 0.57 14.3 fi 1 0** No
X441/92-18 750 19 5 HT9 0.76 13.1 f' 1 0.0011* Yes
X441/91-09 770 19 5.6 HT9 0.39 14.9 ' 1 0.0075** Yes
X441/91-15 740 19 9.2 HT9 0.89 1 1 .7 f 1 0.013 * Yes
X441/92-08 800 19 5.6 HT9 0.42 14 .9bt 0.1 0.0050** Yes
X441/92-07 800 19 5.6 HT9 0.45 14.9 0 .5 0.043 * Yes
X441/91-01 800 19 5.5 HT9 0.55 14 .4 1j1 1 0.030** Yes
Axial positions were not available for these tests. Peak BOL linear heat rates are reported. **Corrected
penetration rates to remove instantaneous liquefaction due to steady state diffusion. (34)
1 Extracted by the author from: (69) (46) (47) (34) (72) (71) (37) (41) (68)
144
Table 29 - EBR-II UPuZr Fuel/Cladding Eutectic Test Data Summary (Cont.) 2
TestPee-Etti
Assembly! Temper- Plutonium Axial Linear Test Paenet- Eutectic
Element ature Loading Burnup Cladding Position Power Length rate ton
("C) (wt% Pu) (at%) Type (x/L) (kW/ft) (hours) Rate ation
(sm/s)?
X441/92-06 800 19 5.6 HT9 0.50 14.7 fi 2 0.020**
X441/91-33 625 19 10.7 HT9 0.69 13.6 l' 1 0.0022**
X441/91-31 650 19 10.4 HT9 0.75 13.24 1 0.0046**
X441/91-19 650 19 9.3 HT9 0.88 11.9"' 1 **
X441/91-02 675 19 11.0 HT9 0.25 14.0 fi 1 0**
X441/91-32 650 19 11.1 HT9 0.61 14.1 "' 12 0.0003**
X441/91-36 660 19 10.9 HT9 0.64 13.9'- 12 0.0013**
X441/91-34 675 19 10.8 HT9 0.67 13.7 "' 12 0.0027**
X441/91-35 650 19 11.1 HT9 0.59 14.2 fi 36 0.0004**
X441/91-29 700 19 9.7 HT9 0.83 12.5"' 1 00067**
X441/91-16 770 19 9.8 HT9 0.85 12.2 1 0.0088**
X441/91-17 700 19 9.8 HT9 0.83 12.5"' 1 0.0067**
X441/91-12 800 19 10.8 HT9 0.68 13.7 f' 0.1 0.0**'
X441/91-13 800 19 10.6 HT9 0.72 13.4 "' 0.5 0.012**
X441/91-28 800 19 11.3 HT9 0.52 14.6-"t 0.5 0.014**
X441/91-11 800 19 10.0 HT9 0.8 12.8"1 1 0.012**
X441/91-14 800 19 10.5 HT9 0.73 13.3 f' 2 0.0064**
X441/91-31 675 19 10.5 HT9 0.72 13.4 "' 1 0.0087
N/A/A-850 675 19 11.2 D9 0.76 14.6 1 0.028
N/A/A-850 700 19 11.2 D9 0.83 13.8 1 0.030
N/A/A-850 723 19 11.2 D9 0.73 15.0 1 0.03
X441/91-18 740 19 11.3 HT9 0.54 14.5 "' 1 0.011
Pin T-608' 675 19 12.6 HT9 0.76 10.8 1 0
Pin T-608' 700 19 13.0 HT9 0.71 11.2 1 0.0006
Pin T-608* 725 19 12.8 HT9 0.73 11.1 1 0
Pin T-608x 660 19 13.1 HT9 0.69 11.3 12 0.0002
X421/90-02 750 19 17 D9 0.87 9.6 ft 1 0.015
X421/90-03 800 19 17 D9 0.84 9.9"' 1 0.022
X421/
90-01+ 750 19 17 D9 0.5 11.8'" 1 0.050
**Corrected penetration rates to remove instantaneous liquefaction due to steady state diffusion. (34) x
Assembly or test number not provided, thus the element number is provided. +This data point is an
outlier in the FBTA database. (72)
The degree to which the liquidus temperature decreases with burnup is thought to be a
function of linear power, which controls the rate of lanthanide build up in the cladding
12 Extracted by the author from: (69) (46) (47) (34) (72) (71) (37) (41)
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No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
(controlled by burnup and linear power) with respect to the rate of the protective zirconium layer
formation (controlled by time at temperature). The high thermal conductivity of sodium ensures
that the peak cladding temperature occurs at the top of the core, where the linear heat rate is the
lowest. The linear heat rate dictates the temperature gradient in the fuel, which is the primary
driving force for lanthanide migration into the cladding. Because the linear heat rate is at a
minimum at the top of the core, the lower temperature gradients provide less of a driving force
for lanthanides to enter the cladding. Lanthanides dominate FCCI at high burnup, so the liquidus
temperature is the highest where the lanthanide concentration is the lowest, at the top of the core.
Short core designs, i.e., EBR-II, have fairly flat axial power distributions and thus this trend is
not easily seen in the EBR-II fuel tests. Unfortunately, due to the short heating times of these
furnace tests it is impossible to definitively know the steady state liquidus temperature for any of
the cladding options at high burnup.
(iv) FFTF Furnace Tests
The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) was an oxide driver fueled testing reactor that more
closely replicates the power and temperature profile of a typical IFR design. Thus, the IFR-1 lead
test assembly was irradiated in FFTF to ensure that the EBR-1I fuel/cladding eutectic database
would apply to other reactor designs. The results of the IFR-1 assembly tests are listed in Table
30. FFTF, like many commercial reactor designs, has a peak cladding temperature at the top of
the core and a peak linear power in the mid-section of the reactor. Thus, the IFR-I tests were also
designed to determine if the liquidus temperature was a function of linear power. As can be seen
from Table 30, the liquidus temperature was found to increase with decreasing linear power.
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Table 30 - FBTA FFTF UPuZr Fuel/Cladding Eutectic Test Data Summary (47)
Test
Temper- Plutonium Axial Linear Penetration Eutectic
Assembly Loading Burnup Cladding Position Powerature (at%) Type Rate (pm/s) Formation?
("C) (wt% Pu) (x/L) (kW/ft)
IFR-1 675 19 9.4 D9 0.56 15.7 0.011 No
IFR-1 700 19 9.4 D9 0.57 15.7 0.011 Yes
IFR-1 700 19 9.4 D9 0.55 15.7 0.017 Yes
IFR-1 725 19 9.4 D9 0.52 15.7 0.026 Yes
IFR-1 750 19 9.4 D9 0.53 15.7 0.027 Yes
IFR-1 725 19 9.4 D9 0.75 12.4 0.012 No
IFR-1 750 19 9.4 D9 0.72 12.4 0.018 Yes
WFR-1 775 19 9.4 D9 0.73 12.9 0.024 Yes
IFR-1 725 19 9.4 D9 0.72 8.5 0.012 No
IFR-1 750 .19 9.4 D9 0.73 8.3 0.0036 No
V.2 Overview of Existing Models
Figure 50 shows the available 1-hour averaged fuel/cladding eutectic formation data (69)
(46) (47) (68) (34) (73) (72) (71) (70). The rate of fuel/cladding eutectic formation is governed
by an Arrhenius equation, such as Eq. V.2, thus a transformation of the data is required to apply
a linear fit.
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Figure 50- Untransformed Fuel/Cladding Eutectic Formation Data
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Predictive models that depend exclusively on temperature are the only publicly available
eutectic formation models and ignore other explanatory variables recognized to be important
(47). The basic eutectic formation model is created by taking a new variable Y, which is a log
transformation of the eutectic formation rate, and bounding the data with a highly conservative
linear fit of a new variable Xl, which is an inverse transform of the temperature data. The
transformed data, seen in Figure 51, clearly exhibits more linearity than the untransformed data.
B Jm
R = A er V.2
Eq. V.2 can be rewritten as Eq. V.3:
I n -R = - BV.3
A T
Introducing the new variable defined in Eq. V.4,
Y = I n R)V.4
and Eq. V.5,
1
X1=- V.5
T
yields the linear Eq. V.6.
Y = B * X1 V.6
Currently, the fuel/cladding eutectic rate is modeled by the 1 variable Bauer correlation
(Eq.V.7). This correlation was created using uranium melt tests in 1962 and was never updated
with additional data developed during the IFR program. The ANL correlation (Eq. V.8) (72),
while not used in the SFR safety analysis code SAS4a (19), is another I variable correlation
referenced by the ANL's fuel testing program as a potential bounding correlation to the ternary
fuel/cladding penetration rates between 650"C to 800'C. These correlations are listed below:
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Bauer correlation:
t = exp(22.847 - 27624 InvT) S
ANL correlation:
f = exp(11.646 - 15665 InvT) --(S
1.1E-03
V.7
V.8
V.3 Creation and Verification of New Models using Multivariable Linear Regression
Because it would be useful for reactor designers to understand how design options, i.e.
fuel type, cladding type and fuel enrichment, and operational parameters, i.e. fuel/cladding
interfacial temperate and burnup, affect the rate of fuel/cladding eutectic formation, a database of
fuel/cladding eutectic penetration rates was collected and multivariable regression correlations
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were fit to the data. The fuel/cladding eutectic formation data are limited and what data exists
spans over the variables listed in Table 31. The database examined includes 61 data points and is
divided using stratified random sampling into two groups, with 80% of the data used in the
training group to fit new correlations using the statistical code JMP (28), and 20% of the data are
used to verify the models. Stratified random sampling is employed in order to ensure that all
types of data are equally represented in both the training and validation data sets. The predictive
worth of each of the correlations is determined by using the correlations to predict the
verification data.
Table 31 - Regression Variable Types and Symbols.
Categorical variables take the value of 1 if true and 0 if false. Continuous variables are valid in
the range given.
Variable Type Symbol
Cladding composition (SS-316, HT9, D9) Categorical SS' D9(HT9 treated implicit)
Fuel composition (UZr or UPuZr, UFj or U) Categorical Zr(U treated implicit)
Burnup (0-17at%) Continuous Bu
Enrichment (0-26wt%Pu) Continuous En
BOL Linear Power (0-15.7 kW/ft) Continuous P
Inverse Temperature (1.05x10 -7.28x10 K-) Continuous InvT
Except for the inverse temperature term, these explanatory variables shift the y intercept
fit up or down depending on the state of the fuel pin at the beginning of the transient. In order to
determine how fuel form, burnup, enrichment or linear power change the temperature sensitivity
of the correlation in S interaction terms must be considered. An interaction term is a term
where two or more explanatory variables appear in the same term with one fitting coefficient.
The final linear model takes the form of Eq. V.9, and then the variables are transformed
back into their original units. Of course, all of these variables will not be statistically significant
and many will be weeded out in the final model to preserve degrees of freedom.
Y=InT(A+B*SS+C*D9+D*Zr+E*Bu+F*En+G*P)+H V.9
* HT9+ I*D9+]*Zr+K* Bu+L* En+M*P+N
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From the fuel/cladding eutectic training data, two correlations were created. The 1St order
interactions correlation showed statistically significant dependencies between the fuel/cladding
eutectic formation rate and fuel/cladding interfacial temperature, plutonium enrichment, linear
power, cladding type, and a first order interaction between burnup and linear power. Bolded
terms indicate variables in which the 9 5th percentile error bars extend beyond zero, and thus
statistically may not exist. Many sources cite a known dependence on eutectic penetration rate
with fuel composition but, as can be seen from Eq. V.10, the 1" order model did not resolve a
dependence. Thus, Eq. V.11 incorporates the 2 order interaction terms into the regression
model in an attempt to resolve this dependency, although at the cost of severely reducing the
statistical certainties around the constant and inverse temperature terms. These two correlations
are shown below.
First order interactions correlation (R2adj =0.80):
i = exp(10.0 - 17800 InvT - 0.051 En - 0. 026 Bu + 0.27 P
+2657 [InvT - 9.4x10- 4] [P - 10.9] + 0.046 [Bu - 6.73] [P - 10.9]
+SS [-0. 004 + 19900 {InvT - 9.4x10-4)] V.10
+D9 [0.77 + 0.65 [En - 9.2) - 0.35 {P - 10.8}])
Second order interactions correlation (R2aaj =0.84):
f = exp(11. 4 - 13800 InvT - 0.03 En - 0.5 Bu
+14000 [InvT - 9.4x10-4][Bu - 6.73]
+Zr [1.3 + 0.483 fBu - 6.73}+1500[InvT - 9. 4x10-4}
-12500{InvT - 9.4x10-4){Bu - 6.7)] V.11
+D9 [0.35 + 0.056{En - 9.2}]
+SS [0. 082 + 16000 fInvT - 9.4x10- 4}
-9700{InvT - 9.4x10 4)fBu - 6.7)])
f is the 1 hour averaged eutectic penetration rate measured in pm/s. R2adj is a goodness-
of-fit measure adjusted to account for the loss of degrees-of-freedom from explanatory variables.
Typically, only variables with a standard error of less than 5% are included in the regression
model. If necessary, terms with greater than 5% statistical error are included to incorporate a
statistically significant higher order term. These terms are bolded to denote their high statistical
uncertainty.
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While R2adj is a useful parameter to gauge the model's accuracy when applied to the
training data, verification data is needed to determine the predictive accuracy of a model. Using
the 13 data points set aside at the beginning of the analysis, shown in Table 32, the Bauer
correlation, ANL correlation, and the 1" and 2 order interaction regression models are used to
predict the natural log transformation of the eutectic penetration rates. The natural log
transformations of the penetration rates were used to compare model accuracy for two reasons:
1. By comparing the log transformation of the penetration rates, accuracy over all orders of
magnitude is ensured. If the non-transformed penetration rates were used, the residuals of
the faster penetration rates would take precedence over the smaller penetration rates.
2. The regression fits were conducted to minimize the sum of the square of the residuals of
the log-transformation of the training, so evaluating the log-transformation of the
verification data ensures consistency.
Table 32 - Validation Data
Test, Temp Rate Enrichment Burnup Zr in Cladding Power
Assembly # (OC) (pm/s) (wt% Pu) (at%) Fuel? Type (kW/ft)
Dipping 1100 3.8E+00 0 0 No SS 0.0
E-33,XY-22 798 3.OE-02 0 2.42 No SS 7.6
86-66,X420 800 4.3E-02 19 2.3 Yes D9 11.0
88-04,X425 800 4.6E-02 0 3 Yes HT9 14.6
87-76,X425 780 1.7E-02 19 3 Yes HT9 13.0
88-24,X423 800 9.OE-03 26 4.7 Yes SS 12.5
91-09,X441 770 7.5E-03 19 5.6 Yes H T9 14.9
88-08,X420 750 5.8E-03 0 6 Yes D9 8.4
88-20,X429 800 2.7E-02 0 8 Yes HT9 12.4
91-15,X441 740 1.3E-02 19 9.2 Yes HT9 11.7
IFR-1 700 1.7E-02 19 9.4 Yes D9 15.7
88-14,X421 800 1.9E-02 0 10 Yes D9 10.7
90-02,X421 750 1.5E-02 19 17 Yes D9 9.6
As can be seen from Table 33, the 2"1 order interaction correlation did the best job of
predicting the data in the verification set, followed closely by the I"t order correlation. The Bauer
and ANL correlations performed similarly to each other but were much less effective at
predicting the verification data than either new correlation. The data in Table 30 is also presented
graphically in Figure 52.
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Table 33 - Natural Log Transformation of Predicted Penetration Rates, ln(r[ ]), Compared toS
Verification Data.
Bauer ANL 1" Order 2 "d Order
Correlation Correlation Interactions Interactions
Experimental Predicted Predicted Residual Predicted Predicted Residual Predicted Residual
1.34 2.73 -1.39 0.24 1.10 2.26 -0.93 2.25 -0.91
-3.50 -2.95 -0.55 -2.98 -0.52 -4.02 0.52 -3.83 0.33
-3.14 -2.90 -0.24 -2.95 -0.19 -3.31 0.18 -3.31 0.17
-3.08 -2.90 -0.18 -2.95 -0.13 -3.43 0.35 -3.49 0.41
-4.07 -3.39 -0.68 -3.23 -0.84 -4.74 0.66 -4.43 0.35
-4.71 -2.90 -1.81 -2.95 -1.75 -4.93 0.22 -5.01 0.30
-4.89 -3.64 -1.25 -3.37 -1.52 -4.14 -0.75 -4.56 -0.33
-5.15 -4.16 -0.99 -3.67 -1.48 -4.44 -0.71 -4.48 -0.67
-3.61 -2.90 -0.71 -2.95 -0.66 -3.40 -0.21 -3.64 0.03
-4.33 -4.42 0.09 -3.82 -0.51 -5.41 1.08 -4.77 0.44
-4.08 -5.54 1.46 -4.45 0.38 -3.81 -0.27 -4.32 0.24
-3.96 -2.90 -1.06 -2.95 -1.01 -3.77 -0.20 -3.98 0.02
-4.20 -4.16 -1.39 -3.67 -0.53 -5.08 0.88 -3.60 -0.60
sum(Ri) 12.4 11.9 4.94 2.5
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V.4 Point Estimate Simulated Transient Comparison
In order to gauge the impact of adopting the new correlations on transient calculations, a
severe ULOF/LOHS was simulated. The realization analyzed in this study is the simulation with
the highest average transient temperature from the RELAP5-3D simulated ULOF/LOHS
calculations with an average core outlet temperature of 550'C. As can be seen from Figure 53,
the peak cladding temperature increases quickly from 587"C to 910"C in 12 seconds and then
slowly decreases as the inlet and outlet temperatures equalize. The second temperature
perturbation at 45 seconds is caused by LOHS effects. Since the lowest experimentally
determined liquidus temperature for metal fuel is 650'C, the analysis was stopped once peak
cladding temperatures decreased below 650"C.
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Cladding Temperature for Metallic Fuel During a Simulated ULOF/LOHS
In order to use the two new correlations to predict the eutectic penetration depth, the
state of the fuel pin is defined. For this analysis, it is assumed that the fuel in the hot channel is
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L
r
-- r r
- L
10 wt% zirconium, was enriched to 19 wt% plutonium, has a steady state linear power of 8.8
kW/ft, is currently at 10 at% Bu and is clad with HT9. The predicted penetration depths for this
fuel in this accident from the four correlations can be seen in Figure 54. It should be noted that
the first order correlation predicts the lowest penetration depth, 0.6 pm, followed by the second
order correlation, 1.7 pim, with the ANL and Bauer correlations predicting the highest
penetration rates, at 7.6 pm and 15.4 pm respectively. It should be noted that the new
correlations predict vastly reduced penetration depths than either of the existing correlations.
This trend supports the notion that the Bauer and ANL correlations are intended to be bounding,
conservative correlations, where as the new correlations are best estimate calculations.
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Figure 54- Eutectic Penetration Depth for the Bauer, ANL, 1'l and 2"d order correlations.
The dotted line at 560pm indicates a typical cladding thickness. "Instantaneous" penetration
depth of 20pm assumed due to steady state diffusion effects.
In order to determine the effects of burnup and plutonium enrichment, a sensitivity
analysis is conducted on both variables. Figure 55 shows the same transient as analyzed in Figure
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54, but with the fuel burnup decreased to 5 at%. Figure 56 also shows the same transient as
analyzed in Figure 53, but with the enrichment increased to 26 wt% plutonium. In both cases, the
expected trends of higher enrichment and higher burnup leading to slightly lower penetration
depths than seen in Figure 54 are exhibited in the new correlations (71) (34).
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Figure 55 - Eutectic Penetration Depth for Figure 56- Eutectic penetration Depth for 26
5 at% Burnup Fuel with the Bauer, ANL, 1 " wt% Fuel with the Bauer, ANL, l" and 2nd
and 2 "nd Order Correlations. Order Correlations.
From examining Figure 54, Figure 55 and Figure 56, it is interesting how much the
current correlations over-predict the amount of eutectic formation during the transient. Current
correlations over-predict the penetration thickness (15.4 pm compared to between 0.4 and 2.5
ptm) by approximately an order of magnitude. Because most ANL benchmark tests
experimentally compare time to cladding rupture, which is a function of creep and eutectic
formation, to DEFORM5 predictions, it is possible that DEFORM5 is under-predicting creep
rates to compensate for the over-prediction in eutectic wastage. Future work should re-analyze
the integral tests with the new eutectic correlations to determine if the predictive capabilities of
DEFORM5 improve, which would indicate that creep was properly handled and cladding failure
prediction uncertainties were caused by inaccurate eutectic modeling, or if the predictive
capabilities degrade, which would indicate that creep was adjusted to compensate for inaccurate
eutectic predictions.
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V.5 Model Uncertainty
This section will utilize the model uncertainty methodology outlined in Section 11.7 on
the correlations described in V.2 and V.3.
Previous applications of this model error methodology have assumed the validation ratio
to be log-normally distributed, a distribution which also complies with both of the previous
stated conditions. To determine if the validation ratio can be modeled as a lognormal
distribution, the Lilliefors test was applied to the natural-log transformation of the validation
ratio for each of the models (24). The Lilliefors test is a 2-sided goodness-of-fit test which
compares the maximum difference between the empirical cumulative distribution of the
validation ratio to a normal distribution with the mean and standard deviation of the input data.
By inputting the natural log transformation of the validation ratios to the Lilliefors test, the
Lilliefors test is tricked into determining if the underlying data is lognormally distributed. The
results of the Lilliefors test for the four distributions of interest can be seen in Table 32. The null
hypothesis which is tested in the Lilliefors test is that the validation ratio data is normally
distributed. If the test returns a p-value of less than 0.05 the hypothesis is rejected, or stated
differently, the test shows greater than a 95% confidence that the data was not derived from a
normal distribution. Thus, the validation ratio cannot be modeled lognormally. In any hypothesis
test, p-values greater than 0.05 do not prove that the underlying distribution is normal but merely
that there is not enough evidence to suggest otherwise. The Lilliefors test does not report p-
values greater than 0.5 or less than 0.001.
It should be noted that while the 1s and 2nd order interaction equations can only use the
13 validation data points listed in Table 32, the Bauer and ANL correlations have more
validation data as these correlations were created with less training data. The number of
validation data points available to each distribution is listed in Table 34. All correlations pass the
Lilliefors test at a 5% confidence level and thus it is acceptable to use the lognormal distribution
to model the validation ratio.
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Table 34- Results of the Lilliefors test on the Natural Log Transformation of the Validation
Ratios for the 4 Fuel/Cladding Eutectic Correlations.
Bauer ANL 1s' Order 2 "d Order
Category Correlation Correlation Interactions Interactions
# of Validation Points 54 61 13 13
p-value 0.50 0.15 0.50 0.07
Lognormally Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distributed?
Now that Table 34 has confirmed that the validation ratio can be modeled as a log-normal
distribution, model uncertainty distributions can be created for the predictive relationships.
Section V.5.A uses the model uncertainty methodology outlined in Section 11.7 to create unique
uncertainty distributions for both the new and old predictive relationships. Section V.5.B applies
these distributions to the transient examined in Section V.4 by plotting the 90% confidence
interval for each correlation.
V.5.A Solving the Model Uncertainty Equations
Solving Eq. 11.28 through Eq.1I.33 is difficult to do analytically because of the difficulty
in integrating over multiple lognormal distributions. Thus, a combination of Monte Carlo (MC)
Methods and numerical integration was employed as necessary.
First, Eq. 11.29-11.33 are solved. Using MC, values of bm and sm, are randomly sampled
from Eq.II.30 and used to evaluate the likelihood of the evidence R* through Eq.II.29. A 3-D
surface of points, with bm and sm, in the x-y plane and the calculated likelihood in the z-plane, is
then created. This surface is the un-normalized portion of Eq. 11.31 and can be seen in Figure 57.
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Figure 57- Un-normalized Posterior Distribution Resulting from MC sampling for the l Order
Fuel/Cladding Eutectic Correlation with 10 Random Samples.
Once enough data points have been sampled to cover the state space sufficiently,
MATLAB's griddata function can interpolate z-values (probability density) on a uniformly
spaced x-y grid (b and sm,) (24). Once the posterior distribution has been re-organized on a
uniform grid of adequate spatial resolution, it is possible to numerically integrate the distribution
to calculate the normalization constant k. At this point, the full joint probability is known and can
be seen plotted in Figure 58.
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Marginal distributions of bm, and sm, Figure 59 and Figure 60, can be calculated from the
joint distribution through Eq. V.1 1 and Eq. V.12. The marginal distributions examined for each
variable separately may show insight into the epistemic uncertainties of bm, and sm,, which may be
hard to determine from a 3-D plot. From Figure 59, the 1 4t order correlation marginal distribution
of bm, indicates that the model slightly over-predicts the experimental data because the maximum
likelihood of the bias factor is slightly positive. For the log-normal distribution, ebm and ebm+js2n
are the 5 0 th percentile and mean of the validation ratio distribution.
7T(bm|R*) = f T(bm, smIR *)dsm
Sm
T((sm|R*) = f T(bm, sm|R*)d bm
bm
V.12
V.13
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The 5t, 50t, 95th and mean values for the bm. and sm for each correlation are listed in
Table 35. The I' and 2 order correlations predict the validation data better than the Bauer and
ANL correlations, thus the bias factors for the new correlations are closer to zero. The large
negative bias factors for the Bauer and ANL correlation indicate that they over-predict the rate of
eutectic formation. The higher sm values for the existing correlations are indicative of a higher
degree of randomness in the validation ratio, a randomness which is expected as these
correlations do not attempt to adjust for many dependent variables.
Table 35- Epistemic Uncertainty in bm, and sm Predictions for the Bauer,
Order Correlations.
ANL, ls order, and 2nd
1st Order 2 nd Order
Bauer Correlation ANL Correlation Interactions Interactions
Sm bm Sm sm bm
m;-'5th -0.78 0.99 -0.81 0.94 -0.27 0.50 -0.26 0.36
50th -0.52 1.15 -0.58 1.09 0.062 0.69 -0.19 0.49
mean -0.51 1.16 -0.57 1.10 0.063 0.72 -0.17 0.51
95th -0.26 1.37 -0.35 1.27 0.40 1.02 0.22 0.74
Returning to the validation ratio distribution,
by substituting the likelihood function from Eq.1I.32
U(10- 6, 35).
Eq. 11.28 can be transformed into Eq. V.14
and the uniform prior distribution, ro(R) =
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s
m(R|R*,M)
1 (n(R)-bm
1 ~ e sm 'm(bm,sm|R*)dbmdsm V.14
jfm,sm \/2 HR S m 35 - 10-6 
dR,0 R 8
0, belse
By combining constants the posterior distribution and abbreviating the lognormal
distribution into the functional name, LN(RIbm, sm), Eq. V.14 can be simplified to Eq. V.15.
m(RIR*, M)
r,1
- ={ifsmLN(R bm sm)(bmlSmIR*)dbmdsm dR, 0:5 R ) 8 V.15
10, else
Thus, solving for the posterior distribution of the valuation ratio reduces to solving the
double integral. While this integral can be solved using Metropolis Sampling Markov Chain
Monte Carlo, it was easier to simply numerically integrate the function and normalize the
resulting distribution. When approached from a numerical integration perspective, the validation
ratio distribution can be thought of as a simple weighted average of all possible lognormal
distributions, with the likelihood (weight) of various combinations of shape parameters
determined from the joint distribution nr(bm, sm IR*). The probability distribution function and
cumulative distribution function 1 s' order fuel/cladding eutectic correlation can be seen in Figure
61.
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Table 36- Aleatory Uncertainty in R Predictions for the Bauer, ANL,
Correlations.
1" Order, and 2nd Order
Bauer
Correlation
ANL
Correlation
1Vt Order
Interactions
2nd Order
Interactions
5th 0.08 0.09 0.30 0.40
50th 0.60 0.56 1.06 0.98
mean 1.18 1.04 1.43 1.14
95th 4.10 3.47 3.66 2.39
Figure 62 through Figure 65 compares the empirical and computational cumulative
distributions for all four correlation's validation factors. The cumulative distributions are an
indication of the confidence that the real validation ratio is below the given value. Thus for the
Bauer correlation, a cumulative distribution of 0.95, or the 9 5th percentile, indicates that 95% of
the time the real validation ratio for an experiment will be less than the 95th percentile value of
4.1. The empirical distributions for the Bauer and ANL correlations are smoother than for the 1s
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and 2 "d order interactions because there is more validation data for the simpler correlations. The
lognormal posterior distributions agree well with the body of the data for all correlations, but the
upper tails of the 1 " and 2 order correlation numerical distributions over-predict the 95th
percentile of the empirical distributions. This apparent over-prediction is acceptable because 13
data points is not enough to have a reliable 95 percentile estimate from an empirical
distribution. Additionally, the lognormal distribution predicts a conservative 95th percentile,
which is desired from a safety/regulatory perspective.
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The validation ratio probability and cumulative distribution functions are plotted in
Figure 66. From Table 32 and Figure 66 and Figure 67, the Bauer and ANL correlations tended
to over-predict the experimental results. This expectation is confirmed by the relatively small
values of R at the maximum probability density. Additionally, the ANL correlation PDF is
skewed slightly more to the right than the Bauer correlation PDF, which agrees with the
empirical distributions shown in Figure 66 and Figure 67. The Is and 2nd order correlations show
better predictive ability as their validation ratio distributions are centered closer to 1.0. The 2n
order correlation is narrower and centered closer to 1.0 than the I1 order correlation, indicating
the better predictive ability predicted by Table 32.
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V.5.B Simulated Transient Comparison with Model Uncertainties
One of the desired goals driving the creation of the model uncertainty distributions was to
examine the confidence in the model predictions. By combining the transient analyzed in Figure
53 with the validation ratio distributions, the range of possible eutectic penetration depths can be
examine. The solid lines in Figure 68 and Figure 69 are the same predictions as shown in Figure
54 (i.e., U 19%Pu 10%Zr fuel, 10at% burnup, HT9 clad, q'=8kW/ft). The four equations are
plotted on two sub-figures for clarity, with the Bauer and 2 order interaction correlation in
Figure 68 and the ANL and 1" order correlation in Figure 69. The 5th and 95h percentile
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estimates from the Validation Ratio distributions are plotted as unconnected markers whose
shape corresponds to original prediction.
While the Bauer and ANL correlations predict thicker (deeper) cladding penetrations than
the 1 1 or 2nd order correlations, there is significant overlap in the distributions for all of the
correlations. This overlap is expected because the Validation Ratio distributions were created
with at least a fraction of the same data. Thus, the empirical validation ratios for all of the
correlations should cause the distributions to be wide enough to provide for some overlap,
assuming the test cases are inside the applicability range of the correlations. If the correlations
are used outside of the training/validation data set, new effects and interactions may occur which
may cause distributions to diverge greatly.
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Figure 68 - Transient Eutectic Penetration Figure 69- Transient Eutectic Penetration
for the Bauer (circle) and 2nd Order for the ANL (triangle) and 1I Order
Interaction (square) Correlations. Interaction (cross) Correlations.
5" and 9 5 th percentile confidence bounds are 5t and 9 5th percentile confidence bounds are
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Typically, regulations will put a limit on both the thickness of eutectic wastage and the
cumulative damage fraction allowed during the transient. The fractional cladding damage is a
normalized measure of the total damage absorbed by the clad, in this case through thermal and
irradiation creep and eutectic wastage (19) (77). The fractional cladding damage can be defined
by Eq. V.16:
FCD(a,T, Bu,...) = ftdt V.16
tmi t(aT,Bu,6...)
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where tf (u, T, Bu, ...) is the time to cladding failure at a given stress, temperature, burnup, or
any other number of potential variables which can weaken the cladding. Under this definition, a
CDF=1.0 indicates that the cladding has breached. tf is typically given through correlations such
as those given in the DEFORM-5 module in SAS4A. Assuming a plenum pressure of 1OMPa,
which is reasonable for end of life metallic fuel pins, and that eutectic wastage acts only to thin
the load bearing portion of the fuel pin, the cumulative damage fraction experienced over the
course of the transient is calculated and plotted in Figure 70. As expected, the 1s' and 2 order
correlations, which predicted eutectic penetration of less than 5%, are almost indistinguishable
from the no-eutectic-formation base case. The substantial cladding erosion predicted by the
Bauer correlation and the ANL correlation only increase the cumulative damage fraction by 3%
and 8% respectively. The minimal contribution of eutectic to the cumulative damage fraction for
HT9 has been observed elsewhere (68) (77), thus it is not surprising to experience creep limited
cladding operation in this case.
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Figure 70- Best Estimates of the Failure Fraction for the ULOF/LOHS Transient for the Four
Eutectic Equations and with no Eutectic Considered.
The right image shows a magnification of the cumulative damage fraction of at the end of the
transient.
The regulator may desire the probability of cladding failure given the uncertainties in
eutectic penetration correlations for the transient. First, we define the conditional cumulative
cladding failure distribution function for a given correlation,F(R), as in Eq. V.17.
F (R) ={0, CDF(-,T,Bu,...IR) <1.0 V17
1, CDF(-, T, Bu, ... |R) > 1.0
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Then the probability of cladding failure can be determined using Eq. V.18 which
integrates Eq. V.17 over all possible values of R (77).
m(Clad Failure) = JF(R) w(RIR*)dR
As expected, the Bauer correlation has the highest probability of cladding rupture,
followed by the ANL correlation. The 1" and 2 "d order correlations predict small penetrations
and tighter distributions, thus the probability of failure for these correlations are many orders of
magnitude lower than the Bauer and ANL correlations. The probabilities of cladding failure
given eutectic wastage uncertainties are given in Table 37. If the Bauer or ANL correlations are
used, then the correlation model uncertainties should be combined with the uncertainties
associated with thermal creep to determine the uncertainties around the time-to-failure and
calculate the true probability of cladding failure for this transient realization. Conversely, if the
l'" and 2"d order correlations are used, the contribution of the eutectic uncertainties can be
ignored, as the extremely low individual contributions to cladding failure in Table 37 will most
likely be dwarfed by the uncertainties in thermal creep and time to failure at these temperatures.
Table 37- Probability of Cladding Failure for the LOF/LOHS Transient Simulation given
Uncertainties in Validation Ratio Predictions for the Bauer, ANL, 1" order, and 2"n Order
Correlations.
Bauer ANL 1Vt Order 2nd Order
Correlation Correlation Interactions Interactions
Probability Of
Cladding 4x10-2  4x10-3  8x10-1 2  6x101 3
Failure I I I I
V.6 Conclusion
The rate of fuel/cladding eutectic formation has historically been modeled as a simple
function of temperature, in spite of 40 years of experimental evidence which supports additional
dependencies such as fuel form, cladding type, burnup, enrichment, and linear power. New
correlations which statistically resolve many of these dependencies were developed and their
predictive uncertainties were quantified. It was shown that the current correlations over predict
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eutectic penetration for potential accident types. Additionally, for the accident analyzed, the
uncertainties associated with new correlations are small enough as to be negligible when
compared to other cladding failure uncertainties, such as creep rates or predicted time-to-
cladding-failure.
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VI CONCLUSION
This thesis is focused on reducing the cost of the SFR in a safe and responsible manner.
The licensing framework described in NUREG-1860, a.k.a. the TNF, was used as a guide to set a
regulatory safety framework within which design alternatives could be compared. This thesis
focused on three primary topics:
* Alternate fuel forms,
e Thermodynamic efficiency,
e Improved modeling of the rate of metal fuel/cladding eutectic formation rate
VI.1.A Alternative Fuel Forms (Metal and Oxide)
Because of the favorable experience of EBR-II with metallic fuel and some potential
advantages of metallic fuel for a burner reactor that is recycling minor actinides, the reference
design for this study employs metallic fuel. Internationally, however, oxide fuel is recognized as
at least the near-term preferred fuel option for sodium-cooled fast reactors. Thus, the trade-off to
be considered is whether an oxide-fueled core would have better or worse safety characteristics
than a metal-fueled core and what the relative cost between the two fuel types would be of
generating electricity. Most of the analysis work described in this section relates to a comparison
of accident scenarios and their relative consequences for the two different types of fuel design.
Response to accident scenarios can have a direct impact on the capital cost of a nuclear power
plant if expensive mitigative systems are required. Fuel cycle costs are likely to be a greater
fraction of power generation costs in cycles involving some form of reprocessing and recycling
than they are for the current generation of once-through nuclear power plants. There are
substantial differences in reprocessing technologies for the oxide and metallic fuels, but there is
very limited information on the cost of the pyroprocessing process used for metallic fuels. Fuel
type can indirectly affect allowable core outlet temperature and hence thermodynamic efficiency.
It can also affect system availability. Hence, the choice of fuel is a highly uncertain yet important
economic driver of the SFR.
Due to large uncertainties associated with the cost of electrochemical reprocessing, as
used for metallic fuel, and aqueous reprocessing, as used for oxide fuel, and their impacts on fuel
cycle costs, a full cost-benefit comparison cannot be completed at this time. Instead, this case
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study focuses on in-core operational differences that should be considered between metal and
oxide fuel. Table 7, reproduced below, overviews the categories used to compare metal and
oxide fuel. In this assessment, design basis events are those that establish the design
requirements for safety related systems, structures, and components. Historically, systems were
designed to assure that these accidents would not result in severe fuel damage or uncoolable
geometry. Events that result in conditions that are outside the envelope of the design basis event
conditions are referred to as beyond-design-basis events. These events could result in severe fuel
damage. For sodium cooled fast reactors, there is a subcategory of beyond-design-basis events
that could result in energetic disruption of the core. These events are referred to as Energetic
Scenarios (ES). The potential for severe fuel damage events to lead to ES depends in part on the
manner in which molten fuel debris is transported after fuel failure. If the fuel debris forms
blockages within the core region allowing fuel material to collect, there is a greater potential for
re-criticality than if the fuel debris is swept from the core region.
Table 7-Metal and Oxide Fuel Comparison
I = favoring metal, 5 = favoring oxide, 3 = neutral.
General Category Specific Category Rank
Events without fuel damage 3
Transient Performance Severe fuel damage events without potential for ES I
Severe fuel damage events with potential for ES 2
Maximum Coolant Outlet Temperature (without ODS clad) 3
Operating Constraints Maximum Coolant Outlet Temperature (with ODS clad) 4
Maximum Achievable Burnup 4
The proposed core outlet temperatures for the next generation sodium reactors indicate a
potential temperature limitation for metallic cores. General Electric's S-PRISM and the
Westinghouse SFR design are both proposing metallic fuel with a fairly low core outlet
temperature (510-530 C). JSFR and EFR are both oxide fueled cores and propose operation at a
higher core outlet temperature, around 550 C. This indicates that, considering only thermal
efficiency, the SFRs employing metal fuel are currently 0.5% less efficient and thus have a
1.25% higher busbar electricity cost (see the Thermodynamic Efficiency Case Study (Section
V.11) for more details). A summary of the cladding options considered for SFR designs can be
found in Table 9, reproduced below.
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Table 9 -SFR Cladding Summary
Cladding Classification Temperature Limit Burnup Limit
HT9 Martensitic 6400C 200 dpa
PNC-FMS Martensitic 6500C 150-200 dpa
D9 Austenitic 6750C 100 dpa
15-15Ti Austenitic 6750C 130 dpa
PNC1520 Austenitic 675"C 160 dpa
ODS ODS 7000C >200 dpa
Taking into account all of the available cladding limits, primarily due to creep and
fuel/clad eutectic formation, the following guidelines can be formulated:
* It is impossible to set an overall eutectic limit for a cladding, because of the large
dependence of the fuel/clad liquidus temperature on cladding choice.
" For U.S. tested cladding, i.e. SS304, SS316, D9, HT9, and variations of U.S. tested
cladding which most likely have similar eutectic behavior, i.e., PNC-FMS, 15-15Ti,
creep limits will limit cladding performance, not eutectic liquefaction.
" With metal fuel, high Pu regions of the core, i.e., >20 at%, may or may not require
restricted cladding temperatures due to burnup effects when using U.S. tested cladding
other than SS316 since no high burnup eutectic data exist and direct-couple tests show an
initially low liquidus temperature. For advanced cladding, such as ODS, high Pu regions
may be restricted to a peak cladding temperature of 650"C unless additional zirconium is
added to the fuel matrix to increase the liquidus temperature or a diffusion barrier is
employed to prevent eutectic formation.
" Lead test assemblies from EBR-II show the potential for HT9 clad fuel to be burned past
20 at%, but not enough data exist at this time to form a licensing basis beyond 11 at%
burnup.
Plant thermal efficiency can have a substantial effect on capital cost. At the current state
of cladding development, both metal and oxide fuel have the same core outlet temperature limits
and potential burnup limits, which are primarily set by choice of cladding. The differences in the
approaches to reprocessing for oxide and metal fuels are substantial. It was not within the scope
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of this study to attempt to estimate the cost of a pyroprocessing facility for metal fuel to compare
against that of the aqueous processes used for oxide fuels.
Outside of thermal creep, the fuel/cladding eutectic liquidus temperature is sometimes
viewed as the maximum achievable cladding temperature and thus a limit for future metal fuel
operations. The fuel/cladding eutectic database indicates that the liquidus limit is highly cladding
dependent and thus a robust eutectic testing program would need to be conducted before any
advanced claddings are employed with commercial metallic fuel. Even with this caveat, the
liquidus temperature identified for HT9 cladding, 650 0C, is commonly viewed as a lower bound
for the liquidus temperature. It should be noted, however, that this liquidus temperature was
determined from high linear power EBR-II tests, typically between 12 to 15kW/ft. Typical
metallic fueled SFR designs have a peak linear power between 8 and 9 kW/ft and are outside of
the experimental database. It has been demonstrated in both EBR-II and FFTF that the liquidus
temperature is a function of linear power, most likely due to the higher temperature gradients in
the fuel associated with higher linear powers. Thus the 650'C liquidus temperature is most likely
overly conservative. Additional fuel testing is need to determine if the 650"C liquidus
temperature for 10 at% fuel can be expected in proposed SFR designs or if it is a product of
conservative fuel testing.
The operational costs of metal or oxide fuel forms appear to be similar. Additional fuel
testing will be required to create a licensing basis for burning U-Pu-Zr fuel past 11 at%, but lead
test assemblies showed that metallic fuel has the potential of being burned past 20 at% burnup
with HT-9 clad. A full economic and fuel cycle comparison was not performed for this case
study because of a lack of reliable information on reprocessing costs, but both fuel forms have
the potential for high temperature and high burnup performance and are believed to be licensable
under the NUREG-1860 licensing structure. In general, capital cost tends to be the largest
element of power generation cost. The cost savings that can be realized from moving to a less
robust containment structure was indicated to be approximately 5% of the capital cost of the
plant. Thus, the ability to select a less robust containment could have a significant economic
advantage for one fuel type over another. On the other hand, if the need to protect against
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external threats requires a robust containment, the differential cost of protecting against
Energetic Scenarios is likely minimal.
VL.LB Design Alternatives Resulting in Improved Thermal Efficiency
Improving the thermodynamic efficiency of a design or process is often considered the
Holy Grail for designers and engineers. Such efficiency gains are seen as a way to increase
output while using the same basic structures and inputs as the original design. With an electricity
generating facility, increasing the thermodynamic efficiency increases the electricity produced
with minimum impact on fuel, capital, and operation and maintenance costs. The following case
study examines how thermodynamic efficiency may be increased in the Sodium Fast Reactor
(SFR) through a combination of:
e increasing the core outlet temperature above 51 OC for metal and oxide fuel
e removing the intermediate loop
e replacing shell and tube heat exchangers with Printed Circuit Heat Exchangers (PCHEs)
e switching from a Rankine to a Supercritical-CO 2 power conversion cycle
In order to raise the core outlet temperature, the entire system including the vessel, the
fuel rods, the primary piping and the steam generators, must be shown to be reliable at the
elevated temperature. Hence all relevant Licensing Basis Events (LBEs) must be shown to lie
within the acceptable region of the Frequency-Consequence-Curve (FCC). In order to satisfy
vessel and piping limits without detailed technical evaluation, the hottest proposed core outlet
temperature of 575 0C was set as an upper temperature bound. This is the core outlet temperature
proposed for the BN-1800 design, which uses Cr 18 Ni 9 steel for vessel, piping and heat
exchanger materials (10). Steady state clad temperature limits are designed to ensure that fuel pin
integrity will be highly reliable at the desired core temperatures. Typically, this is done by
ensuring that the 20- hot channel factor clad temperatures are below material limits of the clad
(16). Using the 6400C clad mid-wall temperature limit from HT-9 (39), it can be shown that the
maximum core outlet temperature from a fuel reliability standpoint is approximately 5500C for
both metal and oxide core designs. This outlet temperature is in line with the standard core outlet
temperatures of most currently proposed SFR designs for oxide fuel (10).
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The safety implications of implementing the design alternatives must also be considered.
The elimination of the intermediate loop is only considered to be licensable for loop-type SFRs
because of the impracticality of managing large sodium/water interactions inside the primary
vessel of the pool type configuration. PCHEs can be implemented as a viable alternative to shell
and tube heat exchangers with no limiting conditions within the expected SFR operating range
due to the robustness of the diffusion bonding manufacturing process (57).
The S-CO 2 cycle still requires validation, especially in the development of control
techniques for transient operation. Significant progress has recently been made in transient
modeling, but additional work will have to enter the experimental realm (Trinh, 2009). A full
recompression cycle test loop is required to test the performance of the cycle under system
transients. The corrosion of stainless steels in an S-CO 2 environment must be investigated
further. Corrosion will affect the lifetime and reliability of heat exchangers and the failure modes
of every PCS component. The British AGR program has operated S-CO 2 cycles reliably at outlet
temperatures of up to 650C, but only at a 4.3 MPa operating pressure. The S-CO2 power
conversion cycle for an SFR would likely operate at 20MPa, increasing creep, fatigue, and
corrosion rates. Early work in the field indicates that operating temperatures should not go above
700"C because dissociation of the S-CO2 at these temperatures may lead to corrosion of the
turbine blade and structural components (66).
RELAP5-3D calculations for metal and oxide fuel show that internal LBEs are within the
acceptable region of the Frequency Consequence curve for the steady state core outlet
temperature limit of 5500C. With the same limiting core outlet temperature and plant design,
these fuel forms should produce the same thermodynamic efficiencies.
The thermodynamic efficiencies were evaluated for plant designs with the following
design space:
* 510 0C and 530 0C core outlet temperatures,
" PCHE and shell-and-tube heat exchangers,
e Intermediate loop and no intermediate loop,
* Rankine, supercritical water and supercritical C02 power conversion cycles.
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Transient analysis of both metal and oxide pool type SFRs indicate the FCC does not
limit the reactor operating temperature. Thus, to maximize thermodynamic efficiency the SFR
designer should use the highest allowable steady state core outlet temperature. Using the
G4ECONs model, the cost saving potential of the design alternatives mentioned above were
calculated and are reported in Table 23.
Table 23-Ranking Busbar Cost Savings for the Various Design Alternatives
Design Alternative Decrease in Busbar Cost
Raising Outlet Temperature from 510C to 550C -2.8%
Removing Intermediate Loop -1.25%*
Adopting PCHEs -1%
S-Co 2 power conversion cycle -8.4%
All Alternatives but Removing the Intermediate Loop -14.4%
All Design Alternatives 
-14.5%
* Does not include capital cost savings from removing intermediate loop
Steady state clad temperature limits prevent HT-9 clad for metal or oxide fuel from hotter
than 5500C, and all major internal LBEs are satisfied for these temperatures. In regard to
increasing thermodynamic efficiency, there is no practical difference between metal and oxide
fuels with respect to the risk informed framework of NUREG-1860. No additional system
constraints exist to prevent the outlet temperature from moving to 550'C. Combined with
removing the intermediate loop, changing to PCHEs, and moving to a S-CO 2 power conversion
cycle, busbar costs may decrease by 14.5%.
VI.1.C Improved Modeling of the Rate of the Metal Fuel/Cladding Eutectic Formation Rate
The fuel/cladding eutectic experiments were conducted over 40 years. During that time,
different fuel forms, cladding options, and experimental procedures were used as technology
improved and sodium reactor designs matured. The range of fuel/cladding eutectic experiments
can be divided into four general categories:
1. Uranium Dripping Tests - 306SS test slugs were dipped into molten uranium to
determine eutectic penetration rates,
2. EBR-II Safety Tests - In-reactor tests where the sodium flow rate was purposely
restricted in an assembly to cause higher than nominal temperatures to enable eutectic
formation,
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3. EBR-II Furnace Tests - UZr and UPuZr fuels were irradiated in EBR-II over a range of
claddings, plutonium enrichments, burnups, and linear powers and subsequent eutectic
tests were conducted in a high temperature furnace,
4. FFTF Furnace Tests - A full length IFR Driver Fuel pin, U 19%PU 10% Zr, was
irradiated in FFTF to 9.5at% burnup and subsequent eutectic tests were conducted in a
high temperature furnace.
The rate of fuel/cladding eutectic formation has historically been modeled as a simple
function of temperature, in spite of 40 years of experimental evidence which supports additional
dependencies such as fuel form, cladding type, burnup, enrichment, and linear power. New
correlations which statistically resolve many of these dependencies were developed and their
predictive uncertainties were quantified. It was shown that the current correlations over predict
eutectic penetration for potential accident types. Additionally, for the accident analyzed, the
uncertainties associated with the new correlations are small enough as to be negligible when
compared to other cladding failure uncertainties, such as creep rates or predicted time-to-
cladding-failure.
VL.D General Conclusions
According to the TNF, both metal and oxide fuel are acceptable and should have the
same operating limits without the use of tertiary shutdown systems. Some additional insights
concerning fuel testing and selection are:
1. The only regulatory advantage possessed by oxide fuel is more robust international and
national fuel testing databases. This advantage partially disappears when considering TRU
fuel which has little oxide or metal fuel testing,
2. While potentially irrelevant from a regulatory perspective, metal fuel possess better inherent
shutdown capabilities when compared to oxide fuel,
3. Future metal fuel testing should be conducted over the entire range of expected operating
parameters. The initial fuel/cladding eutectic database focuses on linear powers which are as
much as two times the peak linear powers proposed by S-PRISM and other metal reactor
designs, which may force unnecessary conservatism on metallic fuel.
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From Table 38, Busbar costs can be decreased by over 19% by optimizing
thermodynamic efficiency, adopting a S-C02 power conversion cycle, and moving to an S-
PRISM-type low-pressure containment. The S-CO 2 power conversion cycle is still in the
developmental stage. A large financial investment is needed before cost savings associated with
this power conversion cycle can be achieved.
The accuracy of predicting fuel/cladding eutectic penetration rates is improved and the
uncertainties in the new correlations are small enough to be neglected for most transients.
Table 38 - Achievable cost savings for the SFR through the application of Risk Information
Design Alternative Rank Decrease in Busbar Cost
Raising Outlet Temperature to 550"C 5 -2.8%
Removing Intermediate Loop 6 -1.3%*
Reducing Containment Requirements 4 -4.7
Adopting PCHEs 7 - I %
S-CO 2 power conversion cycle 3 -8.4%
All Alternatives but Removing the I.L. 2 -18.5%
All Design Alternatives 1 -19.5%
VI.J.E Recommendations for Future Work
This thesis identified a wide array of future work that should be conducted in support of
sodium cooled fast reactor development.
Steady State Analysis
1. Additional high burnup U-19%Pu-10%Zr fuel with HT9 cladding high temperature
eutectic testing should be conducted for fuel irradiated at linear powers consistent with
typical metallic fueled SFR designs, approximately 8 to 9 kW/ft for peak conditions.
2. A rigorous structural analysis is needed focusing on the steady state temperature
dependence of the reliability of primary and secondary piping, valves, primary vessel,
and steam generators. Sodium/water reactions have plagued SFRs for their entire
existence, sometimes causing them to be shut-down for years, as was the case with
MONJU. As designers increase system temperatures in order to increase thermodynamic
efficiency, they must assure that those economic gains will not be lost due to a decreased
capacity factor.
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3. The horizontal, semi-statistical hot channel factor methodology needs to be updated by
assuming non-normal statistical uncertainties. Additionally, axial variations of the hot
channel factors should be considered because creep constraints will occur at the
maximum cladding temperature location at top of the pin, while eutectic constraints will
occur at the peak linear power of the fuel pin. The potential to increase creep and
eutectic cladding temperature limits by decreasing plenum pressure and accounting for
linear power in the eutectic limit should also be examined.
Transient Analysis
1. An analysis of the co-variances of reactivity coefficients in SFR designs is needed. In this
thesis, reactivity coefficients were treated as independent variables, but dependencies
between these coefficients should exist. For example, a harder than expected spectrum
will simultaneously cause the sodium density coefficient to increases and the Doppler
coefficient to become less effective, thus potentially reducing inherent safety. A softer
spectrum will cause the opposite effect. In order to more realistically model the
probabilistic transient response, these dependencies should be incorporated, potentially as
co-variances to the normal probability distributions which currently describe the
reactivity coefficients.
2. Each RELAP5 simulation produces a range of outputs including time dependent
temperature, pressure, flow rates, and Fractional Cladding Damages (FCDs) for various
components. Each of these parameters will have a distribution due to the epistemic
uncertainties, but for now only the FCD has been examined. In fact, because cladding
failure is modeled as a Bernoulli sequence, the only information, or evidence, extracted
from each simulation is whether or not the FCD exceeds 1.0. It is probable that some of
the ignored information could be used to provide a more accurate estimate of the failure
probability, but incorporating this evidence is left as future work.
3. The epistemic uncertainty distributions describing the SFR reactivity coefficients need to
be re-examined. There is no reason to assume that these coefficients are normally
distributed and this assumption is most likely incorrect. Special attention should be paid
to the tails of the distributions, since failure of inherent safety will occur in this region.
Any chosen distribution should ensure that a conservative failure probability will be
reached.
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VIII APPENDIX A - DEFORM5 FAILURE MODEL
For metallic fuel in Sodium Cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs), cladding failures during
accident conditions are primarily caused by stress rupture. Stress rupture is induced by cladding
thinning due to a combination of thermal creep and fuel/cladding eutectic formation. ANL has a
variety of failure models which include both creep and eutectic which are included in SAS, the
details of which can be found on pages 8-115 to 8-127 in ANL-FRA-1996-3 Volume 3 (19).
This appendix seeks to summarize the primary ANL failure model, DEFORM5, and explain how
it can be used to predict cladding failure. The methodology described in this Appendix is used in
the CreepFailure.m code of BEAGLE to predict clad failure.
A. I Nomenclature
For simplicity, the following symbols and definitions will be used for all of the following
equations in this paper:
E = Dorn Parameter = t, exp(-Q/RT)
t, = Mean Rupture Time (hr)
At = Time step (s)
T = Cladding Temperature (K)
Tf = Failure Temperature (ksi)
Ta Temperature at the fuel/cladding interface
Teut = Input Eutectic Temperature (650 0C)
T = heating rate
R = Universal gas Constant
Q = Specific Energy of Reaction = (cal / mole)
* 20%CW SS - Q = 53,508 cal/mole
* HT-9 - 70,170 cal/mole
'= Hoop Stress = r2z r,2  h
o*= 135 ksi
ro = outer cladding radius
ri= inner cladding radius
h = cladding thickness
1 = length of fuel pin
r = cladding midwall radius
P = Internal Gas Pressure- typical high burnup value is - 1OMPa
Pb = Burst Pressure
LMP = Experimentally determined Larson-Miller parameter
B = Burnup (atom %)
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Ff,, = New Failure Fraction
Ff, = Fractional Cladding Damage
r, = outer boundary of old inner cladding cell
r2= outer boundary of old center cladding cell
A.2 ANL Failure Model (DEFORM-5)
Deform 5 calculates cladding failure due to both eutectic wastage of the inner wall and
thinning of the cladding due to thermal creep as discussed in Section 1.2. DEFORM-5 calculates
a static mean failure time for any given time step given average stresses (function of cladding
radius and wall thickness) and cladding temperature. The fractional cladding damage (FCD) is
then computed by dividing the length of the time step by the mean failure time for that time step,
and summing over all previous time steps.
For eutectic formation, the wall thickness decreases at a rate governed by the following
Arrhenius equation. This equation will be replaced with a distributed equation once the
probabilistic model is completed.
r 10-6 * exp (22.847-27624) A.1
The equivalent creep rate is determined by:
o 2.263 36739
Eeq= 5.1966x10' 0 * (-f) * -6 T A.2
Where:
o= 3.956x10- 3 + 2.12x10 1 * (1.144 - 4.856x10 4 * T) (Pa) A.3
the rupture time is then calculated by:
70170 cal
mole
1.986 cal * T A.4
tr = 0 * e* mole*K
where the Dorn parameter 0 can be found by:
A+B*Inn730MPa6 = e aeq A.5
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a - 200
A =-34.8 + tanh 50 + A.6
12
B = (1.5 + .5 * tanh 20 A.7
=- ( r0.5 1+ tanh 2 O)*(0. 7 5 * 1+ tanh
50 17 A.8
where the damage fraction is calculated by:
Ati
trl A.9
and the total FCD is calculated by:
F+1 = F + FFf,0  f, 0 fn A.10
when Fr-,o=1 the cladding is assumed failed. The EOL FCD value is predicted to be 0.0006 for S-
PRISM fuel (4). This value was used as the initial FCD value for all CreepFailure.m
calculations.
A.3 Creep Rate Effect on Cladding Thickness
The creep model presented in section II.A.3 described how to calculate the equivalent
creep rate for steady state and transient conditions. This section will describe how creep affects
the cladding thickness in the RELAP5-3D post-processing model.
First, the primary stresses must be defined. The cladding will be analyzed using a thin
shell approximation where:
P * R0- = h A.l l
P *RUz = 2* h A.12
z = -P 0 A.13
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And the equivalent stress is defined as:
9eq = 002 +z+ (o -z) = 2]* CO A.14
The preloaded strain in a thin shell approximated cylinder, neglecting thermal expansion,
is then calculated by:
P *R Ar
E = *E* (2 -v)=- A.15
P * R
Ez - * (12 *E *h
Al
- 2v) = -
1
Radial strain is not calculated in the thin shell model, but as the radius and height
increases, the thickness must decrease to conserve volume. The change in volume of the
cladding can be expressed as:
(V + AV) = 2 * r * (r + Ar) * (l + Al) * (h + Ah) = 0 A.17
After some arithmetic manipulation the change in thickness can be determined by:
Ah = -h* 1
1
(+ EO) * (1 + Ez))
A.18
A.19
Using the following relations, the t=0 radius, length, and cladding thickness can be calculated.
h= h + Ah A.20
10 = + Al A.21
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A.16
r0 = r + Ar
A.22
Then using the equivalent creep strain rate (deq) from ANL and MIT correlations, the
additional strain in the z and 0 directions (r is not calculated due to the thin shell approximations)
can be calculated by:
At*deq . 1 . At*deq 3 .1 Ari
Ueq I9 2 1 cieq 4 r A.23
At*Eeq [ 1 At*ee 1 1 [
ACz = -1 z -- Je = q -go t=
7eq 1 2 0- eq 2 2 A.24
Where the i superscript indicates that the stresses are calculated with the ith time steps
values for he, lo, and ro. The new thickness now only changes with radius as AEz will always be
0.
Ah 1 = - * 1 A-2Ah -' 1 (1 + AEO)) A.25
Now the i+1th time parameters can be calculated by:
hi+1 = h' + Ah'
A.26
ri+1 =ri+ Ari A2.27
A.4 Validation Against SAS4a/DEFORM5 Calculations
CreepFailure.m does not calculate transient plenum pressure changes, instead using a
constant value for simplicity and speed. While a typical EOL plenum pressure for a metal fuel
pin is approximately 1OMPa (4), most of the cladding damage during the transient will occur at
higher plenum pressure when high fuel temperature allows for further fission gas release. Thus,
the a conservative constant pressure damage calculations should use a plenum pressure high
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enough to conservatively predict the time to failure estimates at all temperatures, within
uncertainties (68). Using trial and error, a 14.3MPa plenum pressure conservatory predicts
cladding failure times at all temperatures, as can be seen in Figure 71.
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Figure 71 - Time to Cladding Failure.
Plotted as a Function of Cladding Temperature from ANL, constant 1OMPa plenum pressure
with DEFORM5, and constant 14.3MPa plenum pressure with DEFORM5 (68)
Figure 72 and Figure 73 show variable pressure and constant pressure failure times for
14.3MPa and 1OMPa respectively. These figures also plot the Error Factor, defined as the
constant pressure predicted time to cladding rupture divided by the variable pressure predicted
time to cladding rupture. As can be seen, 1OMPa shows better agreement at low temperatures
and 14.3MPa shows better agreement at high temperatures.
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A.4 Creep Conclusions
Using the methodology outlined in this appendix, the time to cladding failure can be
approximated for a variety of transients. The cladding damage fraction model is typically
considered a good estimation of failure time for high temperature transients (T > 800'C), but
may provide an overly conservative estimate for less challenging transients (77).
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IX APPENDIX B - RELAP MODEL
Appendix B overviews the RELAP5-3D model in pictorial form. A full description of the
RELAP5-3D model, including validation against the ABR-000, can be found in Matthew
Memmott's thesis (18). First, Figure 74 shows the primary loop. This loop connects the core to
the intermediate heat exchangers and decay heat removal systems.
To/From IHTS To/Fromin
IHT
Spent fuel
redan
IHX
EM Pump
Figure 74 - Primary System of RELAP5-3D SFR Model
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To/F rorr
Figure 75 shows the reactor core model. Channel 190 represents the control assemblies,
180 represents core bypass, and channels 110, 131, 132, 123, 111, and 150 represent inner and
outer fuel assemblies.
Figure 75- Core Layout of RELAP5-3D SFR Model
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,I
Figure 76 shows the intermediate loop of the ABR-1000. This loop connects the IHX to
the steam generators. The balance of plant is represented by a response surface and thus is not
shown.
322
326
Figure 76- Intermediate Loop of RELAP5-3D SFR Model
195
Figure 77 shows the decay heat removal system. It connects the core to a NaK loop
which removes energy to the environment through an additional heat exchanger.
To
Outside
Air
stack
NDHX
From
Outside
712 741
Control
~~~~ ~Valve
Inventory
Control
From Cold
Pool DRACS
Exchanger
To Cold
Pool
Figure 77 - Decay Heat Removal Loop of RELAP5-3D SFR Model
Table 39 compares the RELAP5-3D model parameters with the ABR-1000. It should be
noted that the ABR-1000 report did not specify secondary sodium inventory, so it was originally
assumed to be 533MT. It was later discovered that the secondary inventory was closer to
1000MT, but at that point most of the analysis conducted in this thesis was completed.
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Table 39 - Comparison between RELAP5-3D Model and ABR-1000 Parameters
Model Report Model
Secondary Inventory (MT)
Primary Side
IHX Tin ('C)
IHX Tout ('C)
IHX AP Primary (kPa)
Core Tin ('C)
Core Tout ('C)
Core AP (MPa)
mdot (kgls)
Secondary Side
IHX Tin ('C)
IHX Tout ('C)
IHX AP Secondary (kPa)
mdot (kg/s)
SG Tin ('C)
533
508.19
353.85
9.58
353.01
508.35
0.323
1267.7
333.014
488.871
22.20
1253. 5
488.837
510
355
18.2
355
510
0.314
1256
333
488
14.8
1256
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Na Tin (C)
NaK Tin ("C)
NaK Tout (0C)
NaK H (m)
Air Tin (C)
Air Tout ('C)
Stack H (in)
Stack A (m)
Na mdot (kg/s)
Nak idot (kgls)
air mdot (kg/s)
PCS System
H20 Tin (C)
H20 Tout (C)
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Report
510
489.62
314.87
5.22
30
48.36
8.25
5
12.6
17.5
110
216
453.987
510
355
484
328
8.25
12.6
17.5
216
454
X APPENDIX C - RELAP UNCERTAINTY SCRIPTS AND CODES (BEAGLE)
This Appendix contains the codes and scripts used in the RELAP5-3D uncertainty
propagation code BEAGLE. BEAGLE has three main stages:
1. RELAP Input Generator - Writes a user defined number of RELAP inputs and defines
basic parameters and distributions from which to sample. This stage also allows for the
option to conduct biased importance sampling.
2. RELAP Automation - Automates the process of running every RELAP file generated by
the input generator.
3. RELAP Output Extraction - Reads every RELAP output and transforms minor edit
variables into MATLAB objects.
4. Cladding Failure Calculation - Calculates transient induced cladding damage fractions
and computes the statistical weight of the simulation resulting in failed cladding.
X. 1 RELAP Input Genertor
The RELAP input generator has 3 primary scripts: Importance.m,
ReactivityGenerator.m and Auto.m.
X.l.A Importance.m
function [num,wgt]=inp(random)
if random<=0.5
num=O.0+rand*5/100;
wgt=.1;
elseif random<=0.8
num=0.05+rand*45/100;
wgt=1 .5;
else
num=0.5+rand*50/100;
wgt=2.5;
e n d
X.1.B Reactivity Generator.m
clear
In foldername=
Ou folder n ame=
folders=8;
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runs=50;
inputs=l;
plots=1;
doppler=2;
expansion=2;
sodiumdensity=2;
CRExpansion=2;
CRDLExpansion=2;
sb. t..
1*
7 I-'., f N.
Dop-.e
reactivity(1)=0.7;
reactivity(2)=0.9;
wgt=zeros(6,runs);
tau=zeros(1,runs);
ax=zeros (1,runs);
dop=zeros (1, runs);
rho=zeros (6, runs);
sodlll=zeros(5,runs);
sod123=zeros(5,runs);
sodl50=zeros(5,runs);
mean=zeros (1,3);
sig=zeros (1,3);
sod=zeros(1,runs);
cre=zeros(2,runs);
crdle=zeros (2, runs)
wgtt=zeros(1,runs);
time=zeros(1,runs);
react=zeros(1,runs);
for iii=1:folders
figure (iii)
if reactivity(1)-=0
for i=1:runs
[rnd,wgt(1,i) =inp(rand);
react(i)=reactivity(1)+(reactivity(2)-reactivity(l))*(l-rnd);
rate=0.165; . K/s
time (i)=react(i)/rate;
end
else
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print VleteyW
for i=l:runs
react(i)=reactivity(2);
rate=0.165;
time (i) =react (i) /rate;
end
end
bound (1)=. 3;
bound(2)=. 9;
drho=(bound(2)-bound(1))/12;
x=bound(l):drho:bound(2);
if plots==1
subplot (3, 2, 1)
hist (react, x);
title (
xlabel
ylabel (
enod
t ')
0>
i ~
templ50=[819.629,888.248,937.336,961.40 4 ,95 6 .2 2 6 ];
weightl50=[0.001148,0.001547,0.001686,0.001547,0.001148];
avel50=0;
for i=1:5
avel50=avel5O+templ50 (i) *weightls (i);
end
templll=[798.65,862.28,909.86,935.63,935.26];
weightlll=[0.077075,0.103739,0.3113137,0.103739,0.077075];
avelll=0;
for i=l:5
avelll=avelll+templll(i)*weightlll(i);
end
templ23=[789.8,850.8,897.7,924.5,926.9];
weightl23=[0.084119,0.113221,0.123478,0.1113221,0.084119];
avel23=0;
for i=1:5
avel23=avel23+templ23(i)*weightl23(i);
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end
avetot=avel5O+avelll+avel23;
averho=-5.04+(5.04-7.56)/(1200-900)* (avetot-900);
temp(1)=300;
temp (2) =600;
temp(3)=900;
temp(4)=avetot;
temp(5)=1125;
temp(6)=3000;
temp(1)=300;
temp(2)=600;
temp(3)=900;
temp (4) =avetot;
temp(5)=1125;
temp(6)=1275;
Axial=-0.006;
sigaxial=-Axial*.3;
alpha(1)=-.3205e-2;
alpha(2)=-.1587e-2;
alpha(3)=-0.0912e-2;
alpha(4)=-.085e-2;
if doppler==1
for ii=l:runs
if expansion==1
ax(ii)=Axial;
alpha=alpha+ax(ii);
elseif expansion==2
ax(ii)=norminv(ranexp,Axial,sigaxial);
alpha=alpha+ax (ii); 3; t - Aea Ep.
else
ax(ii)=axial+2*sigaxial;
alpha=alpha+ax(ii);
end
dop (ii) =alpha (3);
rho(4,ii)=averho;
rho(3,ii)=averho-alpha(3)*(avetot-900);
rho(2,ii)=rho(3,ii)-alpha(2)* (900-600);
rho(1,ii)=rho(2,ii)-alpha(1)* (600-300);
rho(5,ii)=rho(3,ii)-alpha(3)* (900-1125);
rho(6,ii)=rho(4,ii)-alpha(4)* (1125-1275);
end
elseif doppler==2
for ii=l:runs
[rnd,wgt(2,ii)]=inp(rand);
randop=(l-rnd); A val
[rnd,wgt(3,ii))=inp(rand);
ranexp=(1-rnd); L oa
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alpha(1)=norminv(randop,alpha(l),alpha(1)*-.2);
alpha(2)=norminv(randop,alpha(2),alpha(2)*-.2);
alpha(3)=norminv(randop,alpha(3),alpha(3)*-.2);
alpha(4)=norminv(randop,alpha(4),alpha(4)*-.3);
if expansion==1
ax (ii)=Axial;
alpha=alpha+ax(ii);
elseif expansion==2
ax(ii)=norminv(ranexp,Axial,sigaxial);
alpha=alpha+ax(ii); s - Axia E n
else
ax(ii)=axial+2*sigaxial;
alpha=alpha+ax(ii);
end
dop(ii)=alpha (3);
rho (4,ii) =averho;
rho(3,ii)=averho-alpha(3)* (avetot-900);
rho(2,ii)=rho(3,ii)-alpha(2)* (900-600);
rho(1,ii)=rho(2,ii)-alpha(1)* (600-300);
rho(5,ii)=rho(3,ii)-alpha(3)* (900-1125);
rho(6,ii)=rho(4,ii)-alpha(4)* (1125-1275);
e Id
else
for ii=l:runs
alpha(1)=alpha(1)+2*alpha(l)*.2;
alpha(2)=alpha(2)+2*alpha(2)*.2;
alpha (3)=alpha (3)+2*alpha (3) *.2;
alpha(4)=alpha(4)+2*alpha(4)*.2*.3;
if expansion==1
ax(ii)=Axial;
alpha=alpha+ax(ii);
elseif expansion==2
ax(ii)=norminv(ranexp,Axial,sigaxial);
alpha=alpha+ax (ii); 3! d -
else
ax(ii)=Axial+2*sigaxial;
alpha=alpha+ax(ii);
end
dop(ii)=alpha(3);
rho (4,ii) =averho;
rho(3,ii)=averho-alpha(3)*(avetot-900);
rho(2,ii)=rho(3,ii)-alpha(2)* (900-600);
rho(1,ii)=rho(2,ii)-alpha(1)* (600-300);
rho(5,ii)=rho(3,ii)-alpha(3)* (900-1125);
rho(6,ii)=rho(4,ii)-alpha(4)* (1125-1275);
end
end
if plots==1 l
subplot (3,2, [5 6])
plot (temp, rho,
title('ppe dAilEpninDsrbto'
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ylabel(>'e
end
for ii=l:runs
if sodiumdensity==1;
j=1;
a=2.0533068e-2;
mean(j)=1.2445e-4*.12/.17;
sig (j)=mean (j)*.16;
peakll=mean(j);
n=10;
for i=1:5
sodlll(i,ii)=peak111*cos(a* (50-n));
n=n+20;
end
j=2;
mean(j)=1.3583e-04*.12/.17;
sig(j) =mean(j)*.16;
peakl23=mean(j);
n=10;
for i=1:5
sodl23(i,ii)=peakl23*cos(a* (50-n));
n=n+20;
end
j =3;
mean(j)=1.3583e-04*.12/.17;
sig(j)=mean(j)*.16;
peakl50=mean(j);
n=10;
for i=1:5
sodl50(i,ii)=peaklSO*cos(a* (50-n));
n=n+20;
end
elseif sodiumdensity==2;
j=1;
a=2.0533068e-2;
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use aman val
mean (j )=1. 2445e-4*.12/.17;
sig(j)=mean(j)*.16; t
[rnd,wgt(4,ii) ]=inp(rand);
peaklll=norminv((1-rnd),mean(j),sig(j));
n=10;
for i=1:5
sodlll(i,ii)=peaklll*cos(a* (50-n));
n=n+20;
end
j=2;
mean(j)=1.3583e-04*.12/.17;
sig (j)=mean (j)*.16; ' 1 t -
peakl23=norminv((1-rnd),mean (j),sig(j));
n=10;
for i=1:5
sodl23(i,ii)=peakl23*cos (a* (50-n));
n=n+20;
end
j =3;
mean(j)=1.3583e-04*.12/.17;
sig(j)=mean(j)*.16; 20
peakl5O=norminv((1-rnd),mean(j),sig(j));
n=10;
for i=1:5
sodl50(i,ii)=peakl50*cos (a* (50-n));
n=n+20;
end
else
j=1;
a=2.0533068e-2;
mean(j)=1.2445e-4*.12/.17; 1' YTfI
sig(j)=mean(j)*.16;
peaklll=mean(j)+2*sig(j);
n=10;
for i=1:5
sodlll(i,ii)=peak111*cos(a*(50-n));
n=n+20;
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end
j=2;
mean(j)=1.3583e-04*.12/.17;
sig(j)=mean(j)*.16;
peakl23=mean(j)+2*sig(j);
n=10;
for i=1:5
sodl23(i,ii)=peakl23*cos
n=n+20;
end
j=3;
mean(j)=1.3583e-04*.12/.17;
sig (j)=mean (j) *.16;
peakl50=mean(j)+2*sig(j);
n=10;
for i=1:5
sodI5O(i,ii)=peakl50
n=n+20;
*Cos
(a* (50-n));
(a* (50-n));
end
end
clear
sod(ii)=sum(sodl5O(:,ii))+sum(sodl23(:,ii))+sum(sodlll(:,ii));
enr d
bound(1)=mean(sod)-3*std(sod);
bound(2)=mean(sod)+3*std(sod);
dsod= (bound(2)-bound(1))/10;
x=bound(1):dsod:bound(2);
if plots==1
subplot (3,2,2)
hist (sod, x);
title ( m entCe
xlabele i.
ylabel (V' Nnbr~ of-m ie
e nd
averad=-0.0039;
sigrad=-averad*.2;
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t Dist ributI n')
if CRExpansion==1
for i=l:runs
cre (1, i)=averad; c i
cre (2, i)=cre (1,i) *782.7311401;
end
elseif CRExpansion==2
for i=l:runs
[rnd,wgt(5,i)1=inp(rand);
cre(1,i)=norminv((1-rnd),averad,sigrad);
cre (2,i)=cre (1,i)*782.7311401;
end
else
for i=l:runs
cre (1, i)=averad+2*sigrad;
crc(2,i)=cre(1,i)*782.7311401;
e- r,-A
end
bound(1)=mean(cre (1,:))-3*std(cre (1,:));
bound(2) =mean(cre (1,:))+3*std(cre (1,:));
dcre= (bound(2)-bound(1))/10;
x=bound(1):dcre:bound(2);
if plots==1
subplot (3,2,3)
hist(cre(1, :),x)
title(
xlabel (
ylabel (' I pa i I
avecrdle=-0.49;
sigcrdle=-avecrdle*.2;
if CRDLExpansion==1
for i=l:runs
crdle(1, i)=avecrdle;
crdle (2, i)=-crdle (1,i) *14.8797;
end
elseif CRDLExpansion==2
for i=l:runs
[rnd,wgt(6,i)]=inp(rand);
crdle(1,i)=norminv((1-rnd),avecrdle,sigcrdle);
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crdle (2,i) =-crdle (1,i) *14.8797;
end
el se
for i=1:runs
crdle(1,i)=avecrdle+2*sigcrdle;
crdle (2,i) =-crdle (1,1) *14.8797;
end
end
bound (1) =mean (crdle (1, ))-3*std (crdle (1,:
bound (2) =mean (crdle (1, :))+3*std (crdle (1,:
dcrdle=(bound(2)-bound(1))/10;
x=bound(1):dcrdle:bound(2);
if plots==1
subplot (3,2,4)
hist(crdle (1,:),x);
title('
xlabel (
ylabel(o
end
if inputs==1
for i=1:runs
name=sprintf(' ',In folder name, iii,i);
wgtt (i) =wgt (1,i) . *wgt (2,i) . *wgt (3, i) . *wgt (4,i) . *wgt (5,i) .*wgt (6,i);
Auto (name, react (i) ,time (i) , temp, rho (:,i) , sodll (:,i) , sod123 (:, ),sod150(:,i)
cre (:,i) , crdle (:,i) ,wgtt)
end
namel=sprintf S d',Ou folder name, iii);
fid=fopen (namel,
fprintf (fid,
for i=1:runs
sod(i)=sum(sodl50(:,i))+sum(sod123(:,i))+sum(sodlll(:,i));
fprintf(fid, .
,i, react (i) , ax (i) , dop (i) , sod (i) , cre (1, i) , crdle (1, i) )
end
fclose (' ll');
if iii > 1
load I
end
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Lo o il
De ExP
3/E) ' )
')
Par.react(iii,:)=react';
Par.ax(iii,:)=ax';
Par.dop(iii, :)=dop';
Par.sod(iii,:)=sod';
Par.cre (iii, :) =cre(1,:)';
Par.crdle(iii,:)=crdle(1,:)';
Par.wgt(iii,:)=wgtt';
save
end
wgttot(1,:)=wgt(1,:
sum (wgttot)
).*wgt(2,:).*wgt(3,:).*wgt(4,:).*wgt(5,:).*wgt(6,:);
end
X.J.C Auto.m
functio
xyz=auto(name,react,time,temprho,sodll,sod123,sodl5O,cre,crdle,wgt)
expansion=1 nt
runtime=500; r ot
ramptime=100+time;
fid=fopen (name,' w ');
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf(fid, '
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
I,
I);
I),
fprintf (fid, ' At
fprintf (fid, ***+*
fprintf(fid, T
fprintf (fid,*
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
ty: IfUm:
n ,temp (1)
f ' ,temp (2)
p f 't temp (3)
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) ;rho (1)
rho (2)
rho (3)
S n'react, time);
,
,
,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
sod=sum(sodl50
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
\An )-
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
(:))+sum(sodl23
\ntemp (4),
\ ',temp (5) ,
',temp (6) ,
(:))+sum(sodl
nsod);
wgt)
rho (4)
rho (5)
rho (6) ) ;
11l(:))
\ , cre (1) , crdle (1) ) ;
);,
)k A A A
J.s tu
I);
\,ramptime);
,runtime);
fprintf (fid, ')
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf(fid,'
fprintf (fid,
fprintf(fid,l
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
- I.
* I.
I (~71
* 2 *
k, A V
***** **** **** ****
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A * 7);
.'') ;
g~' p
I ) *Rt 'A 41 )l 4 ;, , -A i. Al -A , A Al- 1 k 4- It Ilk 4 " A. . . , -,k 4 , k ;, " .-, ;t: k - 'k. . "k -4 . -,
+ 4, 4. *+ -
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf(fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
I,
t)
1 *~*'.
) ;
-I
if expansion==1
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid, ' ***
fprintf (fid,
fprintffdid
fprint (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
x m\' ,cre (2));
O. i em f 04 1000J n' cre(1 );
*1
A :1);
.0 . on t r
',-crdle (2));
Snra 0 \n ,crdle (1));
A) ~A) ~*~A
I)
A *T
p1 00 \ ', -l*cre (2) , cre (1));
t v 82 \ crdle(2));
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*M :ax
Feel Tmp~n')
J:: , ad a x a
f printf (f id, '\n ) ;
fprintf (fid, **\nr');
-7 .6 e n
i \ ,-crdle (2)) ;
fprintf (fid, n ) ;
end
fprintf (fid,
A * A -4  4JA
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf(fid,
fprintf(fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
** 44,4,44
I);
(2
4,444,
44,44444444.444.44 ~4'~4
4 ~
>il k#Al~,#k% 4444)444444444,4)444
I r 2',
A A ~%) 4),~,) 4,4444) A4444444444.4,J.4.\).44; '4,)4,44-~~.4
4>7
I)
4,1);
K
f4,
I)
-.~ 1)
fprintf (fid,
printf (fid,
fprintf(fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid, 202
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf(fid, 2
fprintf (fid,
n. i
fprintf (fid,
+*44 *4,4 ** *4.+-44 +*k4 , -r, 4-
q i
A -x4v!4)1 
,> A A44'A>444A- 44)+* 4** *
) ;
) ; 4
42 4
9J
291
C
u
12.'
,time, react);
- ,react);
1)
n)
.4 1' 4 ,n
* .n 2
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fprintf (fid, *-------- -
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid, n )
fprintf (fidj n )
fprintf(fid, *A
fprintf (fid, * wi
fprintf (fid,*dein
fprint f (fid,*n*)
fprint f(fid,*n )
fprintf (fid, * *4tr
fprintf (fid, '3000
fprint f(fid, '*
fprintf (fid, '300
fprintf (fid,
fprintf(fid,
fprintf (fid, '* )
fprintf (fid, '
fprintf (fid, ' *'
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid, 4,
fprintf (fid, 4
fprintf(fid, '
fprintf(fid, 4 4
fprintf (fid, '
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid, '41
fprintf (fid,
fprintf(fid, 137"170
fprintf (fid,
f ri tf i , '3090
f ri tf (fid, 4*
fprintf (fid, '
fpritf fid0\n';'
')
mplif ed ' : pr. 7'
p"'id .1.
<7 1 2 4': .21<
. 4a, th4
''1 744
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~4)
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4 .
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fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fpr 4 (kfiA,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
k tl4.
fprintf (fid,
r t (1 ,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf (fid,
'**k
'4**
4,4.)
44.4)
I'd):
7'"))
7.44)
1.
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fprintf (fid,
f printf (f id,
fprintf (fid,
fprintf(fid,
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fprintf(fid,
fprintf (fid, *40
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fprintf (fid, *1
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d' , sodll (4) ) ;
n ,sodll (5));
n',sod123 (1)
sod123 (2)
sod123 (3)
sod123(4)
sod123 (5)
:P1',sod5O
nsodl50
,sodl50
', sodI50
n, sodl50
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
) ;
.-LI I
*1'4);0
-I
4 )
'4)
')
X.2 RELAP Automation
The RELAP Automation module consists of *.bat files which automate the running of
multiple RELAP simulations.
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.;
);
X.2.A Multi RELAP.bat
set relapdir= C:\r5\r3d236ie\relap
set mydir= %CD%
set rundir=C:\Users\Matt\Documents\Runs\runtape
set inputdir=C:\Users\Matt\Documents\RELAP\InputGen\importance\Inl
del %inputdir%\*.
copy %inputdir%\* .i %inputdir%\*.
for /F %%a IN ('dir /b %inputdir%\*.') do CALL run %%a
pause
X.2.B Run.bat
set inputfile=% 1
del %inputfile%.o
del %inputfile%.r
copy %rundir%\ABR10OOssM.r %inputfile%.r
cd %relapdir%
relap5 -i %inputdir%\%inputfile%.i -o %mydir%\%inputfile%.o -r %mydir%\%inputfile%.r -m
%rundir%\tpfna2> %mydir%\%inputfile%.out
cd %mydir%
X.3 RELAP Output Extraction
The RELAP Output extraction module removes the minor edits from the hundreds of
RELAP simulation and creates MATLAB arrays which can be used in post-processing.
X.3.A Multi.bat
REM This is the main file
SET INDEXFILE=list.l
del %INDEX_FILE%
REM del folderout.1
REM dir /B /AD * > folderout.1
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SET FOLDERFILE=folderout.1
SET HOMEDIR=%CD%
FOR /F %%A IN (%FOLDERFILE%) DO CALL makelist %%A
Pause
X.3.B Folder.bat
cd %1
set OUTPUTS=allouts.1
copy output.o output.1
del output.o
del %OUTPUTS%
dir /B *.o > %OUTPUTS%
FOR /F %%A IN (%OUTPUTS%) DO ECHO %CD%\%%A >> %HOME_DIR%/list.1
REM FOR /F %%A IN (%OUTPUTS%) DO ECHO %CD%\%%A >> %HOMEDIR%/list.1
cd..
X.3.C Output Process.m
numfiles=1;
c d
runcoutner=O;
for i=l:numfiles
left=numfiles-i;
list=sprintf ( .l)
ARRAY=sortdata(list,left);
[nn] = size(ARRAY,2);
start=runcoutner+l;
runcoutner=runcoutner+nn;
reactbin3 (start:runcoutner) =ARRAY;
end
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ARRAY=reactbin3;
save
clear
load T
pause
c d
Object-builder
X.3.D Sortdata.m
function [ARRAY] =sortdata (list, nn)
close l
fid = fopen(list,
i=0;
while feof(fid) == 0
i=i+l;
tline = fgetl(fi
if i==1
files=tline;
d);
files=strvcat(files,tline);
end
fclose (fid);
clear i
[m, n]=size (files);
I> V
fprintf(1, )1 ;
fprintf (1,'
fprintf (1, '
for i=l:m
fprintf (1,'
end
fprintf (1,
fprintf (1,
fprintf (1, n
clear
time=0;
for i=l:m
tic;
ARRAY (i).VALUE=reader(files(i,:));
time=time+toc;
ave time=time/i;
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1 7 4; , :. , 1 , ,, T
');
-, 1-1 0 - ' ",T I
u n ,files (i, :
left=(m-i)* (nn+l);
time remaining=(left)*avetime;
fprintf (1, ' d Il
,left, files (i, :),time remaining/60);
end
save
plotter
X.3.E Reader.m
function apend - reader (filename)
outputs=15;
literal='M
fid = fopen(filename,
y = 0;
while feof (fid) == 0
tline = fgetl(fid);
matches = findstr(tline, literal);
num = length(matches);
if num > 0
y = y + num;
for i=l:4
skip=fgets (fid)
e nd
first=fscanf(fid,' ',[10,50]);
if size (first,2)==50
n=5;
if first(1,50)==1
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AuL ee o i
.. I~ e
lu REtAP MINO
firs
n=4;
en t d
else
n=4;
first
end
t(:,50)=[];
:,size (first,2))=[];
for i=l:n
skip=fgetl(fid);
en d
second=fscanf (fid,'
if y==1
apendl=first;
apend2=second;
P
[outputs±2-10, 5 01
apend1=cat(2,apendl,first);
apend2=cat(2,apend2,second);
end
end
end
apend2(1,:)=[];
apend=cat(1,apendl,apend2);
fclose (fid);
X.3.F Plotter.m
11 = size (ARRAY,2);
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figure (1)
for j=l:ll
time=ARRAY(j).VALUE(1,:);
pctemp=ARRAY(j).VALUE(10,:)-273.15;
plot(time,pctemp)
if j ~ 11
hold
else
hold
e nd
end
title ('
xlabel ('
ylabel (
1) awa
I )
figure (2)
for j=l:ll
time=ARRAY(j).VALUE(1,:);
potemp=ARRAY(j).VALUE(6,:)-273.15;
plot(time,potemp)
if j ~ 11
hold
else
hold o__
end
title(
xlabel ( '
ylabel( i
figure (3)
for j=l:ll
time=ARRAY(j).VALUE(1,:);
pftemp=ARRAY(j).VALUE(11,:)-273.15;
plot(time,pftemp)
if j ~ 11
hold
else
hold
end
end
e 1s im ')
a m~e ( ^o ) ' )
title ( k
xlabel ('Tie (
ylabel ('Pa ul
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)')
figure (4)
for j=l:ll
time=ARRAY(j).VALUE(1,:);
pow=ARRAY(j).VALUE(8,:)/le7;
plot (time,pow)
if j ~ 11
hold
else
hold
end
end
title (' i ulEu sim
xlabel('Te )
ylabel('T(
figure (5)
for j=l:ll
time=ARRAY(j).VALUE(1,:);
react=ARRAY(j).VALUE(16,:);
plot(time,react)
if j - 11
hold
else
hold It
end
end
title(' t 
xlabel('T n (K)
ylabel ('
X.4 Cladding Failure Calculation
The Cladding Failure Calculation Module takes the arrays from the Output Extraction
module and calculates Fractional Cladding Damage for each simulation, and determines the total
weight of failed simulations, where failure is defined as creep rupture of the cladding, local
boiling in the hot channel, or bulk sodium boiling.
X.4.A Object Builder.m
mrd=l;
n=size (ARRAY,2);
fprintf (1, ' 1d ',n)
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for k=l:mrd
for i=l:n
[r,h, f,ftime, f2]=dimension (ARRAY (i) .VALUE (1,:),
(ARRAY(i).VALUE(10,:)));
[l,m]=size (ARRAY(i).VALUE(1,:));
if k==1
ARRAY(i).DEFORM=zeros(mrd,m);
ARRAY(i).DAMAGE=zeros(m,mrd);
ARRAY(i).DEFORM(1,:)=r;
ARRAY(i).DEFORM(2,:) =h;
end
ARRAY(i).DEFORM(1,:)=r;
ARRAY(i).DEFORM(2,:)=h;
ARRAY(i).DAMAGE(:,k)=f';
ARRAY(i).FRAC DAMAGE(k)=f2;
ARRAY(i).FTIME(k)=ftime;
if mod(i,10)==0
fprintf (1, ' J ', i)
end
end
fprint f (1,
save
jjj =567;
ll=n;
damageplotter
X.4.B Creep Failure.m
function [r,h,f,ftime, f2]=creep failure metal fuel(time,pctemp)
me
P=14.3;
E=HT9_E(510+273.15);
v=.7; S~l~ nRt Io
BU=15;
SSD=(1+BU)^-0.544669;
('I
228
c,, he
hi=.056;
ri=.755/2-hi/2;
et=P*ri/(2*E*hi)* (2-v);
ez=P*ri/(2*E*hi)* (1-2*v);
dr=ri*et;
r(1,:)=ri+dr;
dh=-hi* (1-1/((1+et)* (1+ez)));
h (1, : )=hi+dh;
[m,n] = size(time);
[mm,nn] = size(pctemp);
testm=mm-m;
testn=nn-n;
it (testm+testn)~=0
fprintf (1, ' T : i In
end
f=ones (nn, 1) *0.0006;
dhe=0;
dre=0;
mrd=0;
for i=l:(nn-1)
dt=time (i+1)-time(i);
dtemp=pctemp(i+1)-pctemp(i);
if dt~-0
if i<nn
det=D5_creep(dt ,pctemp (i) , r (i, 1) ,h (i, 1), P) ;
et=et+det;
dh=-hi* (1-1/((1+et)* (1+ez)));
if pctemp(i)>923
hdot=le-4*exp(22.847-27624/pctemp(i));
dhe=dhe-hdot*dt;
dre=dre+hdot*dt/2;
end
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E e iC
r(i+1,1)=ri*(1+et)+dre; d (
h (i+1, 1)=hi+dh+dhe;
tf(1)=D5_failure time(dt,dtemp,pctemp(i),r(i+1,1),h(i+1,1),P);
f (i+l, 1)=f (i, 1)+dt/ (tf (1) *SS D);
end
else
f (i+1, 1) =f (i, 1);
r(i+1,1)=r(i,1);
h (i+1,1)=h(i,1)
end
if ((f(i+l)>1.0)
mrd=1;
&& (mrd<0.5))
ftime=time(i+1);
end
end
f2 (1)=f(nn,1);
if f2<1.O
ftime=O;
en d
function E=HT9 E (T) iasti:ily f HT
E=2.12e11*(1.144-4.856e-4*T); )
functior [sige, sigt]=stress (r, h, P)
sigt=P*r/h;
sige=(1.5/2)A.5*sigt; E
end
function tf=D5_failure time(dt,dtemp,temp,r,h,P)
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a. 11.3-4
[sige,sigt =stress(r,h,P);
C=-(0.5* (1+tanh((sige-200)/50)))*(0.75* (1+tanh((dtemp/dt-58)/17)));
B=12/ (1.5+.5*tanh( ( (sige-200)/50)));
A=-34.8+tanh((sige-200)/50)+C;
theata=exp (A+B*log (log (730/sige) )) ;
tf=theata*exp(36739/temp);
if isnan(tf(1)) ==1
sprintf(': r
end
end
function det=D5_creep(dt,pctemp,r,h,P)
[sige,sigt]=stress(r,h,P);
edot oos=5.1966e10;
sigso=3. 9593e-3*HI'9 E (pctemp);
QoverR=367 39;
creeprate=edot oos* (sige/(sigso*1e-6))^2.263*exp(-QoverR/pctemp);
det=dt*creeprate/sige*3/4*sigt;
end
X.4.C Damage Plotter.m
n=size (ARRAY, 2)
clear f
figure(jjj)
for j= :n
time=ARRAY(j).VALUE(1,:);
f=ARRAY(j).DAMAGE;
% loglog(time,f(:,1),time,f(:,2));
for k=l:mrd
subplot(1,mrd,k)
loglog(time,f(:,k)); grid on
loglog(time,ones(size (time)),'
if j - 11
hold on
else
hold off
end
end
end
grid on
r','LineWidth',1);
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% axis([l,max(ARRAY(l).VALUE(1,:)),le-4,10])
% title('Failure Fractions')
% xlabel('Time (s)')
% ylabel('Cumulative Clad Damage Fraction')
for k=l:mrd
subplot (1,mrd, k)
% tite=sprintf('Clad Damage Fraction for %d\oC \n Core Outlet
Temperature' ,COT(k) +510);
tite=sprintf('%d oC Core\nOutlet Tempeature',COT(k)+510);
axis([l,max(ARRAY(1).VALUE(1,:)),1e-4,10])
title (tite)
xlabel('Time (s)')
ylabel('Cumulative Damage Fraction')
end
%% Do I fail?
clear fail s wieght
fail=zeros(n,3*mrd+l);
for k=l:mrd
for i=l:n
if max(ARRAY(i).DAMAGE(:,k))>=1.0
fail (i, k) =l;
else
fail(i,k)=0;
end
end
end
%% Do I Boil?
for k=l:mrd
for i=l:n
if min(ARRAY(i).VALUE(17,:)-(ARRAY(i).VALUE(7,:)-273+COT(k)))<=0
fail (i, k+mrd) =1;
else
fail (i, k+mrd) =0;
end
end
end
%% Do I Boil?
for k=l:mrd
for i=l:n
if min(ARRAY(i).VALUE(17,:)+273-(ARRAY(i).VALUE(6,:)+COT(k)))<=0
fail(i,k+2*mrd)=1;
else
fail (i, k+2*mrd) =0;
end
end
end
%% Arrange failure weights
load UTOPLOF PAR
[x, y]=size (Par.wgt);
for i=l:x
for j=l:y
fail(j+(i-l)*y,3*mrd+1)=Par.wgt(i,j); % load weights
232
fail(j+ (i-1)*y,3*mrd+2)=i;
end
end
[m,n]=size(fail);
wieght=zeros(m,n-1);
s=zeros(1,n-1);
max=sum(fail(:,n));
for i=l: (n-1)
wieght(:,i)=fail(:,i).*fail(:,n);
% s(i)=sum(wieght(:,i));
s(i)=sum(wieght(:,i))*m/max;
end
X.4.D Failure Prob.m
clear
n=le4;
a (1)=26. 2;
a(2)=1;
b=350;
c=1;
x=logspace(-8,0,n);
yl=betapdf(x,a(1),b-a(1));
figure (201)
loglog (x, yl
xlabel ('
ylabel
legend
axis ( [le-8 1 le-3 le8])
X: _
zl=betainc(x,a(l),b);
figure (202)
semilogx (x, zl)
xlabel ( 1 7
ylabel(' Pb ii
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' ( ; 2d ')
% % folder number
Ja u 1,r
legend(
axis([le-8 1
grid
.9 1])
xlave=a(1)/b*c
x195=betainv(.95,a(1),b-a(1))*c
'ii
e -n I
-E-D
t 1
77 f-I -- -
11
7 . ,. Si 7
- 77777 7 7 77
7,7.
234
XI APPENDIX D - EUTECTIC MODEL UNCERTAINTY CODES (MUTT)
MUTT is a model uncertainty code developed to create uncertainty distributions around
the predictive rate eutectic formation correlations.
XI.1 Main.m
1 2*~ 1 1
close
clear
names(1) .file= e1;
names(2).file=
names (3) .file='.i:,order-';
n ame s (4) . f iIe=' .-deU'
tic;
for iii=l :4
filedata=strcat (names (iii) . file,
load(names(iii).file)
sampleevidence
save (filedata, ,
d t , ' i d )
load (filedata)
double-integral
save (filedata,'', YI'Z,'
_jI
1 -,2 ,
I 2,1 I I
-, -. ,,-, /
I I , 2
r per
validate
end
time= (toc) /60;
fprintf (1, *
compile
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I /
In1 ia ', time)
mea,,
XI.2 Sample Evidence.m
Niter=2e5; o a a
Npar=3;
[N,m]=size(data);m
bmin=-4;
bmax=2;
smax=2.5;
b0=rand* (bmax-bmin) +bmin;
s0=rand*smax;
pi0=1;lie
for j=l:N
pi0=pi0*lognpdf(data(j),b0,sO);
Chain=zeros(Niter,Npar);
Chain(1,:)=[bO,sO,piO];
for i=2:Niter
pi0=1; : i
bO=rand* (bmax-bmin) +bmin;
s0=rand*smax;
for j=l:N i
pi0=pio*lognpdf(data(j),bO
end oie
Chain(i,:)=[bO,sO,piO];
end ri e ote
Chain(:,3)=Chain(:,3) ./sum(Chain(:,3));
x=Chain (: , 1);
y=Chain (:,2);
z=Chain (:,3);
density=500;
xlin linspace (bmin,bmax,density);
ylin linspace(le-6,nsmax,density);
[X,Y] - meshgrid(xlin,ylin);
Z = griddata (x, y, z, X, Y,' i );
U ~ b§
,so)
ii
J ~ itrola
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uniL rmds
dx=abs (xlin (2) -xlin (1));
dy=abs (ylin (2) -ylin (1));
xxx=O;
for i=l:density
for j=l:density j b l
iff isnan(Z(i,j))==1
Z (i, j)=le--300;
xxx=xxx+Z (i, j) *dx*dy;
elseif Z(i,j)<=0C
Z (i, j )=le-300;
xxx=xxx+Z(i, j)*dx*dy;
else
xxx=xxx+Z (i, j) *dx*dy;
end
end ev -
end p
Z=Z/xxx;
[density, n] =size (X)
Marg_b=zeros(density,1);
Margs=zeros(density,1);
for i=l:density
for j=l:density
Marg b(i)=Marg b(i)
end g
end
+Z (ji)*dy;
for i=l:density
for j=l:density ----
Marg s(i)=Marg s(i)+Z(ij)*dx;
en ninert de
end ed e- -
figure (1)
mesh(X,Y,Z);
axis tL ; hold on
xlabel(,
zabel ( ' E
grid
figure (15)
plot3 (x, y,
xlabel (' i-
ylabel('S
zlabel (' P.
z ,
* )
, K (s ) )
f igure (3)
subplot (2, 1, 1)
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.
- -- - - - - - --- - - - -
U ke lih dbeocm
limit (AN
-- - - --- -- -
em ' )
plot(X(1,:),Marg b)
xla e ( ' b l a I a o , (o
ylabelU( ' mi
subplot (2, 1, 2)
plot(Y(:,l),Marg s)
ylabel ( 'P o o\ m
XI.3 Double Integral.m
r mesh=[1000,500];
rtrans=4;
rmax=35;
ratio=cat (2, linspace (le-6, rtrans, r mesh (1)),
linspace (rtrans+ (rmax-rtrans) /(r mesh (2) ),rmax, r_mesh (2)));
dr(1)=ratio(2)-ratio(1);
dr (2)=ratio (sum (r mesh))-ratio(sum(r mesh)-1);
r pdf =zeros (sum (rmesh) , 1)';
[density,n]=size(X);
pdf=zeros(sum(r mesh),density)';
c_pdf=zeros(sum(r mesh),density)';
tic
for i=l: (density)
for j=l: (density)
r-pdf=r pdf+lognpdf(ratio,X(1,i),Y(j,
end
if mod(i,25)==0
end
i f
fprintf (1,
(mod (i,200)==0
fprintf (1,
1))*Z (j, i)
',i/density*100)
end
end n
tot=O; ine
for i=1:2 in ta-
if i==1 i
for k=l:r mesh(i) bei. L a
tot=tot+rpdf (k) *dr (i);
end a
else
for k=(rmesh(i-1)+l):sum(rmesh)
tot=tot+rpdf (k) *dr (i);
---- ------- ----
begin inteCaio
end
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- -ourse mest
ende!
r_pdf=r pdf/tot; n>aiz.
r cdf=zeros(sum(r_ mesh),1); n i. .7 i
for i=1:2 i s t ---------------------
if i==1 .i i?
for k=2:r mesh(i) A i o
r cdf(k)=r cdf(k-1)+r pdf(k)*dr(i);
end end negratin..... ... ...im-
else m m b r
for k= (rmesh (i-1)+1) :sum (rmesh) eo t ga
r cdf(k)=r cdf(k-1)+r pdf(k)*dr(i);
end
e n d ...- - . .. .... .... . . .. .. .. . .. ... . .. ....... . -
r per(l)=interpl(r cdf,ratio,0.05);
r per(2)=interpl(rcdf,ratio,0.5);
r per(3)=sum(r pdf(1:r mesh(1)).*ra
sum(r pdf((r mesh(l)+1):sum(r mesh)
r per(4)=interpl(r cdf,ratio,O.95) ;
figure (5)
subplot (3, 1, 1)
plot(X(1,:),Marg b)
xlabel(
subplot (3,1,2)
plot(Y(:,1),Marg s)
x 1a b e 1 p:
ylabel ( '
subplot (3, 1, 3)
hll = line(ratio,r pdf, 'o
axl = gca;
set (ax1, X o ', ' ,
xlabel(' a
ax2 = axes( ,get(axl,
axis([O,max(ratio),0,1])
h12 = line(ratio,rcdf,I 'kI
ylabel( f P, \pi (Fd )
(1:r mesh(1))*dr(1))+...
ratio((r mesh(1)+1):sum(r mesh))*dr(2))
l ,ax2);
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XI4 Validate.m
[N,m]=size(data);
cumdata=zeros(2*N,1); : a L
xx=zeros(2*N,1); Tw a
cumdata (1) =0;
xx (1)=;
cumdata (2) =0;
xx (2)=data (1) ;
for i=3:(2*N+1)
if mod(i,2) == 0
cumdata(i)=cumdata(i-1);
xx (i) =data ((i) /2)
else
cumdata(i)=cumdata(i-1)+data((i-1)/2);
xx(i)=data((i-l)/2);
end
cumdata=cumdata/max(cumdata);
xx=sort (xx);
figure (6)
plot(xx,cumdata, ratio,r_
xlabel ( i a 1-
ylabel(
cdf)
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XII APPENDIX E - CALCULATION OF PEAK CLADDING TEMPERATURES USING THE
HORIZONTAL METHOD
Appendix D overviews the calculations of the mid-wall and peak cladding temperatures
using the horizontal semi-statistical approach for hot channel factors. The calculations will first
be performed for oxide fuel, and then for metal fuel.
XII. I Oxide Cladding Temperatures (16)
First, the total
as shown in Table 40.
direct hot channel factor is determined for the coolant, film, and cladding,
Table 40 - Oxide Fuel Direct Hot Channel Factors
Power Level
Inlet Flow
Flow Dist.
CaIc.
Clad. Circ. T
Var.
Pellet-Clad
Ecc.
Physics
Control Rod
ZPPR
Product
HCF for Coolant
Temperature Rise
1.0
1.02
1.03
1.0
1.0
1.02
1.02
1.0
1.093
HCF for Film
Temperature Rise
1.0
1.006
1.0
2.1
1.14
1.1
1.02
1.0
2.702
HCF for Cladding
Temperature Rise
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.84
1.14
1.1
1.02
1.0
1.074
Then, using temperature rises determined from the direct hot channel factors, the
statistical hot channel factors are determined by adding each row in Table 41 and then combining
each row in a root-mean-square method to determine the total statistical temperature rise.
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Table 41- Oxide Fuel 3Y Statistical Hot Channel Factors
Statistical (3a) Inlet
T ("F)
Inlet flow
maldistribution
Wire wrap orientation
Subchannel flow area
Film heat transfer
coefficient
Cladding thickness and
conductivity
Coolant properties
Flow distribution
calculational
uncertainty
(calibration)
Nuclear Data
Criticality
Coolant
AT (*F)
27.1
Film
AT ("F)
Cladding
MW AT ("F)
0.5
4.6
8.7
3.9
2.6
0.0
7.8
26.6
32.1
4.6
0.2
2.3
0.3
1.1
0.2
Overall 3o=
Total
3omw ("F)
27.6
4.6
8.7
3.9
8.2
0
7.8
26.8
35.5
5.1
26.4
67.2
This yields the following temperature rises, shown in Table 42, for the nominal, direct,
and 2a cases, assuming the inlet temperature is 356"C, which corresponds to an averaged core
outlet temperature of 5 10 C.
Table 42 - Oxide Fuel Hot Channel Factor Temperature Rises
(0C) Coolant AT (*C) Film AT (*C) Cladding MW AT (*C) Cladding MW T ("C)
Direct 356 195.7 5.4 5.0 562.1
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Inlet T
XI.2 Metal Cladding Temperatures (15)
First, the total direct hot channel factor is determined for the coolant, film, and cladding,
as shown in Table 43.
Table 43 - Metal Fuel Direct Hot Channel Factors
Power Level
Inlet Flow
Flow Dist.
Calc.
Clad. Circ. T
Var.
Pellet-Clad
Ecc.
Physics
Control Rod
ZPPR
Product
HCF for Coolant
Temperature Rise
1.0
1.02
1.03
1.0
1.0
1.02
1.02
1.0
1.093
HCF for Film
Temperature Rise
1.0
1.006
1.0
2.1
1.0
1.1
1.02
1.0
2.370
HCF for Cladding
Temperature Rise
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.84
1
1.02
1.0
0.942
Then, using temperature rises determined from the direct hot channel factors, the
statistical hot channel factors are determined by adding each row in Table 44 and then combining
each row in a root-mean-square method to determine the total statistical temperature rise.
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Table 44- Metal Fuel 3cy Statistical Hot Channel Factors
Statistical (3a) Inlet
T (*F)
Coolant
AT (*F)
Film
AT ("F)
Cladding
MW AT (*F)
Inlet flow
maldistribution
Wire wrap orientation
Subchannel flow area
Film heat transfer
coefficient
Pellet-cladding
eccentricity
Cladding thickness and
conductivity
Coolant properties
Flow distribution
calculational
uncertainty
(calibration)
Nuclear Data
Criticality
Overall 3a=
27.1 0.5 27.6
4.6
8.7
3.9
0.0
4.6
8.7
3.9
0.0
0.0
7.8
26.6
32.1
4.6
23.9
27.5
0.2
2.3
0.3
1.1
0.2
0.0
0.0
7.8
26.8
35.5
5.1
26.4
27.5
This yields the following temperature rises, shown in Table 45, for the nominal, direct,
and 3ca cases, assuming the inlet temperature is 356"C, which corresponds to an averaged core
outlet temperature of 5 10 C.
Table 45- Metal Fuel Hot Channel Factor Temperature Rises
(0C) Coolant AT (*C) Film AT (*C) Cladding MW AT
179 2 4.7
195.7 4.7 4.4
(*C) Cladding MW T (*C)
541.7
560.8
605.6
244
Total
3 amw ("F)
Nominal
Direct
2cy
Inlet T
35E
35E
